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INTRODUCTION AND  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The research agenda 
When our team began its research in the 
year 2000, we decided to focus on what we 
called “crisis states” for two reasons. We 
wanted to investigate the processes that led 
states to collapse into violence and war or to 
recover from episodes of extreme violence 
– that is, “states in crisis” – and we wanted 
to examine how communities at the local 
and national level in poor countries coped 
with severe internal and external shocks – 
or “conditions of crisis” – and managed to 
avoid violence. A “crisis”, we argued, is a 
situation where the political, economic or 
social system is confronted with challenges 
with which reigning institutions (or rule 
systems) are potentially unable to cope. In 
other words, crisis is a condition of disruption 
severe enough to threaten the continued 
existence of established systems. In this paper, 
we take up the findings of our second phase 
of research from 2005 to 2010.
By the time we began the research 
international attention was focused 
increasingly on what were becoming 
known as “fragile states”, which were 
vaguely defined but generally understood 
to be poor developing countries, which 
either had experienced violence and 
warfare or were in danger of collapsing 
into violence (Di John 2008). We set out 
to answer two broad questions. First, why 
and how, under the conditions of late 
development, are some fragile states able 
to respond effectively to contestation 
while others collapse and/or experience 
large-scale violence? Second, what are the 
factors that contribute to and impede state 
reconstruction in post-war periods?
We anchored the research programme 
in multidisciplinary development studies, 
strongly influenced by historical political 
economy and were committed to bringing 
together the insights that could be derived 
from both qualitative comparative analysis 
of a small number of cases and quantitative 
cross-national research. We aimed to develop 
a conceptual framework that could be applied 
to any state and determine whether trends 
pointed toward what we then formulated as 
state collapse or survival, but later understood 
as trends towards state fragility, state resilience 
or accelerated development. This was an 
important conceptual innovation, which 
allowed us to develop our political economy 
approach and interact with evolving debates 
in the policy community. The programme 
was divided into three overlapping teams: 
one undertaking comparative country-level 
research; another comparative research on 
cities; and a smaller third effort devoted to 
looking at regional and global dimensions 
of conflict. 
The core case studies adopted at the 
national level (Afghanistan, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Rwanda, 
Colombia, the Philippines, Tanzania and 
Zambia) were chosen partly with partners 
in mind, but primarily to compare countries 
with markedly different experiences of war, 
state collapse and state reconstruction – with 
the inclusion of two control cases that despite 
deeply rooted poverty had not experienced 
war or state collapse. A secondary group 
of countries evolved with time, including 
Mozambique, Tajikistan and Pakistan. 
The fifteen city case studies (Ahmedabad, 
Arua, Bogota, Dar-es-Salaam, Goma, Gulu, 
Kabul, Kampala, Karachi, Kigali, Kinshasa, 
Managua, Maputo, Medellin, Quetta) were 
chosen in part on the basis of our choice of 
country cases and the partners involved, but 
primarily to explore a range of cities based on 
their scale, experience of conflict and degree 
of geographical and economic integration 
with their central states. The smaller third 
stream of research at the regional level 
focused primarily on a comparative study 
of the role of twelve regional organisations 
in processes of peace making and security, 
but additionally involved research on security-
sector reform and peace mediation.
In studying processes of violence and 
war we do not subscribe to the view that 
conflict or violence is “development in 
reverse”. We reject the use of the term “post-
conflict”, because conflict is ubiquitous 
and a normal condition in human society, 
often driving development in progressive 
directions. We have sought to understand 
the conditions, actions and organisational 
processes that have allowed conflict to be 
managed peacefully, and those that have 
led instead to violence. Neither do we 
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conclude that development will necessarily 
be a route out of violence, since the 
processes involved in development can 
be highly conflictual and at times violence 
can be constitutive of state formation and 
development (Cramer 2006: 199-244). In 
the countries we studied, developmental 
processes were unleashed by violent 
challenges to existing state authorities: for 
instance in Uganda, when Museveni and 
his National Resistance Movement fought 
its way to power in 1986; and in Rwanda, 
where the Rwandan Patriotic Front waged 
a war to bring an end to an exclusionary 
regime that had committed genocide in 
its efforts to stay in power. 
However, “human development depends 
on investing in the future, whether it is in 
education, infrastructure or productive assets” 
(Beall and Fox 2011) and where violence is 
endemic it creates profound uncertainty and 
tends to inhibit investment and development 
more generally (Bates 2001). Recent cross-
country quantitative research has identified 
that outbreaks of violence are heavily correlated 
with the incidence of poverty where political 
regimes “are paralysed or undermined by 
elite divisions” (Goldstone et al. 2010). In our 
cross-country quantitative research we have 
found that the poorest developing countries 
are sharply differentiated between those that 
have experienced violence and war and those 
that have managed to avoid it (Gutiérrez et 
al. 2011). 
We have argued that “fragile states” can 
be best understood as countries particularly 
vulnerable to outbreaks of large-scale 
violence, and we have sought to understand 
what has allowed some states to avoid violence 
and achieve significant periods of “resilience” 
even in conditions of low growth and extreme 
poverty. In our research we have identified 
the central role played by elite bargains 
embedded in wider political settlements 
in determining trajectories of violence and 
change in developing countries, a finding 
that is supported by recent econometric 
evidence that identifies regime type and 
political institutions as central to patterns 
of violence and political order (Goldstone 
et al. 2010). Our findings also sit well with 
those of Douglass North and his colleagues 
who have argued that for most of human 
history states have presided over “limited 
access orders”, guaranteeing privileged access 
to sources of income and political decision 
making to elites as a means for managing 
violence (North et al. 2007, 2009).
In this paper we present the main findings 
of our research, which we believe make a 
significant contribution to wider scholarship 
on the role of the state and development, the 
study of violence and war, the study of urban 
change and the use of measurement tools to 
understand social and political processes. 
We believe the results of this research have 
major implications for current policy debates, 
design and implementation in the countries 
of the developing world in general and in 
what we have defined as both “fragile” and 
“resilient” states. By way of introduction we 
summarise here the main findings and their 
policy implications.
1 Seeing the state as a political 
settlement: elite bargains and  
social mobilisation
The dominant position in the policy 
community when addressing the condition of 
a state, or public authority, in the developing 
world is based on the proposition that “good 
governance”, defined as liberal democratic 
and free market institutions, is the source 
not only of a state’s ability to preside over 
peace and stability, but also over growth and 
development. These are generally assessed by 
the formal rules adopted by a state and the 
policies articulated and implemented. Our 
research suggests that a better understanding 
of the possibilities of progressive institutional 
change and policy reform can be achieved 
by seeing the state as a political settlement 
embodying a set of power relations. 
Policy implications
1. The “design of institutions” (the 
rules and norms that govern behaviour), 
particularly formal state institutions, does 
not determine either political or economic 
outcomes. Democratic institutions in one 
state may be associated with violent conflict 
and economic stagnation, while in another 
they may be related to peaceful social relations 
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6. Incorporating an analysis of political 
settlements can take the work done by 
DFID and others on understanding “the 
drivers of change” in the developing 
countries a step further. This lens allows 
an analysis of the contending interests that 
exist within any state, which constrain and 
facilitate institutional and developmental 
change. It provides a framework to analyse 
how the state is linked to society and what 
lies behind the formal representation of 
politics in a state.
7. To undertake development-assistance 
programmes without understanding the 
political settlement on which a state rests 
can lead to unintended consequences 
of all sorts. Not only does the political 
settlement set the constraints for what can 
and cannot be accomplished with foreign 
assistance, but foreign assistance itself can 
have an impact on the political settlement.
2 Distinguishing state fragility 
and resilience
There is a distinction among the poorest 
developing countries, between those that 
experience a condition of fragility – or a real 
danger of state breakdown and internecine 
violence – and poor countries where the 
state has achieved considerable resilience, 
or peace, even when economic development 
has been elusive. Both fragile and resilient 
states among the poorest countries are also 
distinct from states presiding over accelerated 
development. Not understanding these 
distinctions renders the idea of state fragility 
meaningless and can lead to serious problems 
in international interventions.
It is impossible to understand patterns 
of state fragility and resilience by looking 
only at the national state. In practice, the 
architecture of state authority in every 
society is a complex network of public 
organisations and institutions. Within this 
network, towns and cities serve as critical 
spaces of state formation, consolidation, 
transformation and erosion. Cities are 
particularly significant sub-national units of 
analysis and intervention in “fragile” states.
and economic growth. It is the underlying 
political settlement that determines political 
and developmental outcomes.
2. Understanding the state as a 
political settlement places the goal of 
democratisation in a new light. The insight 
that every state is based on a historically 
specific political settlement provides a route to 
understanding why very similar sets of formal 
institutions – like democratic rules, or rules 
governing macroeconomic management or 
trade liberalisation, or industrial policy – can 
have extremely divergent outcomes.
3. Focusing on the political settlement 
directs attention to the crucial role of 
elites in securing stability in a state, which 
should lead international actors to be 
concerned about the incentives elites face 
to play by the rules of a state. A uniform 
approach to opposing rent seeking may 
provoke instability and violence, and rent 
allocation or special privileges allocated to 
elites may be central to the maintenance of 
peace and state-building processes. 
4. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion are 
central to the stability and resilience of 
political settlements, but important more 
in terms of outcomes than the formal 
institutional arrangements governing 
access to state power. If democratic rules 
are likely to lead to significant exclusion 
of either powerful elites, or important 
regional, ethnic, language or religious 
groups, then they may be inferior to forms 
of power sharing.
5. Support for reforms that promote the 
interest of non-elite social groups must 
be determined by the extent to which 
such groups have developed their own 
organisations capable of articulating 
such reforms and engaging in the 
political contests necessary to enact 
them. International actors need to be able 
to identify organised social constituencies 
for major political reforms if external 
support for such reforms is not only to be 
effective, but also avoid disrupting political 
systems in unintended ways.
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Policy implications
1. Policy practice directed towards “fragile 
states” has been confounded by a failure 
to make clear what distinguishes the 
particular problem of “fragility” from 
general problems facing all developing 
countries. Our definition of state fragility 
directs attention to factors that are most 
likely to provoke violence and lead towards 
state collapse: the lack of a basic legitimate 
monopoly over the means of large-scale 
violence, the absence of control over taxation, 
the failure of state organisations to operate 
in significant territories of the country and 
the existence of rival rule systems that take 
precedence over the state’s rules.
2. There is clearly a category of “resilient 
states” among the least developed countries, 
which has not been given due recognition 
in theory or policy practice. States that have 
achieved and maintained peace over time, 
even when they have presided over economic 
stagnation, have been able to consolidate 
national identity, institutions of citizenship, 
and inter-community communication in 
ways that can insulate them against both 
external crises and the disruptive and 
violence-provoking characteristics of future 
economic development.
3. Analysis and policy discussion around 
fragile states has concentrated almost 
entirely on the “central state”, failing 
to see the particular place of cities in 
state formation historically and the 
contemporary importance of growing 
cities as key sites of state building and state 
erosion. The concentration of high-value 
economic activity within the cities of fragile 
states renders them central to state-building 
processes. Elites capable of challenging the 
bargains on which political settlements rest 
are often located in cities, and growing civic 
conflict and violence threatens to undermine 
state consolidation.
4. Consolidating basic security needs to 
be seen as a precondition for not only 
more elaborate programmes of security-
sector reform, but also for a wide set of 
governance reforms, from implementing 
competitive elections to carrying out 
programmes of decentralisation and 
devolution. Where the state’s own security 
forces are either incapable of defeating non-
state armed challengers or where the state 
cannot maintain power without unleashing 
violence on its population, priority must be 
given to the establishment of a unified chain 
of command, an end to all abusive practices 
against citizens, and ensuring that officers 
and enlisted personnel are paid and have a 
basic capacity to provide protection to elites 
and non-elites within the state’s territory.
5. Taxation is a key indicator for measuring 
state performance and assessing the extent 
of fragility or resilience of a state. A state’s 
taxation capacity can provide an objective 
means to assess the power, authority and 
legitimacy the state possesses to mobilise 
resources and the degree to which it 
monopolises tax collection. The level, 
diversity and manner of collection of taxes 
all provide indications of a state’s position on 
the fragility to resilience spectrum.
6. Assessing the reach of a state’s 
organisations into its significant territory 
is a crucial indicator of a state’s resilience 
or fragility. When a state’s authority 
does not reach important sites of human 
settlement, economic resource mobilisation 
or areas bordering on neighbouring zones 
of conflict, this can be considered a major 
indication of state fragility. Programmes 
that aim to decentralise or devolve power in 
areas where the state is hardly present can 
aggravate fragility, while programmes that 
promote economic and social integration 
of the state’s territory, even if economically 
“inefficient”, may be important to establishing 
state resilience.
7. The extent to which the state’s 
institutions, or rules, trump non-state 
institutional systems, whether anchored 
among regional, ethnic, traditional, 
religious or warlord actors in rural or urban 
areas, is a key indicator of state fragility 
or resilience. Where non-state institutions 
are not subsumed within the state’s own rule 
system, they can act as important sources 
A state’s taxation 
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of legitimacy to those who mount violent 
challenges to the state. Programmes designed 
to promote participation and tap the 
resources of non-state organisations must be 
cognisant of this dimension of state fragility or 
they may potentially contribute to provoking 
or aggravating violent conflict.
8. Dominant approaches to measuring 
state performance, state fragility and state 
failure are poor guides to analysis and 
policy making. The advances made by the 
Crisis States Research Centre offer the basis 
for beginning to deal with the most important 
problems of ambiguity and aggregation, 
and to present a more useful database of 
performance indicators and a more powerful 
set of policy-relevant analytical tools.
3 Political organisations  
and trajectories of fragility  
and resilience
Political organisations shape the ways 
elites relate to each other. They shape the 
relations between elites and their social 
constituencies, and the fundamental 
characteristics of the political settlement 
(the institutions and organisations of the 
state):  most importantly, the powers and 
the limitation of powers over executive 
authority at central and sub-national levels 
of the state. State resilience is most likely 
achieved when the political organisation(s) 
that control the state: (1) mobilise their 
social base in ways that accommodate the 
demands of a sustainable elite coalition 
without pursuing violent repression 
of non-elites; (2) establish executive 
authority within the state with the power 
and resources to discipline defectors 
and reward those who play by state rules; 
and (3) establish the executive authority 
independent of the particular individual(s) 
who occupy high office and subject it to 
checks against the abuse of its power.
Policy implications
1. Executive authority within the state is 
crucial to determining the inclusiveness 
and stability of elite bargains and the 
wider political settlement. Political 
organisations determine whether the 
executive authority has the power to 
articulate and enforce both positive 
incentives for elites to play by state rules 
and negative incentives that make it costly 
for elites to exit. Crucially, in establishing 
executive power within the state, political 
organisations play the central role in 
establishing checks against the abuse of 
power by the executive. Efforts to influence 
patterns of governance need to focus on 
how any reform or policy package may 
affect or be affected by the executive 
authority of the state.
2. Understanding the particularities of 
political organisation must be a prerequisite 
to efforts to promote governance reforms. 
The techniques political organisations use to 
win and maintain power and the patterns of 
collective action they promote are diverse 
and often difficult for outsiders to see, but 
understanding these in any given country is 
essential to understanding how politics works.
3. External actors should focus on areas of 
good performance of a state and attempt 
to understand the interests that have led 
to state effectiveness, rather than attempt 
to assess performance in the aggregate. 
In this way they can determine whether 
such performance can be duplicated 
elsewhere or why it may not be, and ensure 
that interventions designed to address 
one domain of activity do not undermine 
another central activity of the state – most 
notably conflict management. Differential 
performance of a state is deeply related to 
the way political organisations deal with the 
interests of elites and their social constituents. 
The creation of state capacities is deeply 
influenced by political decisions and is never 
simply the result of having the technical 
expertise necessary for a particular activity.
4. Political possibilities, and therefore 
governance reforms, are decisively 
linked to reigning elite interests at a 
given moment in time. The ways politics 
are organised are intimately linked to the 
interests of elites and their constituents 
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at given moments in history. Strategies 
for political or economic reforms that are 
radically at odds with interests embodied 
in a political settlement will either fail or 
are likely to provoke conflict.
5. The promotion of democracy in a 
country needs to focus on establishing 
mechanisms for checks and balances on 
executive authority rather than the form 
of political party competition. In almost 
all cases of state resilience in poor countries 
forms of centralised patronage have been 
organised in national political parties, 
though not all states with national political 
parties have achieved state resilience. 
Where the basic parameters of the state – 
like who is a citizen and who is not, or the 
basic authority to allocate property rights 
– remain contested, the establishment of 
multiple political parties may allow rival 
elites and their social constituents to 
challenge the existence of the state itself, 
thus leading to exacerbated conflict.
6. Political organisations tend to imitate 
those who succeed in gaining and keeping 
power regardless of what advice they may 
receive from at home or abroad. Once this 
is understood, it is possible to understand 
why particular techniques and patterns of 
collective action are adopted by political 
actors, even when in doing so they may 
challenge long established elite bargains 
and political settlements, or reproduce the 
same despite having long fought for change. 
7. Possibilities exist for transformative 
political coalitions to emerge committed 
to establishing security, particularly in 
urban environments where a diversity of 
relatively well organised interest groups 
can challenge reigning political practices. 
Reformist politics are most likely to emerge 
when it is in the collective interests of newly 
emergent elites who do not have the means 
enjoyed by traditional elites to finance their 
security privately.  
4 Politics of violent conflict: 
rebels, warlords and urban  
civic conflict
Our research on states and cities challenges 
crude economic determinist theories 
that seek to explain violence as driven 
by individual utility maximisation, or the 
economic returns combatants can expect 
from engaging in violence. It also rejects 
the idea that differences between armed 
organisations are primarily due to differential 
access to economic resources. All non-state 
armed organisations are not the same, but 
rather they differ not only in terms of their 
motivations and objectives but also crucially 
in the organisational mechanisms they deploy 
as they attempt to survive and grow over time. 
These are essential to understand, if non-state 
armed groups are to be defeated or brought 
into peace negotiations. 
Our research has also found that cities 
are increasingly fraught by civic conflict 
and violence that does not necessarily 
appear to be explicitly political in nature. It 
suggests that violent civic conflicts (as well 
as assaults and homicides) have a political 
dimension that is often overlooked. In a 
quantitative study we found that cross-country 
variation in homicide rates (a rough proxy 
for “social” violence) is explained by a 
combination of traditional socioeconomic 
factors and variations in political institutional 
arrangements. City-level qualitative research 
also points to the significance of political 
factors in spurring violent civic conflict.
Policy implications
1. Understanding the particular organi-
sational mechanisms and incentive struc-
tures within non-state armed actors is 
essential to understanding what sustains 
them, how durable they may be and on 
what grounds they might be defeated or 
brought into peace processes. While these 
organisations are all likely to be deeply 
involved in illegal activities to fund their 
operations, likely to attract young under-
employed men as fighters and may behave 
brutally towards civilians, there are pro-
found differences between them based 
on who they recruit, how they operate, 
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and why combatants join and remain in 
the organisations.
2. Organisational incentives are a far 
better analytical indication of the nature 
of non-state armed movements than 
particular patterns of access to natural 
or illegal resources. In Colombia, the 
paramilitaries and the FARC guerrillas 
have both been deeply involved in narco-
trafficking, while in Afghanistan warlords 
working with or against the state and the 
Taliban have all been involved in the 
production and trade of opium poppies. 
What differentiates these organisations in 
terms of their durability and strength are 
the structure of incentives faced by their 
leaders and members.
3. Only an analysis of the organisational 
dynamics and sources of power and 
legitimacy that underpin warlord 
power can predict their potential role 
in processes of state consolidation and 
state destabilisation. The extent to which 
powerful non-state armed actors like 
warlords or clan bosses can be won over 
to state-building processes depends on the 
trade-offs they face between imperatives of 
bureaucratisation involved in state-building 
projects and preserving the relations of 
patronage on which their power depends.
4. Quantitative large-N cross-national 
studies of episodes of violent conflict can 
identify important associations between 
the multitude of variables related to 
complex processes of violence, but on their 
own cannot explain causal or dynamic 
processes. Large-N research needs to be 
backed up by small-N comparative studies 
that can shed light on the organisational 
dynamics that determine the sustainability of 
armed challenges to the state. Comparative 
analysis of the organisational dynamics 
of FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan allowed us to formulate a model 
to understand their differential behaviour 
along a spectrum separating army-like and 
network-like non-state armed groups. In this 
way we showed that differences between 
them in terms of their relations with civilian 
populations were not determined by their 
resource base, but rather by the imperatives 
dictated by their organisational dynamics.
5. Cities are often havens of relative security 
in civil war, but it would be a mistake to 
take urban security for granted when war 
has ended. Major population movements 
and socio-economic ruptures often lead to 
widespread conflict in cities after civil war. 
Often municipal state capacities are eroded 
with long-term implications for development. 
People will come into cities during and in the 
wake of war, whatever happens, and unless 
issues such as urban employment, housing 
and basic services are addressed, civic conflict 
is likely.
6. Forms of civic violence are ubiquitous 
in the cities of the developing world and 
they are deeply political in character. 
Gang warfare, crime, terrorism, religious 
and sectarian riots, and spontaneous riots 
or violent protest are increasing throughout 
the developing world. While these conflicts 
are rarely fought as direct challenges to 
state power, they are nevertheless usually 
expressions of deep grievances towards 
the state or politically and economically 
powerful urban elites. Treating them as 
criminal activities, or simply repressing 
them, may achieve some peace and order 
© Tom Goodfellow, Kigali building where 10 Belgian soldiers serving in the UN Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda were shot by government soldiers during the genocide of 1994.
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in the short-term, but this can also lead to 
deferred and even more explosive violent 
conflict in the future.
5 Military interventions, 
regional organisations and 
prospects for peace making 
and peace building 
Since the end of the Cold War the rules 
governing international relations have 
changed. Where long-established principles 
of sovereignty appeared to trump concerns 
for the protection of human rights or 
conversely the pursuit of national security 
through pre-emptive action, new doctrines 
have emerged advocating the judicial use 
of international military intervention in 
pursuit of these goals. A rigorous large-N 
study of the long-term impact of military 
interventions in the developing world 
revealed that there is a large and negative 
association with the consolidation of 
democracy after interventions. 
With the disappearance of the bi-polar 
world there appeared to be new room for 
regional organisations to become involved in 
maintaining security and peace-making and 
peace-building efforts within the regions of 
the developing world. However, there is little 
evidence that the confidence international 
actors have in these organisations is warranted. 
International efforts have been developed 
to promote peace-making and peace-
building operations and to attempt to bring 
conflicts internal to states to a conclusion 
through international mediation. There is 
an urgent need to professionalise approaches 
to mediation and to ensure they are well 
resourced and given time to operate effectively.
Policy implications
1. There is a strong, negative and 
significant association between military 
interventions and democracy. A majority 
of cross-country comparative analyses of the 
impact of military interventions over time 
on patterns of democracy and development 
found their effect to be either positive or 
neutral, but these have suffered from serious 
methodological problems. By applying a 
rigorous definition of military intervention 
and reconsidering all episodes since the end 
of World War II, we found that large-scale 
military interventions have had a decisively 
negative impact on subsequent patterns of 
democratic consolidation.  
2. Military interventions have tended 
to destroy a state’s conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, often unleashed forms of 
politics incompatible with democracy, 
upset political settlements and critically 
weakened state systems in general. Many 
interventions have provoked long periods 
of armed conflict in invaded countries. 
They have often given rise to polarised 
nationalist and identity-driven politics. 
Invaders have often combined motives 
of democracy promotion with measures 
that have redrawn elite bargains and 
political settlements in ways that have made 
democratisation more difficult.
3. Despite the optimism among international 
actors that regional organisations can play 
a major role in achieving regional security 
and make a positive contribution to peace 
building, their effectiveness is constrained 
by a lack of common values among their 
member states. The mandate, norms, 
decision-making modalities, goals, strategies, 
programmes, structure, capacity and culture 
of regional organisations derive from their 
member states. Among the cases studied the 
effectiveness of peacemaking was limited 
by the absence of normative congruence 
among member states in Central Asia, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia and the various regional 
organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only 
the European Union achieved the degree 
of normative congruence necessary to forge 
a security community.
4. Opportunities for positive engagement 
in mediation to bring about an end 
to conflict arise when the interests 
of belligerents align to make peace a 
more attractive option than continued 
warfare. The dynamics of war and peace 
can be understood as cyclical, but also 
efforts to understand them through an 
analysis of the causes for the outbreak of 
war are often thwarted by the fact that the 
motivations for participation in violence 
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change over time. Opportunities for 
peace often emerge when processes of 
accumulation of financial, ideological or 
political capital change the economic and 
political landscape and a range of actors 
share an interest in securing what they have 
accumulated. Understanding the cycle of 
war and peace can help to identify the 
most propitious moment for intervention 
through mediation.
5. There is an immediate need for 
international actors to professionalise their 
approach to mediation. Four measures are 
required to bolster international mediation 
capacity: (1) the implementation of a 
rigorous system for appointing and evaluating 
perspective mediators; (2) mediators need 
adequate support in the field to allow them 
to deal with the complexity of conflicts; 
(3) a learning culture needs to emerge 
based on review, assessment, research and 
adaptation; and (4) a confidence-building 
model needs to be adopted to deal with 
national conflicts, breaking from power-
based diplomacy.
6. Mediation requires time necessitating 
a shift away from approaches that attempt 
to find a “quick fix” in peace agreements. 
Mediation takes time to take account of 
the complexity of conflict and the need 
to overcome hatred and mistrust among 
conflicting parties, who must be brought 
to feel they own a peace settlement. 
Mediation, pitched at the right moment 
in the cycle of war and peace, can have 
an important impact, when those involved 
have proper expertise and have mastered 
the skills and techniques of mediation.
6 Economic resource 
mobilisation: trajectories of 
accumulation and links to 
fragility and resilience in states 
and cities
Our research on economic resource 
mobilisation identified different dominant 
trajectories of accumulation in the case-
study countries and cities, which are 
related to elite bargains and patterns of 
state fragility and resilience. In analysing 
the results we distinguish between formal 
and informal capital-accumulation 
processes that predominate in different 
settings. Our findings challenge some 
conventional wisdom in development 
theory and practice. First, resilient states 
with predictable formal rules of the game 
do not necessarily generate dynamic 
economic development outcomes. Second, 
our research at both the country and city 
levels suggests that processes of capital 
accumulation in the informal sector are 
underpinned by fragile, competing and/
or exclusionary elite bargains typical of 
fragile states. Third, external intervention 
and external conditions impose constraints 
and incentives that have a profound impact 
on the choices open to actors in fragile and 
resilient states.  
Policy implications
1. Centralised patronage underpinned 
by an inclusive elite bargain and  state 
control over resources can play an 
important role in maintaining political 
stability but may come at the cost of 
economic development. Policy makers 
need to consider the extent to which 
deregulating an economy across the board 
will be politically destabilising and actually 
undermine economic reforms. 
2. State capacity varies substantially 
across functions and sectors within 
polities – a central feature of fragile 
states not acknowledged in aggregate 
measures of governance – but this 
variation needs to be taken into account 
in the design of economic reforms in 
fragile states. Detailed historical analyses 
of the political coalitions and settlements 
underpinning specific state capacities are 
essential to increase understanding of 
variable state capacity within a polity. As 
such, investigating under which conditions 
the achievement of state resilience hinders 
or facilitates economic development is an 
important area of research.
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3. The creation of organisations that can 
provide support for informal sector firms 
is central to improving production capacity 
and thus sustainable employment creation. 
Tax collection and other government 
strategies need to be linked to providing 
incentives for informal firms to register as 
taxpayers. A promising approach to this 
challenge could be to link the expansion 
of the tax base to the informal sector in 
exchange for providing incentives for 
small and medium-sized firms to increase 
productive capacity.
4. While sectors such as construction and 
the drugs trade provide livelihoods in the 
informal sector for a substantial number of 
people, they are unlikely to be sustainable 
in political economy terms. This is because 
these trajectories of accumulation take place 
in the context of fragile political settlements 
that undermine state building. Moreover, 
the dynamism of the informal sector means 
that capital accumulation proceeds without 
increases in the formal tax base of the state. 
This further undermines the prospects of 
state building.
5. Governments need to effectively regulate 
land and housing markets and deliver 
key public goods in an effort to formalise 
urban informal economies to avoid the 
emergence of political and economic 
entrepreneurs with powerful incentives 
to resist state consolidation. In urban 
settings, policies that contribute to state 
withdrawal are often evaluated on grounds 
of efficiency and equity, but almost never for 
their impact on the institutional resilience 
of the state. This is a major blind spot which 
has far-reaching consequences for the ability 
of states to embark upon or return to a path 
of institutional consolidation.
6. Assessing the initial conditions of 
a polity and the parameters of the 
political settlement on which the state 
is based must be a prerequisite before 
prescriptions for far-reaching economic 
reforms are adopted. Rapid economic 
liberalisation associated with structural 
adjustment programmes in Africa, even 
when these programmes were only partially 
implemented, had a much more devastating 
impact where political settlements and elite 
bargains were factionalised than where more 
solid political organisations reigned.
7 From fragility and resilience 
to development
Promoting development – or progress 
towards accelerated growth and poverty 
reduction – requires both transcendence 
of basic fragility and the creation of further 
state capacity to promote an intensification 
of economic integration within a state’s 
territory and a step-change in productivity 
in agriculture, manufacturing, wider 
industry, trade and key service delivery. 
The way “state fragility” is defined in the 
policy community loses sight of the huge 
distance that must be traversed from 
both conditions of fragility and stagnant 
resilience to a situation where the state 
is presiding over accelerated growth and 
poverty reduction. A “developmental” or 
“transformational” state has to be able to 
create incentives and conditions for the 
holders of wealth to invest in productivity-
raising economic ventures, and incentives 
and conditions for labouring people to 
work for wages. 
While our research was focused more 
on the distinction between fragile and 
resilient states than on developmental 
success stories, we were able to observe 
several factors crucial to the transition from 
fragility and resilience to development. 
Many economically stagnant but resilient 
states depend heavily on resource 
extraction and we found that the ability of 
the state to create a regulatory framework 
to govern the sector is related to the 
political settlement in place when resource 
exploitation begins. We also found that the 
promotion of developmental patterns of 
capital accumulation may only proceed 
incrementally, sector by sector. Our 
research on taxation suggests that it can 
be deployed to encourage transformation 
of production and to establish a terrain 
favourable to the formation of political 
coalitions with an interest in growth and 
development. The research has contributed 
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to a growing body of work that illustrates 
that the way aid is delivered in fragile and 
resilient states can have a profound impact 
on its potential to contribute to sustained 
development. Finally, we conclude with a 
reflection on the types of coalitions that are 
most likely to provide the basis for positive 
developmental transitions.
Policy implications
1. Ensuring that resource-extractive 
industries contribute to wider developmental 
patterns through revenues generated and 
processing operations established, requires 
an activist state. A state needs capacity 
within its revenue and licensing agencies 
and in its law-making bodies, to design and 
implement sectoral development plans that 
ensure the contribution of resource-extractive 
industries to the creation of infrastructure, 
the emergence of processing activities and 
the development of skills among workers. In 
the face of political arrangements that block 
the development of a resource sector, the 
answer is seldom likely to be the wholesale 
withdrawal of the state from intervention 
within the sector.
2. The successful management of 
resource-extractive industries is most 
likely to happen in states that consolidate 
a national development coalition before 
the exploitation of resources begins. This 
means that the first step in assistance to a 
country that is engaging with international 
or domestic business to undertake 
exploration for minerals, fossil fuels or 
any other natural resource, should be the 
creation of knowledge, skills and agencies 
within the state capable of both bargaining 
with and regulating private investors.
3. Sustainable employment creation and 
poverty reduction in rural areas requires 
the development of effective organisations 
where the focus is on developing production 
strategies. Pockets of growth can emerge 
incrementally and these “islands of success” 
can form the basis of development projects. 
This approach is likely to yield greater success 
than “big push” macroeconomic reforms 
often advocated by international actors. The 
challenge will remain to replicate advances 
in single sectors to other sectors within 
agriculture and industry.
4. Taxation and tax reform can be 
deployed to promote investment in lines 
of production with good potential for 
growth. Tax allows governments to secure the 
revenues needed for social programmes and 
public investments. It can be organised both 
as a means to increase public accountability 
and as a nexus for political organising in 
society. Expanding the tax base geographically 
and sectorally can help to embed the state 
in society, and revenue expenditure by the 
state is one of the principal means to meet 
societal demands.
5. Aid needs to be channelled through 
the agencies of the state and it should 
give due priority to developing the core 
capacities of the state to govern economic 
development. Donors need to give due 
consideration to mechanisms that increase 
the capacity of states to raise their own 
finances. Aid channelled outside state 
systems or “off budget” can contribute to 
the creation of a “dual public authority” 
thus weakening states as the centre for 
decision making, in favour of potentially 
rival networks of patronage.
6. Developmental coalitions may emerge 
in less than democratic ways, or only 
within particular tiers or organisations 
of the state, but if they are inclusive 
and incorporate measures to check the 
abuse of executive authority they deserve 
the support of external actors. Political 
settlements and the elite bargains at their 
centre, which are capable of steering a 
course through the conflictual processes 
that may lift a government out of resilient 
stagnation, arise only rarely and are largely 
a matter of internal politics. External actors 
need to be able to recognise and support 
them even when they are organised along 
lines that fall short of the standards of 
modern liberal democracies.
The dominant position in the policy community when addressing the 
condition of a state, or public authority, in the developing world is 
based on the proposition that “good governance” (defined as liberal 
democratic and free market institutions) is the source not only of a 
state’s ability to preside over peace and stability, but also over growth 
and development. These are generally assessed by the formal rules 
adopted by a state and the policies articulated and implemented. The 
institutions or rules are seen primarily as incentive structures: get the 
institutions right and actors will face incentives to behave in ways that 
promote peace and development. This has led international actors 
– for instance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after its 
peace agreement – to focus on adopting a democratic constitution, 
conducting elections and articulating policies to fight corruption, promote 
transparency and reduce poverty. However, these institutional and 
policy reforms have neither secured peace nor even the beginnings of 
a development trajectory in the DRC. In Tanzania and Zambia, similar 
reforms have been adopted peacefully but not led to growth, while in 
Rwanda institutional arrangements that limit democratic competition 
have nevertheless allowed the establishment of peace within its territory 
and significant growth with modest poverty reduction. 
Political settlements  
determine the impact of 
institutional reforms
A better understanding of the possibilities 
of progressive institutional change and 
policy reform can be achieved by seeing the 
state as a political settlement embodying a 
set of power relations. Every state is based 
on a political settlement that embodies the 
distribution of power between contending 
social groups and social classes (Khan 
1995, 2000). Political settlements emerge 
from processes of conflict and bargaining 
(Di John and Putzel 2009). Looking at 
the political settlement focuses attention 
on: intra-elite contention and bargaining 
(political versus economic elites, landed 
and non-landed elites, regional elites, 
rural and urban elites, religious and 
secular elites, etc); contention and 
bargaining between elites and non-elites 
(the rich and the poor, employers and 
employees, land-owners and tenants or 
farmworkers); inter-group contention and 
bargaining (between genders, regional 
groups, ethnic or linguistic communities, 
or religious communities); and contention 
SEEINg ThE STATE AS A POlITICAl SETTlEMENT: 
ElITE BARgAINS AND SOCIAl MOBIlISATION
and bargaining between those who control 
the state and the wider society.
Institutions are not just sets of 
incentives that can be designed by those 
who occupy political authority to achieve 
peace-promoting and growth-promoting 
behaviour in society. Rather, they reflect 
and embody power relationships and 
distributional advantages. Property rights 
and state regulations – key institutions 
defined within any state – create incentives 
for behaviour, but also, by definition, specify 
a historically specific distribution of control 
and authority over assets (Dahlman 1980: 
213-214). Formally designed institutions 
– whether related to an effort to control 
rents, prevent corruption, or promote social 
inclusion and democratic participation – 
which are out of step with the dominant 
political settlement in a polity, are at best 
likely to be ineffective or at worst to provoke 
violent conflict. Historically in Rwanda, 
the threat presented by the introduction 
of democratic reforms in the early 1990s 
likely contributed to the mobilisation by 
Hutu extremists leading up to the genocide 
in 1994 (Golooba-Mutebi 2008b) – an 
extreme case where institutional reforms 
pushed by the international community 
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were entirely incongruent with the reigning 
political settlement. The endorsement of 
decentralisation reforms in Afghanistan and 
Rwanda, with the objective of promoting 
democratic accountability, were actually 
used to project central authority to distant 
regions (OECD 2010; Lister 2007), with 
arguably positive developmental effects in 
Rwanda and negative ones in Afghanistan: 
outcomes were determined by parameters 
of power in the political settlement.
Elite bargains, state-society 
relations and legitimacy
Given the widespread goal within the 
development-policy community to work 
to promote poverty reduction and social 
inclusion, it is particularly contentious to 
suggest that careful attention must be focused 
on the conflicts, entitlements and power 
relations among elites. While the effective 
organisation of non-elites in a society can 
decisively influence the action of elites and 
the shape of a political settlement, in much 
of the developing world the immediate 
prospects for achieving or sustaining peace 
and promoting development are contingent 
on the complex processes of conflict and 
bargaining among elites. We have defined 
elites observable in the developing countries 
today as: a) those in possession of valued 
assets in agriculture, manufacturing, 
services (main capitalists); b) those who 
wield substantial power over the distribution 
and allocation of property rights (traditional 
chiefs, landlords, regional political leaders, 
warlords); c) those who possess authority to 
bargain on behalf of rural communities or 
organised religious communities (traditional 
leaders, religious leaders); and d) those who 
lead political organisations (Di John and 
Putzel 2009: 15).
The “bargain” that emerges between 
elites within a political settlement comes 
about as a means to manage violence and 
achieve peace, as Douglass North and his 
colleagues (2007, 2009) have so convincingly 
argued. In political economy terms, elites 
have privileged access to rents (Khan and 
Jomo 2000), such as licenses to engage in 
mining, establish telecoms networks, run 
bus networks or trucking, or control land. 
In exchange for privileged access to valuable 
resources, income streams and activities, 
elites agree not to fight one another, as they 
come to perceive that the costs of exiting the 
state or breaking from the political settlement 
– or in other words, the costs of not playing 
by the rules of the state – exceed what they 
chance to win by pursuing their interests 
through violence. 
For an elite bargain to hold, the state 
needs to be structured in such a way that those 
who control it command coercive force that 
is solid and legitimate enough that: (1) rents 
allocated and property rights assigned can be 
protected and enforced – a positive incentive 
attracting elites to stick within the political 
settlement; (2) those who defect or choose to 
exit and challenge the state through violence 
face a threat of punishment – a negative 
incentive – that makes exit costly; and (3) 
those who control the state do not need to 
exercise its coercive force against citizens to 
maintain power – there is a basic acceptance 
of their right to rule, or a basic legitimacy. 
That is, states need to demonstrate a “credible 
commitment” to the defence of the terms 
of the bargain and a “credible threat” to 
defectors. As we will argue below, political 
organisation is crucial to structuring the 
state in this way. When externally promoted 
reforms threaten the power of the state 
to allocate rents they may well unwittingly 
contribute to breaking up an elite bargain 
and a reigning political settlement, leading 
to violence and even warfare – as arguably 
was the case during the decade of structural 
adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 
1980s (Putzel 2005). 
However, when social movements 
emerge domestically with organisational 
coherence and discipline, they may force a 
change in rent allocation and the shape of 
the elite bargain, as happened in Zambia (Di 
John 2010a). Recognising power equations of 
elites does not negate the wider importance 
of society for at least two reasons. First, elites 
are part of society and exist only due to their 
command of authority over non-elites – their 
constituents, followers or clients – and their 
actions need always to take into account 
the maintenance of their authority vis à 
vis their social base (this is valid, though in 
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different ways, whether we are considering 
democratic or authoritarian regimes, 
religious or tribal communities, warlords or 
regional strongmen). Second, non-elites not 
only can be decisive in sanctioning specific 
elites, or undermining them, but in doing 
so new forms and sites of social mobilisation 
can emerge, and have done so throughout 
history: “counter-elite movements” that 
can overturn an elite bargain or even give 
rise to new elites altogether (Wood 2000); 
or the reconstitution of old elites in a new 
or re-invented elite bargain and political 
settlement, as happened in Zambia (Di 
John 2010a; Putzel and Gutiérrez 2011). 
Our research in cities has documented 
the emergence of such “counter-elite 
movements” (Gutiérrez et al. 2009).
Inclusive or exclusionary  
elite bargains and  
political settlements
In dominant thinking within the policy 
community, democratic institutions 
are advocated as a means to promote 
participation and social inclusion. While 
the degree of inclusiveness appears to be 
central to the stability of elite bargains and 
wider political settlements, whether or not 
this can best be achieved with democratic 
or alternative institutional arrangements 
is a socially and historically specific issue. 
Inclusiveness is important to elite bargains in 
at least three ways. First is the extent to which 
a bargain is inclusive or exclusionary of rival 
elites (and their constituents) – particularly 
those anchored in diverse territories, 
religious, ethnic or language communities. 
This is what eluded state-building projects in 
Uganda before 1986, but then was achieved 
during Museveni’s first two decades in power 
and what threatens the future of stability in 
the country today (Golooba-Mutebi 2008a; 
Putzel and Gutiérrez 2011); and what the 
post-apartheid state in South Africa achieved 
in cities like Durban (Beall 2005; Beall and 
Ngonyama 2009).
Second, it is crucial whether or not a state 
is formed of one overarching elite bargain, 
like that which was achieved and maintained 
during at least the first thirty years after 
independence in Zambia and Tanzania (Di 
John 2010a; Putzel and Lindemann 2011), 
or instead loosely knits together regionally 
or ethnically based elite bargains within a 
wider territory, as has always been the case 
in the DRC and Afghanistan (Hesselbein 
2007; Giustozzi 2008a). Cities sometimes 
have been the locus of such local bargains, 
as in Lumumbashi in the DRC (Hesselbein 
and Garrett 2009), Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat 
for extensive periods of the Afghan conflict 
(Giustozzi 2009c) and Quetta on the border of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Gazdar et al. 2010). 
The third dimension of inclusiveness 
concerns the relation between elites and 
the wider society. As we argued above, by 
definition elites require a social base and 
how they mobilise that base – for instance 
whether they resort to mobilisation on 
the basis of ethnicity as in the DRC or a 
developmental programme as in Rwanda 
– in large part determines the stability 
and developmental quality of a political 
settlement (Hesselbein 2011). In Durban, 
by promising a new era of peace so much 
desired by ordinary people, political leaders 
built an inclusive coalition at the city level 
around developmental objectives (Beall 
and Ngonyama 2009). In Ahmedabad, 
Chandhoke (2010) showed how a once 
stable and relatively inclusive political 
settlement could become exclusionary 
through patterns of political mobilisation. 
Determining how inclusive or 
exclusionary a political settlement is 
can partly be understood by looking at 
the extent to which divergent elites and 
members of important social groups 
participate in the bargaining process, or 
gain appointments in the offices of the 
state (Lindemann 2010a, 2010 b). However, 
perhaps more fundamentally than actual 
participation of individuals within the 
agencies of the state, the inclusiveness 
or exclusionary character of a political 
settlement can be assessed through the 
distribution of rights and entitlements 
across groups and classes in society on 
which the settlement is based. It is possible 
that an imposed political settlement can be 
more inclusive than one reached through 
pluralist bargaining (as might be argued in 
the case of Rwanda since 1994). As society 
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is formed of contending groups and classes 
with different interests, the ultimate test of 
inclusiveness cannot be solely judged by 
examining positions of individuals within 
state organisations, but rather needs to 
be anchored in the distribution of rights 
and entitlements, which are the outcome of 
the settlement. Neither is inclusiveness of 
individuals necessarily an attribute more 
likely to lead to development or even pro-
poor social policy (as we discuss below).
Our research has demonstrated 
that looking at the state as a political 
settlement and analysing the elite bargains 
and patterns of social mobilisation that 
underpin them can shed considerable light 
on the vexing problem of what makes some 
states more fragile than others.
Policy implications
1. The “design of institutions” (the 
rules and norms that govern behaviour), 
particularly formal state institutions, 
does not determine either political 
or economic outcomes. Democratic 
institutions in one state may be associated 
with violent conflict and economic 
stagnation, while in another they may be 
related to peaceful social relations and 
economic growth. It is the underlying 
political settlement that determines 
political and developmental outcomes.
2. Understanding the state as a 
political settlement places the goal of 
democratisation in a new light. The 
insight that every state is based on a 
historically specific political settlement 
provides a route to understanding why 
very similar sets of formal institutions – 
like democratic rules, or rules governing 
macroeconomic management or trade 
liberalisation, or industrial policy – can 
have extremely divergent outcomes. 
3. Focusing on the political settlement 
directs attention to the crucial role of 
elites in securing stability in a state, which 
should lead international actors to be 
concerned about the incentives elites face 
to play by the rules of a state. A uniform 
approach to opposing rent seeking may 
provoke instability and violence, and rent 
allocation or special privileges allocated to 
elites may be central to the maintenance of 
peace and state-building processes. 
4. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion are 
central to the stability and resilience of 
political settlements, but important more 
in terms of outcomes than the formal 
institutional arrangements governing 
access to state power. If democratic rules are 
likely to lead to significant exclusion of either 
powerful elites, of important regional, ethnic, 
language or religious groups, then they may 
be inferior to forms of power sharing.
5. Support for reforms that promote the 
interest of non-elite social groups must 
be determined by the extent to which 
such groups have developed their own 
organisations capable of articulating 
such reforms and engaging in the 
political contests necessary to enact 
them. International actors need to be able 
to identify organised social constituencies 
for major political reforms if external 
support for such reforms is to not only be 
effective, but also avoid disrupting political 
systems in unintended ways. 
6. Incorporating an analysis of political 
settlements can take the very positive work 
done by DFID and others on understanding 
“the drivers of change” in the developing 
countries a step further (Leftwich 2006). 
This lens allows an analysis of the contending 
interests that exist within any state, which 
constrain and facilitate institutional and 
developmental change. It provides a 
framework to analyse how the state is linked 
to society and what lies behind the formal 
representation of politics in a state. 
7. To undertake development-assistance 
programmes without understanding the 
political settlement on which a state rests 
can lead to unintended consequences 
of all sorts. Not only does the political 
settlement set the constraints for what can 
and cannot be accomplished with foreign 
assistance, but foreign assistance itself can 
have an impact on the political settlement.
Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, 
the problems of weak states, of state collapse and the unleashing 
of violence and war within developing countries and the particular 
challenges of re-establishing order in the wake of violent conflict have 
been a growing concern among international development agencies, 
governments of the North and South and indeed in the organisations 
that attempt to manage global affairs, like the United Nations. This 
was initially cast as a challenge of “failed states”, later evolving into a 
more nuanced and less ideologically defined, though no less obscure, 
problem of “fragile states” (Di John 2008 and 2010d; Putzel 2010a). 
Confusion still reigns among international 
actors over how to define “state fragility” 
and what distinguishes fragile states from 
general conditions of underdevelopment 
and poverty (Putzel and Gutiérrez 2011; 
Gutiérrez 2009). The OECD (2007a) 
consensus view proclaims that: 
 “ States are fragile when state structures lack 
political will and/or capacity to provide the 
basic functions needed for poverty reduction, 
development and to safeguard the security 
and human rights of their populations.” 
Similarly, in an evaluation of its work in 
fragile states DFID (Chapman and Valliant 
2010) stated:
 “ DFID defines fragile states as countries 
’where the government cannot or will not 
deliver core functions to its people’. This 
includes a wide variety of situations from 
collapsed states to strong states with little 
commitment to poverty reduction”. 
The World Bank has deployed the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (based 
on in-house expert opinion designed to 
allocate concessional grants) to identify 
fragile states as those with no CPIA score or 
scoring 3.2 or less  (World Bank 2010: 222). 
These definitions confuse the particularity 
of “state fragility” with general problems 
that plague all poor countries
One of the more important insights 
that has emerged from CSRC research is 
that there is a distinction among the poorest 
developing countries between those that 
experience a condition of fragility – or 
a real danger of state breakdown and 
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internecine violence – from poor countries 
where the state has achieved considerable 
resilience, or peace, even when economic 
development has been elusive. Both fragile 
and resilient states among the poorest 
countries are also distinct from states 
presiding over accelerated development 
(Gutiérrez et al. 2011). Not understanding 
these distinctions renders the idea of state 
fragility meaningless and can lead to serious 
problems in international interventions.
It is impossible to understand patterns 
of state fragility and resilience by looking 
only at the national state. In practice, the 
architecture of state authority in every society 
is a complex network of public organisations 
and institutions. Within this network, towns 
and cities serve as critical spaces of state 
formation, consolidation, transformation and 
erosion. Indeed, in the civil war literature, it is 
increasingly acknowledged that a sub-national 
focus can help enhance our understanding 
of violent civil conflict (Blattman and Miguel 
2010: 34). Our contribution in this regard has 
been to highlight the importance of cities as 
particularly significant sub-national units of 
analysis and intervention in “fragile” states.
Historically, city states and commercial 
towns played a pivotal role in the emergence 
of the “modern” state by facilitating capital 
accumulation and stimulating institutional 
development through processes of elite 
bargaining and social mobilisation (Tilly 
1992; Beall and Fox 2009). However, the 
formation of states in the post-colonial era 
was driven by very different forces than 
those that prevailed in Medieval Europe 
or Japan and occurred during a period 
of unprecedented demographic change. 
Since the end of World War II, the urban 
There is a distinction 
among the poorest 
developing countries 
between those 
that experience a 
condition of fragility 
– or a real danger of 
state breakdown and 
internecine violence – 
from poor countries 
where the state has 
achieved considerable 
resilience, or peace, 
even when economic 
development has 
been elusive. 
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populations of developing countries have 
expanded at historically unprecedented 
rates, driven by declining mortality, 
improvements in food security and high 
fertility rates (Fox 2011). 
This rapid urban population growth has 
been accompanied by a laissez-faire approach 
to urban management over the last 40 years, 
which has resulted in the “urbanization of 
poverty” (Ravallion et al. 2007) and created 
conditions conducive to urban conflict and 
violence (Beall and Fox 2009). Indeed, there is 
some evidence that the widely noted decline in 
the frequency of inter-state conflicts and civil 
wars has been accompanied by an increase 
in urban civic conflict and “social” violence 
(Harbom and Wallensteen 2009; Newman 
2009; Fox and Hoelscher 2010). This may 
represent a significant shift in the geography 
and manifestation of historic struggles 
over rights and resources (Rodgers 2007, 
2010), although further research is needed 
to confirm these trends. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the challenge of ensuring human 
security is an increasingly urban one and 
that understanding the dynamics of urban 
development is essential to any sound analysis 
of state building and state breakdown in 
contemporary developing countries.
Understanding fragility and 
resilience in states and cities
The whole problem of “state fragility” is to 
understand why some poor countries are 
unstable and have been particularly subject 
to violence and warfare, while others have 
achieved long periods of peace even in 
conditions of poverty and low economic 
growth (Gutiérrez et al. 2011, Gutíerrez 
2011). By suggesting that fragile states 
are those without the will or capacity to 
function in ways that reduce poverty, ensure 
development or safeguard human rights, 
the reigning definitions of state fragility 
in the policy community fail to distinguish 
between the particular conditions of 
“fragility” and the general conditions of 
“underdevelopment”. By definition all of 
the least developed countries demonstrate 
a lack of capacity to reduce poverty or 
promote development. Many low-income 
and even middle-income countries are a 
long way from ensuring the protection 
of human rights. For instance, our 
research on violence in Ahmedabad and 
around secessionist movements in India 
(Chandhoke 2009, 2010) demonstrated 
the still imperfect protection of human 
rights in India, but it would be erroneous 
to stretch the concept of fragility so far as to 
label India as a “fragile” state. What is more, 
to make the definition of state fragility rest 
upon the presence or absence of “political 
will” is to confine the categorisation to 
overly subjective ex-post interpretation 
(Grindle 2004). A definition of “state 
fragility” that is useful both analytically and 
for policy intervention needs to highlight 
what distinguishes fragile states from the 
rest of low-income developing countries. 
Clearly, Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2008a) and 
the DRC (Hesselbein 2007) – like Somalia 
and Haiti, where state organisations hardly 
function and where wave upon wave of 
violent conflict or war have prevented a 
modicum of state consolidation – pose 
a very different set of challenges than 
Tanzania or Zambia, or Malawi, where 
poverty remains profound, human rights 
imperfectly protected, but people generally 
live in peace.
The reigning definitions of “state 
fragility” employed by the policy community 
do not recognise the importance of the 
achievements of states like those in Tanzania 
or Zambia in establishing a significant 
degree of “state resilience” (Putzel and 
Lindemann 2011; Di John 2010a). Both these 
countries still suffer deeply rooted poverty, 
low agricultural productivity, tiny industrial 
sectors and weak economic infrastructure, 
but they have maintained peace and 
engaged in the slow process of nation 
building. In 2007, Tanzania and Zambia 
ranked 151 and 164 respectively out of the 
182 countries in the Human Development 
Index (UNDP 2009: 173). In Sub-Saharan 
Africa 22 countries have avoided civil war 
despite conditions of poverty and stalled 
development (Lindemann 2010a, basing his 
assessment on a modification of Sambanis 
2004a). At least another ten countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which fell below Tanzania 
and Zambia on the Human Development 
It is clear that the 
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human security 
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Index, have also avoided civil war (UNDP 
2009; Sambanis 2004a). The counterpoint 
to state fragility is not development, but state 
resilience, which may be a stepping stone to 
more dynamic development, or a plateau 
marked by economic stagnation, beyond 
which it is difficult to pass. Many middle-
income countries in the developing world 
have achieved significant state resilience, 
but have great difficulty in presiding over a 
developmental take-off, including countries 
like Colombia and the Philippines (Gutiérrez 
et al. 2007; Putzel 1992).
At the urban scale as well, social tensions 
and civic discontent can be contained 
rather than translating into violent conflict 
or channelled into processes that promote 
dynamic development – resulting in what 
might be termed “resilient stagnation” 
at the city level. Box 1 demonstrates how 
Swahili creolisation bought peace in Dar es 
Salaam, but in doing so it co-opted those 
social forces that might have been most 
likely to push for developmental changes. 
Achieving state resilience, even at low 
levels of development, allows a period of 
state consolidation – the evolution of a 
shared national identity, acceptance of 
territorial boundaries and the recognition 
of national law – which can provide the basis 
for managing the conflictual dimensions 
of development and become, over time, 
a site in which citizens’ own struggles 
and organisational capacity can win and 
expand rights. The reigning definition 
among policy makers neither captures the 
difference and distance between conditions 
of fragility and stagnant resilience, on the 
one hand, nor those of a developmental 
state on the other. In its liberal impulse that 
“all good things go together” (Packenham 
1973), the international community is 
still functioning within a world view that 
sees development in bifurcated terms: 
poor countries, suffering from economic 
backwardness, corrupt political regimes, 
poor human rights records; and rich 
countries, enjoying high levels of per 
capita income, competitive markets and 
liberal democratic political systems. 
The prescriptions they work with, as in 
the reigning definition of fragile states 
and the “good governance agenda” still 
underpinning most donor strategies, fail 
to capture the strategic challenges facing 
developing countries in relation to the 
condition of their state. The price of buying 
peace, of achieving resilience, may establish 
barriers to further developmental take-off.
The CSRC has anchored its definition 
of state fragility in a coherent and well 
established theoretical tradition, around 
four basic attributes of the state (Gutiérrez 
et al. 2011; Putzel 2010a). The key defining 
characteristic of fragility is the failure of the 
state to exercise a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force – for example, the 
failure to protect the population from 
Box 1: Urban resilient stagnation in Dar es Salaam
The creolisation and Swahili culture that accompanied urbanisation in Tanzania 
helped Dar es Salaam remain unusually peaceful by African city standards. This 
was not only because Swahili creolism blunted ethnic differences and was a 
source of nation building, but because at the level of the local state the Swahili 
tended to avoid involvement in politics, which “precluded them from being 
perceived as threatening” by other groups (Bryceson 2008: 20). In a sense, 
some of the factors that have kept Dar es Salaam peaceful are the same as those 
that have prevented widespread demands being made on the local state in ways 
that might stimulate more dynamic urban development. Urban social forces 
in Dar es Salaam were eclipsed and co-opted by a centralised, Swahili-based 
nation-building project that succeeded in averting conflict, while at the same 
time deflecting some of the contested bargaining processes at the local and 
metropolitan scale that can help foster state transformation. 
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large-scale violence and to ensure that 
non-state armed actors cannot rival the 
state’s security forces (armies and police). 
The second indicator of fragility is the failure 
of the state to develop basic bureaucratic 
capacity, identified in our qualitative 
research by assessing the extent to which 
the state has achieved a monopoly over 
legitimate taxation powers (Di John 2010c). 
A third characteristic of fragility is a significant 
deficit in the state’s ability to exercise 
territorial control (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). 
Our qualitative research has identified a 
fourth characteristic of fragility as the failure 
of the state to ensure that its institutions 
(or rules) trump rival rules anchored in 
non-state institutional systems. All four sets 
of characteristics (summarised in Figure 
1) are observable, mostly measurable, 
distinguish fragile from resilient states, 
and avoid confusing fragility with a general 
lack of progress in achieving development, 
justice and democracy. 
STATE  
FRAgIlITY
STATE 
RESIlIENCE
Armed challenges  
threaten state power
Monopoly of legitimate 
violence rests with the state
State territorial  
reach limited
State reaches the  
significant territory 
Non-state taxation Monopoly of taxation
Institutional multiplicity Institutional hegemony
Figure 1: Four Dimensional State Fragility to Resilience Spectrum
The purpose of defining state fragility 
and resilience in this way is not to create a 
typology, since states perform differentially 
along each of these dimensions. Rather the 
purpose is to understand where a state at a 
given point in time stands along a fragility 
to resilience spectrum, in which direction 
it may be moving and why. It can help to 
determine the sequencing of reforms 
and whether particular reforms, projects 
or programmes are likely to contribute to 
resilience or make a state more fragile. We 
discuss each of these characteristics in turn 
and then the possibilities for measuring them.
Prioritising the legitimate 
monopoly of violence
When those who control the state have not 
succeeded in building security forces capable 
of defeating non-state armed challengers, 
or when the state’s armed forces regularly 
unleash violence against its own citizens 
either as a condition to remain in power 
or because there is no unified chain of 
command or discipline to prevent security 
forces from preying on citizens in urban 
and rural areas, these are signs of significant 
state fragility. The state’s consolidation of 
its armed forces and policing is central to 
its resilience, since other basic functions 
of the state – like establishing a monopoly 
over taxation, ensuring territorial control 
and establishing the hegemony of state 
institutions – are dependent on the state’s 
basic security capacity. The state can only 
build a stable elite bargain and wider political 
settlement if it controls the coercive force 
necessary both to protect the property and 
livelihoods of elites and non-elites and offer 
a credible threat to those who might pursue 
political and economic objectives through 
violent means. 
Most of the attention of the international 
community towards security in fragile states 
has been related to downsizing the state’s 
security forces, demobilisation programmes, 
security-sector reforms and wider concerns of 
providing “human security” and respect for 
human rights (Giustozzi 2011; OECD 2007b: 
13). While these are desirable objectives, they 
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are unattainable without the establishment 
of a basic security capacity within the state. 
The key indicators of state fragility in regard 
to security are an absence of a functioning 
chain of command within the armed forces, 
a failure to provide soldiers and police and 
their dependents with a living wage, incidents 
of wanton violence and extortion carried 
out by state security forces in society, the 
impotence or even involvement of police 
forces in urban riots, and the proliferation of 
non-state and vigilante armed organisations 
in rural or urban areas. 
Establishing control over security and 
providing protection to those under its 
authority is central to the state’s legitimacy 
(Paris 2004). Security is consistently the first 
concern and primary expectation people 
have of the state in every society and only 
declines in importance where its basic 
parameters have already been established 
(Asia Foundation 2008). When the state 
cannot provide security, elites or communities 
will turn to whatever non-state forces offer 
basic protection or even establish their own 
security forces in opposition to those of the 
non-performing state. In the countries we 
studied, this was the situation still prevailing 
in Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2008a) and the 
DRC (Hesselbein 2007; De Goede 2010). 
It was also the situation in Uganda in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, and in Rwanda 
from independence right through to 1994 
(Golooba- Mutebi 2008a, 2008b). In such 
conditions a failure to prioritise action to 
consolidate the state’s security forces is 
likely to make all other action, whether to 
expand access to justice or to reduce poverty 
or improve services or governance, futile. 
This poses particular challenges in the 
cities of fragile states. A focus on the city scale 
allows us better to understand why normal 
processes of social conflict and contestation 
– which inevitably accompany development 
and change and are particularly intense 
in cities, given high levels of diversity and 
compressed inequality – do or do not become 
violent (Beall et al 2010; Rodgers 2010). 
Understanding the dynamics of violence 
requires a clear set of definitions. To begin 
with, it is important to distinguish between 
conflict per se, which can be a constructive, 
generative political force, and violent conflict. 
Our work distinguishes three forms of 
violent conflict and highlights the role of 
cities in each, but also explores some of the 
constructive roles that non-violent urban 
conflict can play in bringing about positive 
developmental outcomes.  
In terms of violent conflict, sovereign 
conflicts are those in which international 
actors are directly involved and cities 
are strategic targets. A second category 
is civil conflict between organised groups 
within a country fighting for control 
of the state itself; in this we draw our 
definition largely from Sambanis (2004a). 
In these conflicts cities may be a “prize” 
for victory, but during the conflict itself 
often remain a refuge from warfare, despite 
also being transformed by the economics 
and demographics of war in ways that can 
inhibit post-war state building. Finally, we 
develop a concept of civic conflict. This is a 
term that aims to capture forms of violent 
conflict that are distinct from civil war and 
also tend to take place in cities. It may spill 
beyond city boundaries, but is associated 
with the urban qualities of diversity and 
inequality, as well as the proximity to and 
visibility of state authorities and their 
organisations. These forms of violence 
can be as diverse as gang warfare, violent 
crime, terrorism, religious and sectarian 
riots, and spontaneous riots or violent 
protest over perceived state failures (Beall 
et al. 2011). They are often analysed under 
the rubric of “social violence” (Fox and 
Hoelscher 2010). Both our quantitative 
and qualitative work has shown that many 
such forms of violence are in fact linked 
to political institutions and agendas (Fox 
and Hoelscher 2010; Rodgers 2007, 2008). 
The term “civic conflict” therefore aims to 
capture the underlying political aspects 
of these forms of violent conflict and 
their frequent links to claims relating to 
citizenship rights (Earle 2010), as well as 
their geographical association with cities. 
One of the key findings in our research 
is that civil conflicts can often reshape 
themselves into civic ones in the “post-
conflict” phase after arms have formally 
been laid down. This builds on the growing 
A failure to prioritise 
action to consolidate 
the state’s security 
forces is likely to 
make all other action, 
whether to expand 
access to justice or 
to reduce poverty or 
improve services or 
governance, futile. 
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recognition in the civil war literature that 
“civil war is only part of a cycle of violence” 
(Sambanis 2004b: 193) and that there are 
important interrelationships between civil 
war, coups, terrorism and crime (Sambanis 
2004b: 195). There are several ways in 
which transitions out of civil conflict can 
sow the seeds of later violent civic conflicts. 
Very rapid urban growth and demographic 
shifts among the urban population during 
a civil war – such as that which took place 
in Gulu, northern Uganda – can have 
knock-on consequences after the war ends. 
Previously dominant social forces attempt 
to reassert themselves and social tensions 
that were kept at bay in wartime begin to 
surface, providing fertile ground for civic 
conflict (Branch 2008). Meanwhile Keen 
(2009) shows how sanctions imposed by 
external actors with the aim of bringing 
civil war to an end can lead to increased 
hardship over the medium term, which 
in urban areas can foster criminalisation 
and the violent expression of grievances 
against the state. “Post”-conflict urban 
stability therefore cannot be taken for 
granted even in cities that may have been 
islands of peace during wartime; these 
too are important issues to consider in 
relation to maintaining a monopoly of 
legitimate violence (Beall et al. 2011). 
Moreover, post-war reconstruction efforts 
can actually undermine the potential of 
cities to accommodate inclusive political 
coalitions that promote development and 
state transformation in the city and beyond 
(Esser 2009; Moxham 2008).
CSRC research on the building of 
national armies has demonstrated that 
there are difficult trade-offs involved in 
“taming violence” and establishing a 
modicum of state control over coercive 
force, essential to the consolidation of a 
country-wide elite bargain and achieving 
a degree of state resilience (Giustozzi 
2011). In situations of state fragility, in 
the absence of strong political organisation, 
an army may be assembled through the 
incorporation of separate militias often 
previously engaged in fighting one another 
and loyal to different elite factions linked 
to different partners in the bargaining 
process. In Tanzania and Zambia solid 
political parties were able to mediate 
the bargaining process and incorporate 
factions and individuals into security forces 
in a regulated and institutionalised manner, 
which was one of the most important factors 
behind establishing a more resilient state 
(Lindemann 2010c). It involved ensuring 
a role for retired officers in politics and 
the distribution of rents, perhaps more so 
in Zambia than Tanzania (Giustozzi 2011). 
In the absence of a solid party a strong 
leader may be able to manage factionalised 
security forces for a time, but as Giustozzi 
(2011) observed:
 “ as leadership wanes or is distracted by other 
tasks, the agency is likely to suffer rapid 
decay in the command-and-control structure. 
This is the case of Uganda’s army under 
Museveni, of Afghanistan in the 1990s and 
of DR Congo.”
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the state 
authorities with foreign backing have 
maintained security as a high priority, but 
success in securing a legitimate monopoly 
of coercive force without a political 
settlement including non-state armed 
challengers appears to be increasingly 
unlikely (Giustozzi 2011). In the DRC after 
2002, most external actors have attempted 
to pursue development interventions 
without prioritising the establishment of 
a disciplined integrated national army 
in what appears to be an increasingly 
misguided hope that maintaining a UN 
force would be adequate to provide civilian 
security (De Goede 2010). 
In contrast, central to achieving 
stability and peace and establishing state 
legitimacy in Rwanda after the genocide 
has been the state’s success in establishing 
disciplined armed forces and police (Putzel 
and Golooba-Mutebi 2009). Moreover, in 
Kigali a relatively small police force has 
been supported by forms of community 
policing such as District Defence Forces and 
the institution of a range of neighbourhood 
and community activities that facilitate 
“horizontal” urban securitisation, which 
together have helped reduce crime and 
Post-war 
reconstruction efforts 
can actually undermine 
the potential of cities 
to accommodate 
inclusive political 
coalitions that promote 
development and state 
transformation in the 
city and beyond.
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violent civic conflict dramatically in the 
city (Goodfellow 2011a; Goodfellow and 
Smith forthcoming). The resilience of 
states presiding over poverty in Tanzania 
and Zambia was also largely dependent 
on the consolidation of the state’s control 
over basically disciplined armed forces 
and creating a basic policing capacity 
(Lindemann 2010c). The progress made in 
Uganda after 1986 was closely related to the 
state’s provision of security to large parts 
of the territory and continuing sources 
of state fragility can be found in failures 
to extend security throughout the entire 
territory and the decline in discipline and 
effectiveness in both the army and the 
police in more recent years (Golooba-
Mutebi 2008a). 
Consolidating the state’s control 
over security has in some cases involved 
maintaining large numbers of soldiers in 
the armed forces (Rwanda), providing 
appointments within the state to retiring 
officers (Tanzania and Mozambique), or 
ensuring balanced recruitment from across 
the territory (Tanzania and Zambia). It 
may well be that such measures have had 
a dampening effect on economic growth, 
sometimes creating rents for former military 
and police personnel, inefficiencies in the 
security forces and budget deficits, yet these 
trade-offs have been important in achieving 
a degree of state resilience. 
Tax administration
Tax-collection capacity is a key indicator of 
state performance and provides important 
clues as to where polities lie on the spectrum 
between fragility and resilience (Di John 
2010c). The process of tax collection is 
one of the most powerful lenses in political 
economy to assess the distribution of power 
in a polity. Taxation is also one of the few 
objective indices we have that measures the 
power, authority and legitimacy of the state 
to mobilise resources. Other well-known 
indices of governance such as “corruption” 
or “participation” are much more indirect 
and vague as measures and rely on subjective 
surveys (Kaufmann et al. 2008). 
There are several components of tax 
collection that can be analysed to understand 
the relative fragility and resilience of a state.
First, the ability of the state to monopolise 
the collection of tax enhances state resilience. 
This is because it reduces the prospects of 
non-state actors financing rebellions and/
or challenging state authority in the delivery 
of social services. Monopolisation of tax 
collection may reflect as much, if not more, a 
resilient state than the tax-collection capacity 
itself. In the post-1990 period, in Zambia, 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Mozambique, the 
state has maintained a monopoly over tax 
collection in the country even though there 
were substantial episodes of smuggling in all 
four countries. In Uganda, Colombia and 
the Philippines, there is monopoly of tax 
collection in most parts of the country, though 
there are territorially limited but significant 
episodes of non-state actors collecting or 
attempting to raise revenue. While there 
is significant smuggling in the Philippines 
and Colombia, its effect on conflict and 
violence (and ultimately resilience) is 
different than in Zambia or Rwanda. When 
communities, enterprises or those moving 
goods through the country are forced to 
buy protection from political organisations 
determined to challenge the authority of 
the state (Philippines and Colombia), this 
becomes an important source of conflict. 
In Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Rwanda there is no evidence that smuggling 
is linked to such organisations and thus has 
less negative impact on state resilience. In 
the DRC and Afghanistan, the state is far 
from having a monopoly over taxation, and 
as a result these are the least resilient – that 
is, the most fragile, states. In both cases, 
because smuggling is controlled by political 
organisations determined to challenge the 
state, substantial violence and conflict emerge 
(Di John 2010c).
Second, levels of tax collection and the 
diversity of tax-revenue sources also matter for 
state resilience. Tax levels matter because 
greater tax-revenue mobilisation increases 
the prospects of financing broad-based 
service delivery and enhances the prospects 
of financing the security apparatus of the 
state. The diversity of tax-revenue sources 
12 •  MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
also matters for state resilience. There are 
several reasons for this. First, a state may 
have very high tax collection due only to 
mineral or fuel abundance. For example, in 
Angola, state leaders may not necessarily be 
accountable to their citizens because such 
revenues are “unearned”. This is because 
revenues flow into state coffers without 
leaders having to bargain with domestic 
interest groups over tax policy and tax 
collection. This can sever state-society links 
and lead to predatory behaviour on the 
part of state elites (Moore 2004). Second, 
increasing the diversity of the tax base, and 
not just relying on VAT, has been central 
to keeping tax revenues from collapsing in 
the face of trade liberalisation (IMF 2005). 
Finally, diversifying tax revenue towards 
personal and corporate income tax has 
important consequences for state resilience 
since it is a direct tax that is particularly 
effective in institutionalising state-citizen 
relations. This is because direct taxes tend 
to be most effective in activating “voice” 
among citizens (Lieberman 2002).
In our cases, performance varies in terms 
of both tax collection levels and the diversity 
of its sources. Our research findings suggest 
that resilient states such as Zambia have 
relatively high tax levels and a diversity of tax 
sources (Di John 2010b). Our findings also 
suggest that low tax states (including those 
beyond the case studies such as Sierra Leone) 
have been vulnerable to episodes of political 
violence.  These include Mozambique, 
Rwanda, DRC and Uganda.
What is also striking is that successful cases 
of post-war or post-genocide reconstruction 
have been accompanied by improvements in 
tax collection and tax diversity. In Rwanda, 
the tax take increased from 9 per cent of 
GDP in 1994 to over 14 per cent of GDP in 
2008. In Uganda, the tax take increased from 
7 per cent of GDP in 1986 to 12 per cent of 
GDP in 2005. In Mozambique, the tax take 
increased from 9.5 per cent of GDP in 1995 
to over 16 per cent of GDP in 2008. In cases 
where the state remains fragile, the tax take 
has remained relatively low. The extreme case 
is Afghanistan where the tax-take averaged 
4.7 per cent of GDP in the period 2003-05. In 
the DRC, the tax take averaged 6.5 per cent of 
GDP in the period 2000-03 but has increased 
to an average of 10 per cent of GDP in the 
period 2004-5 (see Di John 2010c, Tables 1-3 
for more detailed evidence).
War and conflict can affect taxation 
capacity locally as well as nationally, with 
implications for state building at the city 
level and the ability of municipalities both 
to deliver services and avert civic conflict in 
the longer term. For example, we have noted 
how cities are often the “eye of the storm” 
in civil wars, but at the same time especially 
strong demands are made of municipal or 
metropolitan tiers of government in terms of 
service delivery, with local states being unable 
to cope with the rapid influx of people. This is 
often accompanied by increased dependence 
on financial transfers from the centre at the 
expense of developing their own taxation 
mechanisms. This has been evident in 
Srinagar, Kashmir (Venkatachalam 2007) and 
is exacerbated in contexts where international 
actors intervene and “over determine” urban 
decision making “above the heads” of local 
state organisations. As a result they become 
marginalised with long-term implications 
for local state capacity (Esser 2009). This 
can be particularly damaging in the case of 
metropolitan tiers of government that have 
potentially important taxation functions and 
have especially strong demands made of them 
in terms of service delivery.
Finally, the manner in which tax is collected 
and the degree of participation in the budgeting 
process can enhance state legitimacy and thus 
can contribute to state resilience. The extent to 
which tax is collected through quasi-voluntary 
compliance is a sign that the tax regime has 
at least a broad passive legitimacy among 
the population (Levi 1988). Our research 
suggests that most resilient states among our 
cases collect taxes in a non-coercive manner.
Establishing the basic taxation capacity 
necessary to achieve state resilience has also 
involved trade-offs that may have contributed 
to slow rates of economic growth and 
development. Every tax regime is embedded 
in patterns of state-created rent allocation, 
which form the essence of elite bargains. 
In some cases, increasing taxes and/or 
enforcing tax collection has proved difficult 
since this would reduce the income flows 
of elite and allied upper-income groups. In 
terms of elite rent creation, tax exemptions, 
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low income tax rates and the systematic 
toleration of tax evasion can create rents 
for particular companies, public or private. 
There are several ways in which tax patterns 
and policy contribute to the creation of rents 
for elites.
One of the common patterns that emerge 
in most cases is that high levels of tax evasion 
are tolerated. This is the case for all types of 
taxes. If one includes the substantial amount 
of assets held abroad by economic elites – 
a common feature in sub-Saharan African 
economies (Collier et al. 2004) – as well as 
suspected high levels of capital flight through 
transfer pricing by multinationals (often with 
domestic elites as junior partners), then the 
level of income-tax evasion rises further. 
Much of this toleration for tax evasion is 
linked to the fact that big business groups 
are important financers of political parties, 
as in the Philippines (Putzel 2010b). 
A second common pattern that emerges 
in our cases (and elsewhere) is the negligible 
collection of urban and rural property taxes. 
This provides a large benefit, especially to 
elites who own valuable property assets. 
In Zambia, for instance, property taxes in 
the period 2001-5 comprised a mere 0.13 
percent of GDP (Di John 2010b). In Rwanda, 
the coverage of the existing property-
taxation system reaches only a tiny fraction 
of properties in Kigali, and even in these 
cases taxation is based on very old property 
valuations with little relevance to the current 
market (Goodfellow 2011b). This may be one 
of the more important pay-offs urban-based 
elites receive in the reigning elite bargain. 
Meanwhile in Uganda populist interventions 
by the central government prior to elections 
have deliberately undermined the ability 
of the City Council to collect property tax 
(Goodfellow 2010). This low property-tax 
collection both limits the degree to which 
local, and especially city, governments can 
fund public goods and social spending. 
A third pattern that emerges in some of 
the cases (Zambia, Rwanda, Mozambique, 
Tanzania) is the relatively low rates of 
taxation on agriculture, which (while part 
of investment incentives) can be seen to 
benefit elite landowners and particularly 
large farmers and agro-processors.
Fourth, there has been a significant decline 
in the corporate tax burden on big business, 
which has benefitted both foreign firms 
(particularly in mining) and political and 
economic elites. This has taken place through 
several mechanisms. First, there is substantial 
evasion of taxation as discussed earlier. 
Second, there has been a decline in corporate 
taxes in most of our cases from an average of 
35-40 per cent in the 1980s and early 1990s to 
around 25-30 per cent since the late 1990s. 
Much of this decline in corporate tax rates 
has been the result of worldwide trends and 
influential IMF advice and conditionality, 
but has nevertheless enhanced the profits 
accruing to big businesses. Third, tax regimes 
in mining and for other large “mega-projects” 
have tended to be extraordinarily investor-
friendly through such mechanisms as low 
royalties, tax holidays, VAT and import-tariff 
exemptions among others (see Di John 2010c 
on Zambia, Mozambique and DRC). 
Territorial reach of the state
A third dimension of the state that is 
fundamental to fragility and resilience is 
the reach of the state’s organisations and 
institutions into its significant territory – 
that is, the main areas of human settlement, 
economic activity and borders, especially 
when the latter are contested, sites of conflict 
or sites for the passage of people or goods. 
A state can achieve considerable resilience 
without establishing its presence in remote 
areas only for so long as they remain sparsely 
populated, devoid of significant economic 
extraction and uncontested by either internal 
groups or interests from neighbouring 
countries. Historically, this was the case in 
middle-income countries like Colombia and 
the Philippines, but also in the least developed 
countries like Afghanistan. However, if any 
of these conditions change over time, then 
the absence of the state and its jurisdiction 
over land can lead to important sources of 
violent conflict and fragility.
When such lands become new sources 
of economic resource mobilisation, as 
happened with the rise of the coca trade 
in Colombia, forces promoting violence 
can become deeply rooted territorially 
and institutionally. Communist guerrillas, 
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paramilitaries and drug barons have been 
able to sustain for decades their challenge 
to state authority (or often, as is the case 
with paramilitary organisations, their 
alliances with state authority) by occupying 
such lands. This has occurred in Colombia, 
which is a middle-income country where 
agricultural incomes no longer figure 
prominently in the formal economy as a 
whole (Gutiérrez et al. 2007). 
We have looked at the territorial reach 
of the state from a number of perspectives. 
One important indicator of the state’s 
failure to establish its presence in the 
significant territory under its jurisdiction 
is the production of major illicit crops, as 
has been the case in Colombia (Gutiérrez 
et al. 2011). In the southern Philippines the 
fact that most economic activities remain 
informal is also an indication of fragility 
(Hesselbein 2011; Lara 2011). The extent 
to which major economic extraction occurs 
in conditions of informality or illegality is 
a major indicator of state fragility. Since 
the breakdown of the Mobutu state in 
what is today the DRC, a huge proportion 
of the country’s major economic activity 
(mining) has been undertaken beyond the 
purview of the state (Hesselbein 2011). A 
similar situation prevails in Afghanistan in 
relation to poppy cultivation (Goodhand 
and Mansfield 2010).
State resilience in Tanzania and Zambia 
was achieved by extending the reach of state 
organisations to most parts of the country 
(Putzel and Lindemann 2011; Di John 2010a). 
In Tanzania the villagisation programme 
of the 1970s, while having little effect on 
increasing agricultural productivity, allowed 
the state to extend its authority throughout 
the territory. The compulsory villagisation 
policy was the “largest resettlement effort 
in the history of Africa” with about five 
million rural Tanzanians being resettled. 
Some have judged the ujaama scheme, if 
not an abject failure, at best to have had a 
neutral effect on agricultural production 
and productivity. But there is considerable 
evidence that not only did the programme 
provide significantly improved access to very 
basic social services for most rural Tanzanians, 
it also played an important role in national 
integration (Klugman et al. 1999). In 
Zambia, agricultural policy aimed to reduce 
the role of expatriate commercial farmers 
(Sandberg 1990). Marketing boards, while 
often paying below international prices for 
produce, nevertheless gave small farmers a 
guaranteed price and access to transport and 
storage. Bates (1974) pointed out that this 
limited the expansion of large-scale farming 
and underpinned the maintenance of low 
land productivity, but this may well be one of 
the trade-offs that ensured peace over long 
periods of time. In both countries, during 
the first two decades after independence, 
marketing boards contributed to developing 
state-rural interest-group links, and in 
providing social infrastructure and services. 
In both countries, poverty was equally 
spread across the countryside throughout 
the nation’s territory, avoiding the kind of 
regional disparities that have generated 
violence in other countries.
It is also possible to assess the territorial 
reach of the state through an analysis 
of patterns of tax collection. Taxation 
– particularly in the form of land and 
property taxes, customs and border 
collection – can help increase the territorial 
reach of the state. There are a range of 
outcomes across the cases we studied. In 
Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Colombia and the Philippines, the state 
maintains border stations capable of 
collecting customs/trade taxes at least 
of most licit trade, though smuggling 
and illicit trade continue. There are also 
tax offices present in all provinces and 
at all levels of government throughout 
these countries (Di John 2010c). This has 
clearly not been the case in Afghanistan 
and the DRC, where state control over 
customs collection has been much more 
limited and concentrated geographically 
in the capital city, though the former has 
sporadically extended its territorial reach 
to most border stations. 
Despite the widespread reach of the 
tax authorities, it is important to note that, 
apart from customs collection, in many of 
the countries the bulk of taxed economic 
activity  is largely concentrated around the 
capital city (eg, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Uganda, DRC and Afghanistan), though 
in Zambia and Rwanda the tax base was 
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more geographically dispersed. In the 
middle-income country cases, Colombia 
and Philippines, tax collection is even 
more geographically spread due to greater 
regional development (Di John 2010c), 
which despite the fissures of regionally based 
fragility discussed above is an indication of 
the overall resilience of these states.
However, while cities clearly often 
contribute disproportionately to national 
tax revenues and are thus important 
sites of state reach, ironically within cities 
themselves there are important issues 
regarding the limits of territorial reach. 
In many cities in low-income states (both 
fragile and resilient) there is highly uneven 
reach within urban areas, which contributes 
both to low urban tax revenues, poor 
local services and sometimes pockets of 
fragility and violent conflict. For example 
in Kampala the very limited effectiveness 
of the state with respect to implementing 
basic regulations regarding urban planning 
impedes the delivery of basic services and 
infrastructure, which in turn hinders 
taxation because urban dwellers in certain 
neighbourhoods resist paying taxes when 
they feel the state offers them nothing 
in exchange (Goodfellow 2012). This 
perpetuates vicious cycles of poor state 
reach even in the heart of the city from 
which state power emanates. This poor 
performance by the state also arguably 
contributes to explosions of civic conflict 
in the form of violent riots in the city 
(Goodfellow 2010, 2011a). In Kigali, by 
contrast, the reach of the state is much 
more thorough, which has facilitated the 
collection of certain kinds of local taxes 
(with the important exception of property 
tax, as noted above), and also the provision 
of urban security (Goodfellow 2011b; 
Goodfellow and Smith forthcoming). 
This intense state reach could, however, 
pose its own dangers if combined with 
the suppression of non-violent forms of 
political conflict and contestation over the 
longer term (Beall et al. 2011; Goodfellow 
and Smith forthcoming). 
Institutional multiplicity
A final indicator of fragility, though one more 
difficult to precisely measure, concerns the 
dominance of state institutions or rules within 
a state’s significant territory. The coexistence 
of rival authorities with competing claims to 
social and political legitimacy is a defining 
characteristic of state fragility and a situation 
referred to in CSRC research as “institutional 
multiplicity” (Hesselbein et al. 2006). Where 
a state has not been able to ensure that its 
own institutions (or rules) trump rival rules 
anchored in non-state institutional systems, 
long-run peace and stability are unlikely. 
When alternative rule systems – like those 
anchored among traditional authorities, 
warlords, religious organisations or regional 
power brokers – exist in rivalry with the state’s 
own rules they can act as powerful sources 
of legitimacy to mobilise people in violent 
conflict against the state. When the rules of the 
state are consistently overridden by rival rule 
systems it is unlikely that a state can preside 
over peaceful processes of development. 
Extreme institutional multiplicity has 
characterised state fragility in the DRC 
and Afghanistan, where regional power 
brokers, warlords, traditional authorities 
and (in Afghanistan) religiously defined 
authorities, have long established 
institutions in which they anchor their claims 
to legitimacy, and their armed challenges 
to the state. Afghanistan provides a stark 
illustration of the challenges of institutional 
multiplicity. Military efforts to quash 
the Taliban have failed and alternative 
strategies of trying to incorporate diverse 
sites of authority into formal local and 
national government structures have not 
yet succeeded either (Beall and Esser 
2005; Giustozzi 2009b). In conditions of 
institutional multiplicity conflict tends 
to be formulated in “indivisible” terms 
(Hirschman 1995) as a zero-sum game that 
escalates into violence and is a pernicious 
source of state fragility. The contrasting 
achievements of Uganda, Tanzania and 
Zambia in promoting state rules over those 
of traditional authorities presented in Box 
2 illustrate why addressing institutional 
multiplicity is so central to achieving 
state resilience.
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Box 2: Institutional multiplicity in Uganda, Tanzani and Zambia
In Uganda, for all its successes, the presidency of Museveni has performed poorly 
in promoting the pre-eminence of state institutions in the face of rival institutional 
frameworks. Uganda’s experience of exacerbated conflict and civil war after 
independence was in no small part due to the failure of elites in control of the state 
to win over rival elites anchored in regionally and ethnically based communities 
(Lindemann 2010a; Golooba-Mutebi 2008a). Museveni’s success in the guerrilla war 
in the mid-1980s was due largely to the alliance with, and support from, the Baganda 
and other communities excluded from power under previous regimes. The National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) state attempted, through the restoration of the 
Buganda Kingdom and its endowment with certain legal rights to preside over cultural 
affairs within its traditional communities, to incorporate and subsume Bagandan 
institutions within the state. However, violent riots in Kampala in 2009 by supporters 
of the Kabaka (King of Buganda) were stark evidence of growing social discontent 
married to identity politics (Goodfellow 2010). Museveni’s highly personalised 
rule and the sluggishness with which he approached the institutionalisation of 
reforms did not contribute well to universalising state institutions in the face of 
rival institutions of the Buganda Kingdom. Exclusionary practices of the state in 
terms of appointments to government posts and promotions within the military 
(Lindemann 2010a) reinforced the claims of Baganda leaders and others who are 
now challenging the very legitimacy and constitutional basis of the regime in their 
pursuit of a federal alternative.  
This sits in sharp contrast to the experience of Tanzania and Zambia, where the 
state was able to either marginalise or subsume rival institutions (Putzel and Gutiérrez, 
2011). The central issue here is not the obliteration of non-state rule systems anchored 
in local traditions or religions, but their subordination to the preeminent rules, or 
laws, of the state. In Zambia, actors prone to appeal to traditional sources of authority 
were incorporated into the ruling party. In Tanzania, when rural communities 
disheartened by the absence of state police forces established village security 
forces based on their own local traditions (the sungusungu), the state recognised, 
incorporated and subsumed their authority within its own security architecture 
(Heald 2002). 
In cities, confrontations between rival 
authorities (including both state and non-
state actors) are commonplace due to the size, 
density and diversity of urban populations. 
But it is also in cities where the possibility 
for negotiated settlements between rivals 
is greatest – as our research in Durban and 
other cities has illustrated. There, traditional 
authorities were incorporated into the 
organisations of city government (Beall 
2005; Beall and Ngonyama 2009; Beall et 
al. 2011). If state consolidation is understood 
as a process of formalisation, such settlements 
can serve as important stepping stones in 
processes consolidating state resilience and 
transformation. While some observers see the 
incorporation of traditional authorities into 
formal governance structures as a throwback 
to colonial strategies of governance and 
antithetical to state consolidation (Mamdani 
1996), it is instructive to consider the myriad 
institutional arrangements that persist in 
“modern” states. In Europe, for example, 
constitutional monarchies continue to 
exist alongside well-established and stable 
parliamentary democracies, highlighting 
the fact that political settlements, which 
evolve in diverse ways, can contribute to state 
consolidation and transformation in the long 
run. The key question, from the viewpoint of 
policy intervention, is whether and to what 
extent a politically negotiated incorporation 
of potential rival sources of authority and 
legitimacy into a political settlement might 
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lead to state consolidation or erosion in the 
medium to long term.
Measuring state performance
In our research we contend that this approach 
to understanding state fragility and resilience 
can also be explored through quantitative 
analysis. Our research on measures of state 
performance has provided a far-reaching 
critical assessment of current practices and 
an alternative approach that we believe begins 
to address the problems that mark most 
efforts and that can serve as an alternative to 
policy-makers (Gutiérrez et al 2011; Gutiérrez 
2011). While many in the academic and 
policy communities are critical of current 
practices, they nevertheless deploy some form 
of measurement of “state fragility” in order 
to set priorities in the allocation of resources. 
While World Bank officials often proclaim 
that the CPIA index designed to allocate 
concessional aid to developing countries 
was never meant to be a measure of fragility, 
they nevertheless deploy it in identifying a 
list of fragile states. DFID, like other bilateral 
agencies, operates with its own list when it 
states, for instance, that 46 per cent of its 
bilateral expenditure in 2007-2008 was in 
fragile states (Chapman and Vaillant 2010), or 
when asserting as they do in their operational 
plan that only 10 per cent of fragile states 
have met the Millennium Development Goals 
(DFID 2011), or that fragile states account 
for a fifth of the population of developing 
countries and one-third of all who live in 
extreme poverty (DFID 2010). No one likes 
indexes, it would appear, but we cannot live 
without them.
In their present form, the majority of 
Poor State Performance Indices (PSPIs) 
are unsound. The reliability and validity of 
such high-profile PSPIs have been frequently 
challenged. Whilst not all criticisms are valid, 
some key points hold firm: many of the PSPIs 
are guilty of “conceptual stretching” where 
lack of definition and too many variables 
produce arbitrary and “noisy” results; 
aggregation (or weighting) of the variables 
is inadequately or incorrectly done, and in 
reality never discussed despite being the 
crucial step of index building after making 
the concept operational; and definitional 
inconsistency or the assigning of ad-hoc cut-
off points for data groupings diminishes the 
usefulness of results.  
On the other hand, at least two 
fundamental problems remain. First, PSPIs 
and other political databases are specific 
from the point of view of the type of data 
that they administer. Their databases “live” 
in a much more multi-dimensional and 
complex space than others like the datasets 
measuring economic growth.  They try to 
operationalise concepts that are ambiguous 
and have no properly defined borders: when, 
for example, does an “adequate” provision 
of public services start or end? Almost all 
PSP variables therefore have crucial missing 
information, especially where it is most needed 
(such as information related to countries in 
deep conflict or suffering major disruption). 
Many indexes rely on expert assessments of 
general social processes, without clearly noting 
that they contain specific variables that can 
increase or decrease separately. For example, 
a variable about “repression” or “violence 
against civilians” is not really ordinal because 
it includes counts that do not necessarily 
increase simultaneously. Some forms of 
violence may go up, while others go down. 
In sum, PSPIs have to deal with deteriorated, 
incomplete and ambiguous data. 
Second, all aggregation procedures can 
run into problems. This is particularly true 
when used in highly dimensional databases 
that are intended to operationalise complex 
concepts. For example, no reasonable 
aggregation procedure devised to produce 
a state-performance index can be fully 
compensatory: that is, it cannot assign 
a simple trade-off between one person 
who was tortured and the sound delivery 
of an immunisation programme. To do 
so is to embed in the index assumptions 
of equivalencies that are patently absurd 
and indefensible.
The team separated the operational 
definition of fragility and statehood 
from potential causes, consequences and 
correlates, in order to make tolerably good 
regressions between independent variables 
and both aggregated fragility and each of 
its dimensions separately. 
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Until now, all indexes have used fully 
compensatory aggregation rules, and 
resulting rankings are thus deeply flawed. 
In Measuring Poor State Performance, 
Gutiérrez et al (2011) have created new tools 
that deal with the incomplete and ambiguous 
nature of the data. Typically, builders and 
managers of political indicators have to deal 
with incomplete, deteriorated, intrinsically 
ambiguous and highly multidimensional 
data. The team created specific tools (fuzzy 
regressions and clustering, for example) that 
have allowed them to produce systematic 
data analyses while taking into account any 
limitations of the specific type of data that is 
being utilised. 
The team created a new Monopoly of 
Violence, Administration and Territorial 
Reach (MAT) database, which when deployed 
using the new tools provides important 
advances in measuring state performance.
First, it provides the systematic evidence 
emerging from our qualitative work to 
document our central proposition that 
fragile states constitute a specific subset of 
poor countries. If development (measured 
by GDP) and state fragility (measured by 
an aggregated index coming from the 
MAT variables) are correlated then a huge 
amount of unexplained variance remains 
and, furthermore, this variance is especially 
large at the bottom. This means that there 
are many different types of states at the lowest 
levels of development: some quite resilient, 
others quite fragile. Understanding that 
these different types exist and that different 
responses will thus be necessary should be 
the central focus of the policy community in 
relation to fragile states.
Second, different aspects of fragility 
have separate causes.  Each component of 
state performance seems to be associated 
with a different set of variables. This 
coincides with our research on the nature 
of political settlements and elite bargains, 
which suggests that states do not perform 
uniformly across their functions and 
different power equations within the state 
can lead to differential performance. 
Third, the quantitative analysis provides 
considerable systematic evidence for our 
proposition that achieving state resilience 
may make progress in development difficult.
Policy implications
1. Policy practice directed towards 
“fragile states” has been confounded by 
a failure to make clear what distinguishes 
the particular problem of “fragility” from 
general problems facing all developing 
countries. The narrow definition of “state 
fragility” presented here directs attention 
to factors that are most likely to provoke 
or sustain violence and conflict, and lead 
towards state collapse: the lack of a basic 
legitimate monopoly over the means of large-
scale violence, the absence of control over 
taxation, the failure of state organisations 
to operate in significant territories of the 
country and the existence of rival rule systems 
that take precedence over the state’s rules. 
Adopting a clearer definition of state fragility 
not only allows the identification of countries 
particularly at risk of collapse but also suggests 
priority areas of action that can stabilise states.
2. There is clearly a category of “resilient 
states” among the least developed countries, 
which has not been given due recognition 
in theory or policy practice. States that have 
achieved and maintained peace over time, 
even when they have presided over economic 
stagnation, have been able to consolidate 
national identity, institutions of citizenship 
and inter-community communication in ways 
that can insulate them against both external 
crises and the disruptive and violence-
provoking characteristics of future economic 
development. External interventions need 
to value the factors that contribute to state 
resilience even when they have involved the 
allocation of inefficient rents and socially 
questionable elite privileges. The steps taken 
to secure state consolidation in this sense 
may serve to block state transformation or 
development, leading to what we have termed 
“resilient stagnation”.
3. Analysis and policy discussion around 
fragile states has concentrated almost 
entirely on the “central state”, failing 
to see the particular place of cities in 
state formation historically and the 
contemporary importance of growing 
cities as key sites of state building and 
state erosion. The concentration of high-
value economic activity within the cities of 
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fragile states renders them central to building 
basic taxation capacities, and the size, density 
and diversity of urban settlements generates 
intense institutional multiplicity, which can 
result in challenges to the hegemony of state 
institutions at the very centre of the state. 
Elites capable of challenging the bargains 
on which political settlements rest are often 
located in cities, even when they derive wealth 
from non-urban activities, and growing civic 
conflict and violence threatens to undermine 
state consolidation.
4. Consolidating basic security needs to 
be seen as a precondition for not only 
more elaborate programmes of security-
sector reform, but also to the wide set of 
governance reforms from implementing 
competitive elections to carrying out 
programmes of decentralisation and 
devolution. Where the state’s own security 
forces are either incapable of defeating non-
state armed challengers or where the state 
cannot maintain power without unleashing 
violence on the population, priority must be 
given to the establishment of a unified chain 
of command, an end to all abusive practices 
against citizens, ensuring that officers and 
enlisted personnel are paid and have a 
basic capacity to provide protection to elites 
and non-elites within the state’s territory. 
Demobilisation may need to be delayed 
until there are opportunities for gainful 
employment and armed forces deployed in 
socially constructive ways. 
5. Taxation is a key indicator for measuring 
state performance and assessing the extent 
of fragility or resilience of a state. A state’s 
taxation capacity can provide an objective 
means to assess the power, authority and 
legitimacy the state possesses to mobilise 
resources; and the degree to which it 
monopolises tax collection, and the level, 
diversity and manner of collection of taxes 
all provide indications of a state’s position on 
the fragility to resilience spectrum. 
6. Assessing the reach of state organisations 
into its significant territory is a crucial 
indicator of a state’s resilience or fragility. 
When a state’s authority does not reach 
important sites of human settlement, economic 
resource mobilisation or areas bordering 
on neighbouring zones of conflict, this can 
be considered a major indication of state 
fragility. Programmes that aim to decentralise 
or devolve power in areas where the state is 
hardly present can aggravate fragility, while 
programmes that promote economic and 
social integration of the state’s territory, even if 
economically “inefficient”, may be important 
to establishing state resilience.  
7. The extent to which the state’s 
institutions, or rules, trump non-state 
institutional systems, whether anchored 
among regional, ethnic, traditional, 
religious or warlord actors in rural or 
urban areas, is a key indicator of state 
fragility or resilience. While institutional 
diversity is a valued characteristic of the most 
developed and stable states, where non-state 
institutions are not subsumed within the state’s 
own rule system they can act as important 
sources of legitimacy to those who mount 
violent challenges to the state. Programmes 
designed to promote participation and tap the 
resources of non-state organisations must be 
cognisant of this dimension of state fragility, or 
they may potentially contribute to provoking 
or aggravating violent conflict.
8. Dominant approaches to measuring 
state performance, state fragility and state 
failure are poor guides to analysis and 
policy making. They have been plagued with 
the same problems of conceptual stretching 
and ambiguity that have characterised 
qualitative work on the subject, thus serving 
as poor guides to analysis and policy making. 
However the imperatives of resource 
allocation within the policy world and the 
revolution in statistical information and 
tools that are available mean that this line 
of research and analysis is both necessary 
and promising. The advances made by the 
Crisis States Research Centre offer the basis 
for beginning to deal with the most important 
problems of ambiguity and aggregation 
and to present a more useful database of 
performance indicators and a more powerful 
set of policy-relevant analytical tools.
In assessing determinants of differential experiences of state fragility and 
resilience our attention has focused on patterns of political organisation 
(Putzel and Gutiérrez 2011). Political organisations are groups whose 
purposeful action is principally directed to achieving positions within 
the state and shaping its rules or institutions, and basic policy direction. 
They combine the deployment of techniques (for example, electoral 
competition, violent action, pact making) and they promote patterns 
of collective action – anything from loose networking, the organisation 
of armed militias to the building of hierarchical and disciplined political 
parties to pursue this goal. In the deployment of techniques and patterns 
of collective action, political organisations shape the ways elites relate 
to each other; they shape the relations between elites and their social 
constituencies; and they shape the fundamental characteristics of 
the political settlement – the institutions and organisations of the 
state – most importantly, the powers and the limitation of powers over 
executive authority.
The ways in which political organisations 
mobilise their social base and on whom 
they rely to finance their activities and 
the influence this creates, can either unite 
or divide powerful elites and win over or 
alienate non-elites to the state’s rules. 
Political organisations provide the ideas 
and strategies that define state rules and 
the techniques and patterns of collective 
action for managing elite bargains and 
projecting the authority of the state into the 
wider population. The executive authority 
within the state (which holds the powers of 
coercion, taxation and the public finance 
and essential service delivery) is the “glue” 
or “solvent” that holds together or dissolves 
an elite bargain. It is at the level of executive 
authority that an “encompassing interest,” 
in Olson’s (1971) terms, can be established 
in the state. Each of these dimensions of 
political organisation is crucial to the 
fragility-resilience equation.
 
Importance of  
executive authority
How a political organisation once in power 
structures and institutionalises executive 
authority within the state is crucial to 
trajectories of fragility and resilience. This 
is because executive authority needs to be 
powerful enough both to offer credible 
positive incentives for elites to forge a stable 
bargain (able to defend property rights 
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State resilience is most likely achieved when 
the political organisation(s) that control 
the state: (1) mobilise their social base 
in ways that accommodate the demands 
of a sustainable elite coalition without 
pursuing violent repression of non-elites; 
(2) establish executive authority within 
the state with the power and resources to 
discipline defectors and reward those who 
play by state rules; and (3) establish the 
executive authority independent of the 
particular individual(s) who occupy high 
office and subject it to checks against the 
abuse of its power. 
A diversity of forms of  
political organisations
The universe of political organisations and 
the forms of collective action they promote, 
particularly in developing countries where 
state formation is still on the agenda, are 
immensely varied. They comprise not only 
political parties (which are themselves a 
heterogeneous set), but can include clan 
alliances, territory-wide centralised personalist 
patronage networks, competing warlord 
realms, competing militia organisations 
and military dictatorship. Furthermore, in 
processes of state formation it is typical that 
state and party organisations merge, and that 
some of the main modalities of collective 
action are pursued through the agencies 
and networks of the state.
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and allocate promised rents) and to offer 
credible negative incentives, or the power 
to punish elites who pursue their interests 
through violent means outside the terms 
of the bargain. Of course the problem 
with powerful executive authority is the 
ever present danger that it will abuse its 
power through exclusion or repression, 
which means that political organisations 
capable of promoting state resilience need 
to simultaneously incorporate checks on 
the abuse of power by executives. Executive 
authority needs to be understood not 
only at the level of the central state, but 
throughout the tiers of the state down to 
the local level. This is why in some states, 
forms of political organisation emerge at 
the sub-national level, particularly in cities, 
capable of effecting considerable change 
through local executive authority, as we 
discuss below.
The executive authority of a state 
is shaped by the patterns of political 
organisation from which it emerges. In 
Zambia an effective executive authority 
was established by a ruling party, UNIP, 
which was faced with fractious contending 
elites by concentrating power in the hands 
of the President. His office was given the 
means both to deal with internal factions 
and to buy in elites that were potentially 
capable of destabilising the state. In a 
sense, by bringing contentious elite groups 
into the state, the conflict between them 
could be managed peacefully. This took 
what would be an “indivisible”, all or 
nothing conflict, in Hirschman’s (1995) 
terms, and transformed it into a divisible 
conflict capable of negotiated resolution. 
At the same time the power of the 
executive was limited, first by allowing and 
institutionalising the position of powerful 
non-executive actors within the party/state 
rather than subordinating, marginalising 
or repressing them. Second, abuse of power 
by the executive authority was limited by 
a “third party” enforcer by respecting 
the independence and abstaining from 
attacking the Zambian trade unions. This 
was crucial not only in pre-empting elite 
factions from mobilising social groups to 
take up violence to pursue their demands, 
but also in developing an interest among 
all elite contenders in building a security 
sector that was both effective and loyal. In 
other words, it was a formula for creating 
state resilience (Di John 2010a; Putzel and 
Gutiérrez 2011).
The contrast to Uganda is striking. 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement 
(NRM), which banned competitive political 
parties, allowed the concentration of 
executive authority within the state, and 
this contributed in no small part to the 
development achievements of the regime 
over the last 25 years. But the loose structure 
of the NRM provided no means to impose 
limitations on the executive authority. This 
allowed the executive to abuse power both 
within the state – for instance by developing 
personalist patronage networks within the 
armed forces – and in relation to opposition 
forces made up of elites excluded from 
the state. In the end, this had a negative 
feedback loop with signs of damaging 
effectiveness as well, again observable in 
a weakening of the armed forces (Putzel 
and Gutiérrez 2011).
Political organisation and the 
differential performance within 
the state
The forms of political organisation and the 
patterns of collective action they pursue 
can create an executive authority that is 
effective in some areas while crippled in 
others – and importantly not by design, 
but by unintended and unpredictable 
consequences of particular courses of 
action. This insight provides an important 
corrective to the enterprise to assess and 
measure governance performance in policy-
oriented research. Over the past decade 
research at the World Bank has attempted 
to “measure” seven key areas of “good 
governance” (security of property rights, 
voice and accountability, political instability 
and violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption) and identify their contribution 
to economic performance (see Kaufman 
et al. 1999). As discussed above the 
usefulness of these types of measurements 
and explanation is limited both because 
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data is generated through subjective 
surveys and because serious problems of 
aggregation are not tackled. In fact, in their 
approach to aggregate measures they do 
not provide any information on the extent 
to which capacity varies across different 
state functions or sectors within a polity 
(Di John, 2008, 2010d). 
In Zambia, the ruling party’s efforts to 
forge an inclusive elite bargain and a stable 
political settlement led to the creation of a 
strong capacity for conflict management 
through rent allocation. But it was this 
very pursuit, which spawned an approach 
to marketing boards in agriculture and 
management of mining, that had huge 
economic costs. While marketing boards 
were central to party and state control over 
the countryside and were instrumental in 
expanding the territorial reach of the state, 
the resulting loss in economic production 
and productivity was high. In mining, in the 
early 1970s, in response to pressures from rent-
seeking elites within the UNIP ruling party, 
President Kaunda used his executive power 
to terminate the management contracts in 
the mining sector and established direct state 
control despite a dire lack of management 
capacity. Proceeds from mining were not 
reinvested but used to finance patronage 
arrangements that bought peace, and 
production in the sector suffered a sharp 
decline (Di John 2010b). The ability to 
maintain political order has coincided with 
a state incapable of promoting sustained 
economic development. The Zambian 
state’s strong capacity and performance in 
conflict management and its weak capacity 
and performance in economic management 
was not the result of a deficit in technical skills, 
but rather a result of deeply rooted interests 
and the way they were politically organised, 
which achieved state resilience at the expense 
of economic development.
The Zambian experience sits in sharp 
contrast to that of Botswana in regards to 
both marketing boards in agriculture and 
the management of the mining sector (Di 
John and Putzel 2009).  In Botswana, the 
ruling party incorporated cattle-ranching 
elites, but also relied on the support of the 
wider rural vote to maintain its power.  The 
marketing board it established gave ranchers 
a good deal and ensured exchange rates 
were not overvalued stimulating exports, in 
direct contrast to Zambia’s management of 
marketing boards. Internal party competition 
and the pressure of opposition parties 
provided both an incentive for performance 
and a check against executive abuse of power. 
The fact that diamond mining only emerged 
as a major industry after the country had 
developed broad-based political parties and 
efficient economic institutions to protect 
property rights helped avoid de-stabilising 
rent-seeking struggles. Due to the generally 
broad and inclusive coalition of the BDP 
ruling party, diamond rents were widely 
distributed in the form of infrastructure 
and social service delivery, which reduced 
the incentives of elites “to rock the boat” 
by forming large-scale challenges to the 
state authority. The pattern of political 
organisation that emerged in Botswana 
allowed the state to create strong capacities 
in economic management, which achieved 
resilience at much less cost to development. 
The construction of a legitimate, national 
political party, as the organisational 
expression of the political settlement, was 
central to both increasing the bargaining 
power of the government to maximise the 
tax benefits of mineral abundance and to 
organise spending and patronage in ways that 
promoted political stability and economic 
growth (Di John and Putzel 2009).
In Colombia the executive authority 
produced by a consociational agreement 
forged in the late 1950s to resolve a decade of 
internecine conflict known as “La Violencia” 
could act effectively around issues that did 
not step on the toes of the local politicians 
with interests in rural lands who were 
empowered by the consociational agreement. 
This is why the Colombian state could build 
strong capacities and achieve considerable 
success in macroeconomic management, 
but not in designing and implementing 
an effective land reform. The agreement 
that bought peace in effect imposed too 
great a check on executive authority, and in 
the process ushered in a transformation of 
the elite bargain by stealth, incorporating 
within its fold networks of criminals and 
narcotraffickers who emerged as prominent 
on the local scene. This explains both the 
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differential capacities within the Colombian 
state and why, despite the resilience it 
achieved in many respects, it suffers from 
deeply rooted fissures of fragility (Putzel and 
Gutiérrez 2011).
National political parties and 
state resilience
Our research has found that the construction 
of national political parties is central to the 
institutionalisation of centralised patronage 
and can reduce the possibility of political 
contests around more narrow regional or 
ethnic lines. This is consistent with recent 
econometric evidence that the main factor 
responsible for reducing conflict is the extent 
to which political organisations are cohesive 
(Gladstone et al. 2010; Di John 2010c).
It may be more likely, particularly 
where a state is poorly formed or deeply 
damaged after a period of intense civil 
war, to secure a modicum of democratic 
functioning within a single party than in open 
competitive electoral politics. This was the 
case in Tanzania and Zambia in the decades 
following independence and more recently 
in Uganda and Rwanda after emerging from 
civil war and genocide. This was because a 
single party could ensure that those engaged 
in politics accepted the basic rules of the state, 
for instance governing citizenship and the 
parameters of rent allocation within the elite 
bargain. Organising to secure state power 
did not require recruitment on the basis of 
identity politics either among elites or their 
social constituents. In Tanzania and Zambia, 
the ability of the state to reach throughout 
the country’s territory was a by-product of 
the development of nationally based political 
parties, which developed an inclusive system 
of patronage across all agricultural regions 
(Hesselbein et al. 2006; Di John 2010a).
But for such a model of political 
organisation to contribute to state 
resilience, there must be checks on 
executive authority (particularly its exercise 
of coercive force) built in to the party’s 
basic structure. There must be a means to 
replace leaders and to express differences 
in viewpoints and strategy. The single party 
organisation in Zaire under Mobutu had 
precisely the opposite effect, leading to 
extreme state fragility since it embodied no 
checks on the abuse of executive authority 
(Hesselbein 2007; Putzel et al. 2008). In 
establishing his one party state, Mobutu 
imitated the successful form of political 
organisation in Tanzania, but without the 
historical foundations and checks and 
balances that the CCM had established 
during forty years before independence. 
Political organisations evolve 
through imitation
Learning by imitation of the dominant 
actors produces a rapid spread of skills 
and techniques that may have developed 
by chance, but that end up affecting the 
political settlement in quite consequential 
ways (Gutiérrez 2007). When the Liberal 
Party had to accommodate to the terms of 
the consociational agreement in Colombia, 
to survive in electoral politics and to be able 
to exercise authority in any domain it made 
big concessions to local elites who could 
deliver the votes, thereby welcoming into its 
fold actors anchored in illicit economies and 
deploying violent techniques who previously 
were shunned. When this allowed them to 
win votes, then the Conservatives adopted 
the same techniques thus bringing about a 
transformation of the political system, the 
shape of the elite bargain and a fundamental 
weakening of the state’s monopoly over the 
means of violence. 
© UN Photo/Mario Rizzolio, Ntabila camp in Tanzania 12 July 2007. Despite hosting 
hundreds of thousands of refugees from neigbouring conflicts, Tanzania has remained peaceful.
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A more fortuitous outcome was generated 
by similar dynamics in Zambia. When UNIP 
came to power it adopted a practice of 
“tribal balancing” to get beyond tribal 
social mobilisation that could well have 
led to violence, and it managed to hold 
onto power in part by perpetuating this 
practice. It was so effective that when the 
disaffected opposition groups – some of 
which had actively mobilised on the basis 
of ethnolinguistic identities and others 
which had shunned tribal balancing (the 
trade unions) – mounted their challenge 
to UNIP, they appeared as the MMD in 
the mirror image of UNIP adopting the 
same successful practices at least during 
the party’s first decade in office, with a 
similarly positive impact on state resilience 
(Putzel and Gutiérrez 2011).
Transformational politics  
in the cities 
Patterns of political organisation can 
change over time and the terrain of urban 
politics offers some of the most opportune 
possibilities for redrawing elite bargains 
and reshaping political settlements. One 
of the consequences of the changes in 
Colombian politics described above was the 
increased dissatisfaction of urban elites with 
the way power in the major political parties 
shifted to local rural elites and eventually 
criminal actors. This increasingly affected 
the fortunes and patterns of conflict in the 
urban areas and led to the emergence of 
new coalitions (Beall et al. 2011).
Since the 1990s, Bogotá and Medellín 
have seen an extraordinary reduction in 
civic conflict, described by Gutiérrez et 
al. (2009) as a “metropolitan miracle”. 
Against a backdrop of soaring levels of 
urban violence, a fresh style of politics 
accompanied a new constitution adopted 
in 1991. This allowed for wider political 
participation and debate, which in turn saw 
coalitions of essentially middle class and 
elite interests emerge. They were politically 
heterogeneous but homogeneous in their 
collective commitment to the provision of 
public goods targeted at wider urban society, 
but ultimately for their own benefit as well. 
Simply put, “the bourgeoisie discovered 
that its own interests sat well with the urban 
modernisation programmes” proposed 
by the capital city’s mayor. Consequently 
a relatively diverse combination of urban 
interest groups, who traditionally had 
pitted their interests against one another 
and continued to do so in other cities such 
as Cali, came together in the realisation 
that “the factionalism of traditional 
politics made collective action difficult 
and the costs paid in terms of the need of 
provision of private security were too high” 
(Gutiérrez et al. 2009: 14). 
The “miracle” was achieved by the 
particular configuration of the political 
coalitions forged in the two cities at 
critical junctures, alongside the creation 
of institutions and processes for generative 
engagement. The subsequent drop in 
homicide rates was not achieved in the third 
city, Cali, where a developmental coalition 
did not emerge and where violent civic 
conflict persists. In Bogotá and Medellín 
it was the presence of a substantial and 
differentiated vocal urban middle class 
that made the critical difference. Had only 
a narrow coalition of dominant elites been 
involved in decision making, the costs of 
providing private security for themselves 
would not be prohibitive and thus the 
motivation for broader urban public goods 
provision would not have been present. 
Indeed, this is what has arguably occurred 
in contemporary Managua, the capital city 
of Nicaragua (Rodgers 2004, 2008).
The formation of developmental urban 
coalitions in Bogotá and Medellín is one of 
the most compelling examples we have of 
institutionalised mechanisms for generative 
civic engagement in a state marked by deep 
fissures of fragility. However, it is important 
not to overplay the inclusionary nature 
of class coalitions that came to dominate 
political organisation in these cities. The 
majority of poor urban residents in Bogotá 
and Medellín were not welcomed into public 
debate and attention needs to be paid to the 
“illusion of the bourgeoisie that the defence 
of its interests equals the defence of society 
as a whole” (Gutiérrez et al. 2009: 15). While 
there has been a reduction in violent crime 
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and homicides, the institutionalisation of 
mechanisms to allow for the articulation 
and negotiation of conflicts between the 
lower and higher rungs of urban society 
needs further attention, and the challenge 
of replicating the gains made throughout 
the state is formidable. 
Policy implications
1. Executive authority within the state is 
crucial to determining the inclusiveness 
and stability of elite bargains and 
the wider political settlement. It is 
fundamentally shaped by the techniques 
and patterns of collective action deployed 
by the political organisation(s) that control 
the state. Political organisations determine 
whether the executive authority has the 
power to articulate and enforce both 
positive incentives for elites to play by 
state rules and negative incentives that 
make it costly for elites to exit. Crucially, 
in establishing executive power within 
the state, political organisations play the 
central role in establishing checks against 
the abuse of power by the executive. 
Efforts to influence patterns of governance 
need to focus on how any reform or 
policy package may affect or be affected 
by the executive authority of the state. 
2. Understanding the particularities 
of political organisation must be a 
prerequisite to efforts to promote 
governance reforms. In the developing 
world, where state formation and 
consolidation is still very much on the 
agenda, there are a plethora of different 
forms of political organisation that 
matter. The techniques they use to win 
and maintain power and the patterns of 
collective action they promote are diverse 
and often difficult for outsiders to see, but 
understanding these in any given country 
is essential to understanding how politics 
works. External actors tend to (mistakenly) 
assume that the familiar models of political 
organisation found in developed liberal 
democracies are present or can be easily 
created in developing countries. While 
forms of political organisation can be, and 
widely are, mimicked, the way they operate 
is historically and societally specific.
3. External actors should focus on areas of 
good performance of a state and attempt 
to understand the interests that have led 
to state effectiveness, rather than attempt 
to assess performance in the aggregate. 
In this way they can determine whether 
such performance can be duplicated 
elsewhere, or why it may not be, and ensure 
that interventions designed to address one 
domain of activity – for instance the provisions 
of state subsidies to agriculture – do not 
undermine another central activity of the 
state, most notably conflict management. 
Prominent attempts to assess governance 
performance in the aggregate are bound to 
present a distorted understanding of reality, 
both because they are based on subjective 
and impressionistic perceptions and because 
they do not account for or focus on the ways 
in which states perform differently in the 
different domains of their activities. This 
differential performance is deeply related 
to the way political organisations deal with the 
interests of elites and their social constituents. 
The creation of state capacities in this regard is 
deeply influenced by political decisions and is 
never simply the result of having the technical 
expertise necessary for a particular activity. 
4. Political possibilities, and therefore 
governance reforms, are decisively linked 
to reigning elite interests at a given moment 
in time. The ways politics are organised are 
intimately linked to the interests of elites 
and their constituents at given moments in 
history. Botswana’s successful management 
of its mining resources is related strongly to 
the fact that the political organisations that 
shaped the executive authority of the state did 
so before mining resources were available, 
and built a strong and inclusive bargain on 
the basis of its cattle-ranching economy, 
which fortuitously proved solid enough to 
manage the windfalls derived from diamonds. 
Strategies for political or economic reforms 
that are radically at odds with interests 
embodied in a political settlement will either 
fail or are likely to provoke conflict. The 
birth of progressive political movements in 
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some cities in Colombia in recent years was 
based on a profound realignment of interests 
within the city. 
5. The promotion of democracy in poor 
countries needs to focus on establishing 
mechanisms for checks and balances on 
executive authority rather than the form of 
political party competition. In almost all cases 
of state resilience in poor countries, forms of 
centralised patronage have been organised in 
national political parties, though not all states 
with national political parties have achieved 
state resilience. There are important reasons 
why, in fragile states, even the achievement of 
a modicum of democratic functioning may 
be more possible in the context of a single 
national party than in a competitive party 
system. Where the basic parameters of the 
state, like who is a citizen and who is not, 
or the basic authority to allocate property 
rights, remain contested, the establishment of 
multiple political parties may allow rival elites 
and their social constituents to challenge the 
existence of the state itself, thus leading to 
exacerbated conflict.
6. Political organisations tend to 
imitate those who succeed in gaining 
and keeping power regardless of what 
advice they may receive from at home or 
abroad. The evolution of dominant forms 
political organisation and strategies and 
tactics, whether in directions conducive 
to promoting state resilience or fragility, 
development or stagnation, often appears to 
be incomprehensible.  Our research indicates 
that leaders of  political organisations learn 
by imitating the behaviour of dominant 
(successful) political actors. This allows for 
the rapid spread of skills and techniques 
of “doing politics”, which can break from 
long established traditions in both positive 
and negative ways. Once this is understood, 
it is possible to understand why particular 
techniques and patterns of collective action 
are adopted by political actors, even when in 
doing so they may challenge long-established 
elite bargains and political settlements (as in 
Colombia), or reproduce the same despite 
having long fought for change (as in Zambia). 
7. Possibilities exist for transformative 
political coalitions to emerge committed 
to establishing security, particularly in 
urban environments where a diversity of 
relatively well organised interest groups 
can challenge reigning political practices. 
A large and diversified urban middle class 
in Bogotá and Medellín had an interest in 
collectively addressing growing civic violence, 
in contrast to the traditional wealthy elites who 
could organise their security privately. The 
new groups also had the organisational clout 
to rise above the confines of the increasingly 
discredited traditional political organisations. 
They recast an elite bargain at the level of the 
city primarily centred on their own interests 
rather than the interests of the urban poor, 
but nonetheless their capture of power at the 
level of the city significantly reduced violent 
conflict. While challenges to move further in 
a developmental direction or in organising 
around the interests of poor communities 
remained, the dynamic of politics in these 
Colombian cities illustrates the more likely 
and possible route for reformists politics 
that shore up state resilience in developing 
countries today.
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Since the late 1990s analytical work on violent conflict in the developing 
world and the policy prescriptions based on it has been dominated by 
propositions that non-state armed actors are fundamentally motivated 
by “greed” rather than “grievance” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002) and that 
wars of the late 20th and early 21st Centuries are of a “new” type (Kaldor 
1999), characterised by high levels of criminalisation. Recent cross-country 
quantitative analysis has cast considerable doubt on much of this work, 
identifying poverty and political institutions as major determinants of violence 
(Goldstone et al. 2010). But in policy domains the propositions of Collier 
and his colleagues still influence thinking about why people participate 
in armed conflict. A wide range of CSRC research on states and cities 
challenges these propositions, demonstrating the strategic importance 
of understanding not only the different motivations that lead non-state 
actors to take up violence, but also the ways in which the structure and 
dynamics of armed organisations affect trajectories of war, peace and state 
building. The research included: a comparative study of the main guerrilla 
organisation (FARC) and the paramilitary organisations in Colombia; a 
comparative study of non-state armed organisations in Colombia and 
Afghanistan; a range of research on warlords, the Taliban and other armed 
organisations in Afghanistan; a study of the Islamic and clan-based armed 
movements in the southern Philippines and comparative studies of urban 
violence in both fragile and resilient states.   
assessing their likely durability over time 
as well as possibilities for combating or 
making peace with them.
In Colombia both the FARC, which has 
posed the longest standing armed challenge 
to the state, and the paramilitaries, which 
have often been allied with it, are deeply 
embedded in narco-trafficking, other 
illegal businesses and in attacks against 
each other. Indeed there is evidence that 
like the political organisations described 
above, they have evolved through processes 
of imitating the “successful” tactics of 
each other. However, there are profound 
differences between them, based on who 
they recruit (in terms of gender, education 
and occupation), how they operate – the 
organisational mechanisms they have 
employed as they attempted to survive 
and grow over time – and why combatants 
join the group and why they remain over 
time. Detailed analysis of a wide variety 
of data sources demonstrated that FARC 
members are younger and less educated 
than paramilitaries, and comprise a higher 
proportion of peasants and women in 
contrast to the more socially heterogeneous 
male membership of the paramilitaries 
POlITICS OF VIOlENT CONFlICT: REBElS, 
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Bringing politics back in to the 
study of violent conflict
CSRC research challenged one of the 
basic propositions coming out of the 
crude economic determinants of conflict 
literature, namely that all non-state armed 
organisations are essentially the same in that 
those who lead and join them are motivated 
by individual utility maximisation, or the 
economic returns they can expect from 
engaging in violence. For Collier rebellion 
can be studied as a form of criminality 
explained by the rent-seeking behaviour 
of leaders and the existence of a labour 
market for unemployed young males. A 
detailed study in Colombia of the main 
guerrilla organisation, the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), 
and rival paramilitary organisations, 
found that not only do non-state armed 
organisations differ in terms of motivations 
and objectives in pursuing violence, but 
also the differences between them cannot 
be understood as a result of differential 
access to economic resources (Gutiérrez 
2008). Understanding the organisational 
dynamics of armed groups is central to 
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(Gutiérrez 2008). Paramilitaries recruit 
more delinquents and former state soldiers, 
with leaders drawn from territorial elites 
including cattle farmers, other rural rich 
and narco-traffickers. FARC operates more 
as an army, and is more bureaucratised with 
tougher discipline and collective rather than 
individual economic incentives, in contrast 
to the paramilitaries whose organisations are 
based more on networks of personal relations. 
While both engage in illegal economic 
activities, the clearly established chain of 
command in FARC ensures resources are 
centralised with the organisation, while the 
paramilitaries offer individual incentives to 
profit from these activities, allowing a degree 
of property accumulation and upward social 
mobility not found in FARC. While both 
types of organisation behave brutally towards 
civilians, FARC combatants are more likely 
to do so as part of a strategic plan and under 
orders, while paramilitary brutality is likely 
to be more widespread and arbitrary due to 
the licence given to individual combatants.
Individual economic incentives 
have made the paramilitaries a weaker 
organisation, more prone to internal 
disputes and desertions than FARC. 
FARC requires a life-time commitment 
of recruits who are more likely to come 
from the ranks of the employed, while 
the paramilitaries demand no such 
commitment and draw more foot soldiers 
from the ranks of the unemployed. FARC 
have been more prone to enforce rules of 
moral behaviour, restrictions on drinking, 
wife battering, incest, drug consumption 
and prostitution whereas paramilitaries 
generally have been unconcerned with such 
rules. Ideology places a greater role in the 
FARC than among the paramilitaries. The 
paramilitaries are more of a “cadre army”, 
led by legal and illegal elites, operating 
more as a mafia, while the FARC are more 
of a “mass army”, whose leaders come from 
modest social backgrounds and function 
as a disciplined fighting force. 
By undertaking this type of analysis it 
becomes much more possible to assess the 
sustainability of a non-state armed group 
and the possibilities for engaging in peace 
negotiations, not to mention the tactics and 
strategy that would need to be employed by 
a state to achieve victory and to pre-empt the 
re-emergence of violent challenges. It also 
allows an understanding of the challenges 
posed in demobilisation and reintegration 
processes after war, which far too often 
are treated with a uniform template that 
does not account for profound differences 
between non-state armed combatants. For 
instance, in Colombia paramilitary child 
soldiers have a strong problem of drug 
and alcohol consumption, while FARC 
children do not (instead, FARC girls have 
a history of abortions, with the particular 
psychological and social legacies incurred).
Can warlords be state builders?
CSRC research in Afghanistan and in 
the southern Philippines, looking at the 
role of regionally based warlords, has 
similarly pointed to the importance of 
understanding differential organisational 
dynamics and incentive systems among 
non-state armed actors for assessing the 
prospects of peace making and indeed 
of state building and state consolidation. 
In Afghanistan, warlords prioritised 
the accumulation of power through the 
monopolisation of large-scale violence and the 
centralisation of patronage, though through 
markedly different means (Giustozzi 2009b). 
The research illustrated how processes of 
primitive accumulation of power needed to 
© UN Photo/UNODC/Zalmai, Opium poppy fields in Afghanistan, 2005. The income from 
opium has been an important source of finance for continued warfare in Afghanistan.
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pursue state formation were difficult if not 
impossible to carry out within bureaucratised 
or representative systems. Still, once confident 
in the solidity of their territorial base, in 
pursuing their goals Afghan’s warlords, who 
relied on patrimonial forms of authority, 
were compelled to engage with processes of 
bureaucratisation in efforts to get beyond the 
limits of what Giustozzi called the ephemeral 
“empires of mud”, which disappear with the 
passing of the patrimonial leader. However, 
this process took the shape of a difficult and 
precarious transition between a patrimonial 
and a more institutionalised system, with 
negative implications for their legitimacy 
among key constituencies. The departure 
from pure patrimonialism led to an increasing 
difficulty in exercising authority over what 
Giustozzi has labelled the “military class”. 
Still they achieved too little in terms of 
institution building to be able to capture the 
organisational and economic bases of the 
cities. The transition was made particularly 
problematic by the establishment of a central 
government with the backing of foreign 
armed force. But while the government stood 
in the way of the warlords they did not succeed 
themselves in establishing control over the 
country’s territory.  
Research in the Philippines looked at why 
political-military actors of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), who engaged in a 
peace process with the central state in exchange 
for gaining control over a new autonomous 
region, soon lost popular legitimacy and 
political control over the region (Lara 2011). 
The study carefully examined the differential 
institutional basis underpinning the power of 
three sets of actors in the region (political-
military organisations, Islamic clerics and their 
networks, and warlord/clan leaders) and the 
leverage this gave them with the central state. 
It demonstrated that the legitimacy of political-
military organisation had been based largely 
on their ability to protect local communities, 
both in terms of physical security and in terms 
of securing livelihoods. Giving up their armed 
power without building new alliances, the 
political-military organisations could not 
rival the warlord-like power of clan leaders 
whose own claim to legitimacy and leverage 
with the central state was based on both 
their command of coercive force and the 
durability of their own institutions, or rule 
systems, governing access to the informal and 
illicit economy. 
From armies to networks: the 
organisational dynamics of non-
state armed actors
Building on comparative research within 
single countries, the CSRC also undertook 
comparative analysis across country cases, 
most interestingly in a study of the FARC in 
Colombia and the Taliban in Afghanistan, to 
explore the role of organisational dynamics 
in determining variance of behaviour of 
non-state armed actors (Gutiérrez and 
Giustozzi 2010). We discovered the power 
of an analytical lens that assesses where a 
challenger lies on a spectrum between two 
polar types of organisation: an army and 
a network association. This has reinforced 
our findings that we can learn more about 
the dynamics of violent conflict through 
organisation-inspired, than through resource-
inspired, explanations (Collier and Hoeffler 
1998). It also challenges the important work 
of Weinstein (2006), who suggests that armed 
groups that are strategically dependent on 
support from civilians refrain from attacking 
them, while groups that can rely on illicit 
resource income are more likely to exercise 
violence against civilians. This research also 
demonstrated the advantages of deploying 
qualitative comparative small-N studies over 
single case studies on the one hand, and 
the insights they permit that quantitative 
cross-national investigations on their own 
do not. Their great strength over the other 
approaches is to identify explanatory 
mechanisms that travel across contexts.
Both the FARC and the Taliban are 
heavily reliant on income from illicit crops: 
coca and opium respectively. Both have 
undertaken rebellions over a long period of 
time and have been relatively successful in 
surviving the offensives of adversaries who 
command huge technological superiority. 
Both are violent and repressive but within 
limits. However, the Taliban are deeply 
rooted in society while the FARC is not. 
Our research has found that the differences 
between them can best be understood 
through organisational dynamics. The 
This research 
demonstrated the 
advantages of 
deploying qualitative 
comparative small-N 
studies over single 
case studies on the 
one hand, and the 
insights they permit 
that quantitative 
cross-national 
investigations on 
their own do not. 
Their great strength 
over the other 
approaches is to 
identify explanatory 
mechanisms that 
travel across contexts. 
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FARC operates as an army, which maximises 
separation from civilians: physically, by 
establishing camps; symbolically, with 
insignias and uniforms; and socially, 
by creating new hierarchical structures 
independent from those of the peasant 
world in which they largely operate. The 
Taliban functions as a network, maximising 
integration with civilians, adopting existing 
social hierarchies and merging with 
society both physically and symbolically. 
Armies can survive only through internal 
cohesion and require denying access of 
fighters and middle-ranking officers to 
rents, and punishing any internal conflict. 
Networks survive by expanding their social 
base offering incentives to members and 
followers, and internal conflict is a price 
for broad inclusiveness.
The research compared the two 
armed challengers according to military 
hierarchy, membership and discipline, 
ideology, funding and their relations with 
civil society. They differ sharply along each 
parameter. The Taliban are decentralised, 
based on “fronts” formed on the initiative 
of local commanders, whereas the FARC has 
evolved into a centralised organisation with 
a non-personalised leadership organised in 
columns with territorial commands in charge 
of military actions, tax collection and other 
rackets. Discipline is loose among the Taliban, 
where criminal behaviour is tolerated, and 
only occasionally punished, factionalism is rife 
and fighters and commanders are paid, while 
commanders recruit community followers 
often for a short engagement with the 
network and of course do not recruit women 
(Giustozzi 2008b, 2009b). FARC members 
receive no payment and rents collected are 
generally centralised, membership is for life 
and community mobilisation is minimal, 
while membership is highly reliant on women 
recruits and factionalism almost absent. The 
Taliban are inspired by religious ideology and 
a claim to nationalism bolstered by a deeply 
rooted network of organic intellectuals or 
clerics who command social respect. FARC 
is a radically lay group, originally inspired by 
communist ideology and disconnected from 
local mores. Funding is highly centralised 
in the FARC, with little individual rent 
allocation, while decentralised in the Taliban 
with wide access to individual rents – though 
both have usurped important “regulatory 
functions” from the state in centrally tapping 
into the resources from illegal drugs. Both 
organisations undertake military operations 
that cause great civilian casualties, and practice 
“rough justice” among members and citizens 
accused as traitors. But the Taliban are rooted 
in society through religion, the coordination 
of rural elites (traders, smugglers, clerics 
and landowners) and through their network 
structure. The FARC is isolated from society; 
its ideology appears almost alien, with its 
presence concentrated in sparsely populated 
areas and has no capacity for long-term 
connections with regional elites. 
As our research concludes, “while 
the FARC is an army without substantial 
political support, the Taliban are a powerful 
political movement without an army 
proper” (Gutiérrez and Giustozzi 2010). 
The organisational techniques deployed 
(closer to those of an army or of a network) 
resulted from their experience of conflict 
as they sought solutions to urgent problems 
of the day, and solidified through practices, 
routines, identities and know how applied 
over time. They were not in this sense 
determined by access to resources, but they 
have been marked by path dependencies in 
that organisational choices taken influence 
possibilities in the future. Understanding the 
divergent practices and survival mechanisms 
of armed organisations that challenge the 
state is crucial to attempts either to defeat 
them in combat or make peace with them 
through negotiation.
Political drivers of urban  
civic violence
Cities have always been focal points of 
sovereign conflicts given their strategic 
importance as containers of capital, 
concentrated population centres and the 
geographical locus of state institutions. 
Historically, control of a capital city has 
been the de facto legal basis for a political 
organisation to claim sovereignty over 
associated territory (Landau-Wells 2008). 
While the frequency of sovereign conflicts 
has declined in recent decades, they 
remain a source of great destructiveness, 
While the FARC is 
an army without 
substantial political 
support, the Taliban 
are a powerful 
movement without 
an army proper... 
Understanding the 
divergent practices 
and survival 
mechanisms of armed 
organisations that 
challenge the state 
is crucial to attempts 
either to defeat them 
in combat or make 
peace with them 
through negotiation. 
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as illustrated in our discussion of military 
interventions in the next section. 
Similarly, cities are often implicated in 
civil conflicts over control of the state. Civil 
conflicts have historically been rooted in the 
countryside, with cities serving as spaces of 
relative security and refuge for those fleeing 
violence, as in Northern Uganda (Branch 
2008), Nicaragua (Rodgers 2008), Kashmir 
(Venkatachalam 2007), the South Bolívar 
region of Colombia (Vargas 2009) and in 
several cities of Afghanistan in the 1980s 
(Giustozzi 2009c). Cities often play a crucial 
role in the economy of war, as they have in 
Afghanistan, which can both be an incentive 
to all sides to keep them relatively secure and 
also create a degree of autonomy from the 
central state as they seek protection from 
rebel groups, as happened in Goma in the 
DRC (Vlassenroot and Buescher 2009). 
However, cities are also increasingly 
fraught by civic conflict and violence that 
does not necessarily appear to be explicitly 
political in nature. For example, gang warfare, 
communal violence, criminal assaults and 
homicides are rarely classified as “political” 
violence. Yet our research suggests that violent 
civic conflicts (as well as more prosaic forms 
of violence such as assaults and homicides) 
have a political dimension that is often 
overlooked. For example, in a quantitative 
study, Fox and Hoelscher (2010) found that 
cross-country variation in homicide rates 
(a rough proxy for “social” violence) was 
explained by a combination of traditional 
socioeconomic factors (such as poverty, 
inequality and ethnic diversity) and variations 
in political institutional arrangements. City-
level qualitative research also points to the 
significance of political factors in spurring 
violent civic conflict. For example, the deadly 
riots that shook Ahmedabad in Western India 
in 2002 were clearly linked to a Hindu ethno-
religious project within the state of Gujurat 
(Chandhoke 2009). We also found instances 
where suppression of political competition 
designed to prevent such violence has merely 
deferred its onset, as in the case of riots in 
Maputo, Mozambique (Sumich 2010). 
Questions also remain about the medium and 
long-term impact of limitations on political 
competition for Kigali, particularly given the 
spate of grenade attacks in the city in early 
2010 (Goodfellow and Smith forthcoming).
Policy implications:
1. Understanding the particular 
organisational mechanisms and incentive 
structures within non-state armed actors is 
essential to understanding what sustains 
them, how durable they may be and on 
what grounds they might be defeated 
or brought into peace processes. It also 
is necessary for assessing the particular 
requirements for their reinsertion into 
society after war. The dominant view 
in policy circles that non-state armed 
organisations are all essentially the same 
and that they can be studied as a form of 
criminality based on individual rationality 
and economic motivations is fundamentally 
flawed. While these organisations are 
all likely to be deeply involved in illegal 
activities to fund their operations, likely 
to attract young underemployed men as 
fighters and may behave brutally towards 
civilians, there are profound differences 
between them based on who they recruit, 
how they operate and why combatants join 
and remain in the organisations. 
2. Organisational incentives are a far better 
analytical indication of the nature of non-
state armed movements than particular 
patterns of access to natural or illegal 
resources. The differences between non-state 
armed organisations cannot be understood 
by their differential access to economic 
resources. In Colombia, both paramilitaries 
who in the past were often allied to the 
state and FARC guerrillas challenging the 
state have been deeply involved in narco-
trafficking. In Afghanistan, warlords at 
times working with the state and at times 
challenging it and the Taliban who present 
the greatest challenge to the Western-backed 
Karzai regime are all deeply involved in the 
production and trade of poppies. In the 
Philippines, clan-based warlords, the Islamic 
armed movements fighting for autonomy 
and armed communists who mobilise the 
rural poor have relied only marginally on 
wealth generated by natural resources. 
In Colombia, the structure of individual 
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economic incentives offered to fighters and 
officers of paramilitary organisations have 
made these organisations weaker than the 
FARC, where the mobilisation of resources 
is centralised. 
3. Only an analysis of the organisational 
dynamics and sources of power and 
legitimacy that underpin warlord 
power can predict their potential role 
in processes of state consolidation and 
state destabilisation. Crucial to assessing 
the likelihood that non-state armed actors, 
like warlords or clan bosses, may contribute 
to state consolidation or state unravelling is 
an examination of the trade-offs they faced 
between imperatives of bureaucratisation 
involved in state-building projects and 
preserving the relations of patronage on 
which their power depends. In Afghanistan, 
warlords participated differentially in 
alliances supporting and opposing state-
building projects over time precisely on 
these grounds.  Similarly in the Philippines, 
the possibility of enlisting clan-based 
warlords in efforts to bring about peace 
in the conflict-torn southern regions of 
the country has depended on reconciling 
their personality-based patronage systems 
on which their power is based with the 
formal democratic and legal procedures 
of the central state. 
4. Quantitative large-N cross-national 
studies of episodes of violent conflict 
can identify important associations 
between the multitude of variables 
related to complex processes of violence, 
but on their own often cannot explain 
causal or dynamic processes. Large-N 
research needs to be backed up by small-N 
comparative studies that can shed light on 
the organisational dynamics that determine 
the sustainability of armed challenges to 
the state. Our comparative analysis of 
the organisational dynamics of FARC in 
Colombia and the Taliban in Afghanistan 
allowed us to formulate a model to 
understand their differential behaviour 
along a spectrum separating army-like and 
network-like non-state armed groups. In 
this way we showed that differences between 
them in terms of their relations with civilian 
populations were not determined by their 
resource base but rather by the imperatives 
dictated by their organisational dynamics. 
As an army the FARC had to remain aloof 
from local populations while as a network 
the Taliban could not survive without deep 
roots in society. This has led to decidedly 
different strategies and tactics deployed by 
these challengers of state power, crucial to 
understand in efforts to confront them or 
win them over to peace processes.
5. Cities are often havens of relative 
security in civil war, but it would be a 
mistake to take urban security for granted 
when war has ended. Major population 
movements and socio-economic ruptures 
often lead to widespread conflict in cities after 
civil war. Due attention needs to be paid to the 
often-overlooked effects of sovereign and civil 
conflict – and post-conflict reconstruction – 
on the local, as well as national state. Often 
municipal state capacities are eroded with 
long-term implications for development. 
People will enter cities during and in the 
wake of war, whatever happens, and unless 
issues such as urban employment, housing 
and basic services are addressed, civic conflict 
is likely.
6. Forms of civic violence are ubiquitous 
in the cities of the developing world and 
they are deeply political in character. 
Gang warfare, crime, terrorism, religious 
and sectarian riots, and spontaneous riots 
or violent protest are increasing throughout 
the developing world, but contrary to 
much recent analysis these need to be 
understood as deeply political in character. 
While these conflicts are rarely fought as 
direct challenges to state power, they are 
nevertheless usually expressions of deep 
grievances towards the state or politically 
and economically powerful urban elites. 
Treating them as criminal activities, or 
simply repressing them, may achieve some 
peace and order in the short-term but this 
can also lead to deferred and even more 
explosive violent conflict in the future.
Major population 
movements and 
socio-economic 
ruptures often lead to 
widespread conflict 
in cities after civil 
war... People will 
enter cities during 
and in the wake 
of war and unless 
issues such as urban 
employment, housing 
and basic services 
are addressed, civic 
conflict is likely. 
MIlITARY INTERVENTIONS, REgIONAl 
ORgANISATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR 
PEACE MAkINg AND PEACE BUIlDINg
5
Since the end of the Cold War the rules governing international relations 
have changed. Where long-established principles of sovereignty appeared 
to trump concerns for the protection of human rights or conversely the 
pursuit of national security through pre-emptive action, new doctrines have 
emerged advocating the judicial use of international military intervention in 
pursuit of these goals. With the disappearance of the bipolar world there 
appeared to be new room for regional organisations to become involved in 
maintaining security and peace-making and peace-building efforts within 
the regions of the developing world. In this context international efforts have 
been developed to promote peace-making and peace-building operations 
and to attempt to bring conflicts internal to states to a conclusion through 
international mediation.
with an ideological justification, whether it 
was the “mission civilisatrice” of colonial times, 
or interventions to safeguard international 
security around a self-defence logic, to protect 
human rights, to overthrow dictatorship or to 
fight terrorism, which have been the official 
and unofficial justifications for more recent 
military interventions. While some recent 
military interventions can be argued to have 
led to pacification and state building (Sierra 
Leone), most – as in Afghanistan, Iraq, the 
DRC and Palestine – have led to prolonged 
periods of state collapse and violent conflict.
CSRC research has shown that military 
interventions since 1945 have made 
democracy less likely, increased the risk 
of coup d’état and have had a deleterious 
effect on economic development (Gutiérrez 
and González forthcoming). This is not an 
argument for the international community 
to abstain from mounting interventions in 
a cause that is deemed just by international 
law (for instance to halt a genocide), but 
the record of interventions give pause 
in relation to many of the other goals of 
military intervention, which often have 
been articulated by invading powers.
In the period following World War 
II, military invasions have had a major 
impact on trajectories of state fragility. 
Since the end of the Cold War, politicians, 
think tanks, public intellectuals, human-
rights advocacy groups and academics 
have suggested that external military 
interventions can advance democratisation 
in the developing world. A number of 
quantitative studies have provided backing 
The Centre engaged in three dimensions 
of research addressing problems of 
international security. First, we undertook a 
large-N study of military interventions over 
time in an attempt to analyse the extent 
to which external military intervention 
has promoted or retarded moves towards 
democracy and development. Second, we 
undertook a comparative study of regional 
organisations across the globe to assess to 
what extent they have achieved effectiveness 
in peace making and peace building. Finally, 
based on historical studies of war particularly 
in Afghanistan, we attempted to analyse the 
logic of passages from peace to war and war 
to peace, and what this could tell us about the 
most propitious moments for international 
intervention in attempts to broker peace. 
Connected to this was a further effort to assess 
experiences of international mediation in 
various peace processes. We report on each 
of these in turn.
Perils of international  
military intervention
External military intervention into the 
territory of a state, particularly where there 
is an asymmetric balance of military power 
in favour of the invading country, can lead 
to the outright collapse of the state and 
the unleashing of widespread violence. 
The military conquests of territories, both 
historically and in recent times, have 
caused collapse of state organisations 
and greatly increased mortality rates over 
extended periods of time. External military 
interventions have always been undertaken 
CSRC research has 
shown that military 
interventions since 
1945 have made 
democracy less likely, 
increased the risk of 
coup d’état and have 
had a deleterious 
effect on economic 
development.
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for this proposition, though usually with 
caveats that have generally been forgotten 
in debates among policy practitioners over 
the efficacy of military interventions. The 
most pessimistic evaluations of the impact 
of military interventions on prospects for 
democracy argue that they have no effect. 
CSRC research contradicts this consensus 
and has found that there is a strong, 
negative and significant association 
between military interventions and 
democracy. By re-examining the data 
on military interventions we found that 
when military interventions are rigorously 
defined (that is when we distinguish 
between invasions and minor skirmishes), 
large-scale military interventions have had 
a decisively negative impact on subsequent 
patterns of democratic consolidation. 
The methodological innovations of this 
research were bolstered by both theory and 
common sense. As Gutiérrez and Gonzalez 
(forthcoming) argue:
 “ It does not seem too sensible to put in the same 
bag a hot pursuit of the Venezuelan army in 
Colombia in the late 1980s, or a three hours 
interchange of shots [across] the border 
between Tanzanian and Ugandan troops, 
and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 
or the US interventions in Iraq. They are 
different kinds of things – maybe simply 
quantitatively, maybe qualitatively”.
By applying a more rigorous coding of 
events that actually constituted military 
interventions, the data tell a story very 
different than the reigning consensus. 
There are four reasons why military 
interventions have been so noxious for 
democracy. First, they tend to destabilise 
and often destroy an existing state’s conflict-
resolution mechanisms, often provoking 
long periods of armed conflict. Second, 
military interventions have often, though 
not always, unleashed highly polarised 
nationalist and identity-driven politics that 
usually are incompatible with democratic 
practices (Laitin 2008). Third, invaders often 
combine discourses of democratisation with 
policies that favour their own supporters, 
redrawing what we have called elsewhere 
the elite bargain and political settlement in 
ways that may favour the invading country 
but be dysfunctional for democratisation 
or even state consolidation. Evidence of 
this is abundant in research on Afghanistan 
(Giustozzi 2008b), but none of the 
quantitative analyses of the impact of military 
interventions to date have considered 
how interventions may affect the political 
economy of an invaded country. Fourth, 
military interventions can simply critically 
weaken all state systems, a finding familiar 
to social historians like Skocpol (1998), who 
argued that civil wars cannot be understood 
without accounting for international variables 
like military interventions. 
It would clearly be wrong to conclude 
that international actors should never 
intervene militarily. The failure of 
international action to halt the genocide 
in Rwanda in 1994 still casts a long shadow. 
However, as Mamdani (2007) has pointed 
out, in recent years there has been a 
dangerous tendency of those advocating 
military intervention to stretch the definition 
of genocide, and certainly, as our research 
has demonstrated, to use an argument 
that intervention will promote democracy 
when the empirical evidence demonstrates 
precisely the opposite. As Gutiérrez 
and Gonzalez (forthcoming) conclude: 
 “ We have shown … [that military intervention] 
has promoted globally (very) negative practices. 
If democratization is really one of the key 
objectives, to invade cannot be more than an 
ultima ratio method”.
A new approach to regional 
organisations and security
Our research on regional organisations 
has found that their effectiveness in 
achieving security has been constrained 
by the character of their member states 
and the extent to which their members 
share common values. In this sense the 
outcome of efforts to build effective 
regional security organisations has been 
very much determined by the reigning 
political settlement in each state. The 
CSRC undertook comparative research 
on the role and impact of regional 
“It does not seem 
too sensible to put 
in the same bag a 
hot pursuit of the 
Venezuelan army in 
Colombia in the late 
1980s, or a three 
hours interchange 
of shots [across] the 
border between 
Tanzanian and 
Ugandan troops, and 
the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan or the US 
interventions in Iraq”. 
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organisations in relation to peace and 
security (Nathan 2010b). The project 
covered the African Union (AU), the Arab 
League (AL), the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE), the European Union (EU), 
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), 
the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Shanghai Co-operation 
Organisation (SCO), the South Asian 
Association for Regional Co-operation 
(SAARC) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). 
In contrast to the uncritically positive 
view of regional organisations’ contribution 
to conflict prevention and resolution 
dominant in the policy community, we 
found huge variation in outcomes in the 
organisations’ peacemaking effectiveness, 
from highly successful (EU) to completely 
ineffectual (SAARC). In assessing the 
effectiveness of these organisations the 
research considered (Nathan 2010b):
 “ the scope, duration, severity and prevalence 
of violent conflict between and within the 
member states of a regional organisation; 
the organisation’s strategies and activities 
(or lack thereof) aimed at preventing and 
resolving violent conflict; and the outcome of 
the organisation’s peacemaking endeavours”. 
 
Effectiveness was shaped by a range of 
historical, geographical and political factors. 
However, fundamentally, the mandate, 
norms, decision-making modalities, goals, 
strategies, programmes, structure, capacity 
and culture of regional organisations derive 
from their member states. 
The research found that an organisation’s 
peace-making effectiveness depends 
largely on whether its members want the 
organisation to be effective (that is, whether 
they perceive the organisation as acting in 
their own state interests) and on whether 
they have the political trust and cohesion 
that are needed to make it effective in the 
realm of peace and security. This trust and 
cohesion is born from “congruence in the 
core values of member states to enable them 
to engage in close political co-operation on 
conflict prevention and resolution” (Nathan 
2010b). In the cases studied, the absence of 
normative congruence between the Central 
Asian states kept them from setting up a 
viable regional organisation; in South Asia, it 
was so low that SAARC could not function as 
a forum for conflict management; nor for the 
most part could IGAD. ASEAN has effectively 
dealt with inter-state disputes, but political 
diversity among them and strict adherence 
to principles of non-interference have barred 
the organisation from dealing with intra-state 
conflicts. SADC members have struggled with 
peace-making in the region because “they 
lack common values in terms of domestic 
governance and policy on peacemaking” 
(Nathan 2010b). Only the EU had achieved 
the degree of normative congruence to forge 
a security community. 
The sacrifice of sovereignty required to 
make regional organisations work requires 
trust. In the absence of common values, 
member states are unable to resolve or 
transcend their major disputes, build trust 
and cohesion, develop regional policies 
and act with common purpose in crisis 
situations. Recognition of these dynamics 
means that the process of addressing 
regional conflict dynamics must still be 
© UN Photo/Stuart Price, African Union High Representative for Somalia, former President 
Jerry John Rawlings, in Mogadishu, 19 July 2011.
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focused largely on the positions, role 
and practices of each state. Support for 
regional organisations can be no substitute 
to working with individual states both in 
the prevention and in the resolution of 
violent conflicts. 
Cycles of war and prospects of 
mediation in peace making
War and peace are commonly understood 
as separate processes, and international 
actors have analysed and developed 
strategies for intervening in these processes 
in a disconnected fashion. Our research 
has suggested that it may be more useful 
to understand processes of war and peace 
as part of a cycle where opportunities for 
intervention in processes of mediation 
and peace making may appear at specific 
points in time and then subside again. 
Attempting to understand singular causal 
factors behind a war may be futile since 
through the cycle the causes or driving 
factors behind war tend to change 
over time. When possibilities for peace 
making emerge, international actors have 
often been ill-prepared for constructive 
engagement since mediation skills have 
not been developed in a systematic and 
professional manner. 
While participants and observers of 
violent conflict often find themselves 
caught up in what appears to be an 
inexplicable spiral of violence, our research 
in Afghanistan suggests that there is an 
underlying logic underpinning the passage 
from peace to war, and importantly that 
there are opportunities during war for 
peace making. The common approach to 
studying war and policy work to intervene 
in peace is centred on understanding initial 
causes. While wars often begin with limited 
challenges to existing authority, they can 
escalate as processes of accumulation of 
financial, social and political power provide 
incentives for new actors to enter a conflict 
even if they did not start it. In Afghanistan, 
at particular points in time when the state 
sponsored by external forces appeared 
weak, warlords and the Taliban entered 
the conflict even though they had not 
started the war (Giustozzi 2009b, 2010). 
Opportunities for peace often emerge when 
processes of accumulation of financial, 
ideological or political capital change the 
economic and political landscape, and a 
range of actors share an interest in securing 
what they have accumulated. 
In outlining the cycles of war and 
peace in Afghanistan since the Soviet 
intervention in 1989 through to 2009, 
Giustozzi (2009a) identified two major 
patterns of external intervention designed 
to bring war to an end – the provision of 
financial support and large-scale military 
intervention. Depending on where actors 
are in the cycle of war, financial support to 
build a local state bureaucracy to address 
the presumed causes of war or large-scale 
military intervention to change the balance 
of power may or may not be effective. 
Much depends on whether the bureaucrats 
involved in a state-building project, or the 
combatants involved in opposing it, are 
convinced that the state will survive or 
fall, or whether they believe they can earn 
more through the prolongation of conflict 
or its cessation. 
Giustozzi identified two moments when 
peace was possible in Afghanistan: when 
the Soviets withdrew and most factions were 
ready to make peace, but international 
actors failed to offer effective mediation; 
and in 1994, when the Taliban emerged 
as peacemakers and its main rivals were 
exhausted and had accumulated enough 
wealth to make peace attractive, but this was 
brought to an end with US-led intervention 
in 2001. By the middle of 2010, Giustozzi 
(2010) suggested that while several 
protagonists in war had accumulated 
considerable financial resources and 
would like to secure them, the prospects 
for further gains – particularly given the 
external resources flowing into the country 
– were still very good. Both the Karzai 
government and the Taliban tapped into 
these resources. 
Understanding the cycle of war can help 
to identify the most propitious moment 
for intervention through mediation – the 
moment missed in Afghanistan after the 
Soviet withdrawal – but then international 
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agencies need to possess the right skills 
to mediate effectively. The most effective 
is of course to intervene before conflict 
leads to war, but this requires constant 
monitoring (Wulf and Debiel 2009), 
detailed knowledge and understanding of a 
country and a developed understanding of 
cycles of war and peace. The international 
organisations charged with this role often 
are hamstrung by their members and 
cannot intervene at the right moment 
(Giustozzi 2010).
Nathan’s (2010a) research and analysis 
of mediation experience suggests that 
there is still a dearth of expertise and 
understanding of what is required for 
effective intervention. While mediation 
requires all the understanding of 
complexity of war as that required by 
military commanders, there has been little 
effort to train or educate mediators, or to 
develop doctrines, strategies, operating 
procedures and standards specific to the 
requirements of peace mediation. No 
clear criteria have been adopted for the 
appointment of mediators, leaving the 
task within the general realm of diplomacy. 
All of this has fundamentally weakened 
the capacity of international actors to 
effectively engage in mediation. 
Nathan concluded that there were four 
measures required to bolster this capacity: 
(1) the implementation of a rigorous system 
for appointing and evaluating prospective 
mediators, discarding the practice of 
appointing prominent individuals without 
regard for their expertise in mediation; 
(2) mediators need adequate support in 
the field to allow them to deal with the 
complexity of conflicts – support for 
monitoring and analysis, thematic specialists 
capable of dealing with issues concerning 
land, law, gender, economic welfare and 
human rights, as well as communications 
and management expertise; (3) a learning 
culture needs to emerge based on review, 
assessment, research and adaptation; and 
(4) a confidence-building model needs to 
be adopted to deal with national conflicts, 
breaking from power-based diplomacy 
(Nathan 2010a, 2009b). 
Too often international actors have 
attempted to achieve peace through a 
“quick fix” (Healy 2009; Nathan 2005, 
2009a; Pinfari 2009). Mediation takes 
time to take account of the complexity 
of conflict and the need to overcome 
hatred and mistrust among conflicting 
parties, who must be brought to feel they 
own a peace settlement. Efforts to reach 
a quick fix have bedevilled processes of 
mediation in Darfur (Nathan 2006). No 
peace is possible if the parties to a national 
conflict are unwilling to work for a peace 
agreement. However, mediation pitched at 
the right moment in the cycle of war and 
peace can have an important impact, when 
those involved have proper expertise and 
have mastered the skills and techniques 
of mediation.
 
Policy implications
1. There is a strong, negative and 
significant association between military 
interventions and democracy. A majority 
of cross-country comparative analyses of the 
impact of military interventions over time 
on patterns of democracy and development 
found their effect to be either positive 
or neutral, but these have suffered from 
serious methodological problems. By 
applying a rigorous definition of military 
intervention and reconsidering all episodes 
since the end of World War II, we found that 
large-scale military interventions have had 
a decisively negative impact on subsequent 
patterns of democratic consolidation.  
2. Military interventions have tended 
to destroy a state’s conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, often unleashed forms of 
politics incompatible with democracy, 
upset political settlements and critically 
weakened state systems in general. Many 
interventions have provoked long periods 
of armed conflict in invaded countries. 
They have often given rise to polarised 
nationalist and identity-driven politics. 
Invaders have often combined motives 
of democracy promotion with measures 
that have redrawn elite bargains and 
political settlements in ways that have made 
democratisation more difficult.
Understanding the 
cycle of war can help 
to identify the most 
propitious moment 
for intervention 
through mediation – 
the moment missed 
in Afghanistan  
after the Soviet 
withdrawal – but 
then international 
agencies need to 
possess the right skills 
to mediate effectively. 
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3. Despite the optimism among international 
actors that regional organisations can play 
a major role in achieving regional security 
and make a positive contribution to peace 
building, their effectiveness is constrained 
by a lack of common values among their 
member states. The mandate, norms, 
decision-making modalities, goals, strategies, 
programmes, structure, capacity and culture 
of regional organisations derive from their 
member states. Among the cases studied the 
effectiveness of peacemaking was limited 
by the absence of normative congruence 
among member states in Central Asia, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia and the various regional 
organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Only 
the European Union achieved the degree 
of normative congruence necessary to forge 
a security community.
4. Opportunities for positive engagement 
in mediation to bring about an end 
to conflict arise when the interests 
of belligerents align to make peace a 
more attractive option than continued 
warfare. The dynamics of war and peace 
can be understood as cyclical, but also 
efforts to understand them through an 
analysis of the causes for the outbreak of 
war are often thwarted by the fact that the 
motivations for participation in violence 
change over time. Opportunities for 
peace often emerge when processes of 
accumulation of financial, ideological or 
political capital change the economic and 
political landscape and a range of actors 
share an interest in securing what they have 
accumulated. Understanding the cycle of 
war and peace can help to identify the 
most propitious moment for intervention 
through mediation.
5. There is an immediate need for 
international actors to professionalise 
their approach to mediation. Four 
measures are required to bolster 
international mediation capacity: (1) the 
implementation of a rigorous system for 
appointing and evaluating perspective 
mediators, discarding the practice of 
appointing prominent individuals without 
regard for their expertise in mediation; 
(2) mediators need adequate support in 
the field to allow them to deal with the 
complexity of conflicts – support for 
monitoring and analysis, thematic specialists 
capable of dealing with issues concerning 
land, law, gender, economic welfare and 
human rights, as well as communications 
and management expertise; (3) a learning 
culture needs to emerge based on review, 
assessment, research and adaptation; and 
(4) a confidence-building model needs to 
be adopted to deal with national conflicts, 
breaking from power-based diplomacy.
6. Mediation requires time, necessitating 
a shift away from approaches that attempt 
to find a “quick fix” in peace agreements. 
Mediation takes time to take account of 
the complexity of conflict and the need 
to overcome hatred and mistrust among 
conflicting parties, who must be brought to 
feel they own a peace settlement. Mediation 
pitched at the right moment in the cycle 
of war and peace can have an important 
impact, when those involved have proper 
expertise and have mastered the skills and 
techniques of mediation.
Despite the optimism 
among international 
actors that regional 
organisations can 
play a major role in 
achieving regional 
security and make a 
positive contribution 
to peace building, 
their effectiveness 
is constrained by 
a lack of common 
values among their 
member states.
ECONOMIC RESOURCE MOBIlISATION: TRAjECTORIES 
OF ACCUMUlATION AND lINkS TO FRAgIlITY AND 
RESIlIENCE IN STATES AND CITIES
6
Our research on economic resource mobilisation identified different 
dominant trajectories of accumulation in the case-study countries and 
cities, which are related to elite bargains and patterns of state fragility 
and resilience. In analysing the results we distinguish between formal 
and informal capital-accumulation processes that predominate in 
different settings. Our findings challenge some conventional wisdom in 
development theory and practice. First, resilient states with predictable 
formal rules of the game do not necessarily generate dynamic economic 
development outcomes, as illustrated by the Zambian and Tanzanian 
cases. In conventional new institutional theories such as North (1981, 
1990), countries with well specified institutions and property rights are 
argued to have lower transaction costs, which should induce greater 
long-run investment and growth. Such theories do not consider that a 
stable set of property rights may be part of a settlement where dominant 
asset owners are not compelled to be productive or to reproduce 
themselves. As such, secure property rights can be associated with 
growth-restricting processes. We show, in the case of Zambia, how the 
construction of elite bargains, while instrumental in maintaining political 
stability and state resilience, did not provide an incentive structure that 
promoted productivity growth in the main economic sectors. 
political organisation play a decisive role in 
the extent to which external interventions 
affect a polity, nevertheless external action 
and conditions create constraints and 
incentives that have a profound impact 
on the choices open to actors in fragile 
and resilient states.
Resilience-development trade-
offs in the formal sector
Our research on Zambia (Di John 2010a) 
points to an important phenomenon in many 
LDCs: namely the maintenance of a resilient 
state that coincides with economic stagnation 
and decline, a syndrome that we have called 
“resilient stagnation” (Putzel 2010a). 
Over the period 1970-2010 Zambia 
exhibited many of the major risk/stress 
factors commonly associated with the 
onset of civil war including: high ethnic 
fractionalisation; one of the continent’s 
most unequal distributions of income; 
severe economic decline throughout 
much of the 1980s and 1990s; extreme 
dependence on primary commodity 
exports (copper); political institutions 
riddled by neo-patrimonial rule and high 
levels of corruption; and a very “bad 
neighbourhood” with prolonged and 
Our findings also challenge some influential 
views on the informal economy, which is 
widespread in most of the countries and 
cities we studied.  One view popularised 
by De Soto (2000) suggests that the 
informal sector is the site of dynamic capital 
accumulation opportunities, filled with 
innovative and risk-taking entrepreneurs. 
A second view, widespread in the donor 
community, suggests that the informal 
sector is an important part of the creation of 
livelihoods and thus should receive greater 
attention in poverty-reduction strategies. 
Our research at both the central state and 
city levels suggests that while the informal 
sector does contain pockets of dynamic 
capital accumulation, these processes are 
underpinned by fragile, competing and/
or exclusionary elite bargains typical of 
fragile states. At the same time, processes 
of dynamic capital accumulation in the 
informal sector, particularly in mining, 
can further weaken already fragile states.
Finally, we consider briefly the 
ways in which external interventions 
in the economy affect trajectories of 
accumulation, elite bargains and patterns 
of state fragility and resilience. While our 
research has demonstrated that patterns of 
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large-scale political violence in most of 
its neighbouring countries. Despite these 
conditions, Zambia has not only managed 
to avoid large-scale violent conflict 
throughout its post-colonial history but 
has also become an example of peaceful 
regime change and democratic transition 
since the early 1990s.
Our research showed that state 
resilience in Zambia has been the result 
of a relatively stable and inclusive bargain 
among contending elites, which has 
been underpinned by the construction 
and maintenance of a dominant national 
political party. This arrangement reduced 
the possibility of substantial capital 
accumulation and political power outside 
of the formal political system. While there 
has been significant faction fighting within 
Zambia, the maintenance of a centralised 
form of patronage prevented such faction 
fighting from developing into alternative 
sources of authority and power in the polity, 
which have proved destabilising to political 
order in more fragmented patrimonial 
regimes, like in the DRC (Hesselbein 2007). 
The effectiveness of the elite bargain is 
manifested in continued state resilience 
despite changes in electoral competition 
and the transformation of the economy 
from a heavily interventionist model to 
a more liberal model with economic 
liberalisation in the 1990s. 
In terms of economic strategies, 
the main party from 1964-1991 (UNIP) 
controlled nearly all the paths through 
which access to state resources and 
employment in the formal sector could be 
obtained. These included tariff protection, 
subsidised agricultural inputs, subsidised 
credit, state-enterprise jobs and preferential 
exchange rates. The Party monopolised 
office holding at the national, provincial 
and municipal levels. To rise in the civil 
service or military one had to be a member 
of UNIP. By centralising and controlling 
politics and patronage, the only way elites 
could advance economically was to bargain 
with the party and its government. Party 
office became dependent on executive 
patronage – a strategy exemplified in the 
slogan “It Pays to Belong to UNIP”. In 
essence, in Zambia, just like in Tanzania, 
the implementation of one-party rule 
created incentives for elites to bargain 
with the state rather than exit and form 
challenges to state authority.
Our research also pointed to the large 
economic costs of conflict prevention 
in Zambia. The elite bargain and 
accommodating urban consumers with 
low food prices led to a series of economic 
policies that were based on the deployment 
of subsidies and access to valuable rights 
based more on political rather than 
economic criteria.  While marketing boards, 
for example, were central to party and 
state control over the countryside and were 
instrumental in expanding the territorial 
reach of the state, the resulting loss in 
economic production and productivity 
was high (Di John 2010a). 
To get a rough (and indeed conservative) 
indication of the costs of conflict prevention, 
we examined the lost revenues from the 
copper industry as a result of the complete 
nationalisation of the industry. Before 
1972, the state had a 51 per cent share 
of the industry and contracted out the 
management of the industry to experienced 
foreign firms (Di John 2010a; Hesselbein 
and Garrett 2009). The management of 
the industry was generally effective up to 
this point. Given the pressure to nationalise 
the industry from high-level UNIP elites, 
Kaunda decided to terminate all of the 
management contracts in 1973 and placed 
the entire industry in the state where there 
was a severe lack of management experience. 
Moreover, copper proceeds were then used to 
fund non-copper businesses as a mechanism 
to widen patronage to elites. This policy 
starved the copper industry of resources to 
maintain competitiveness. The economic 
consequences of this decision were very costly. 
Exports declined from 622,900 metric tonnes 
in 1972 to 228,000 on the eve of privatisation 
in 1999. We conservatively estimated that over 
fifteen years the industry lost some US$ 690 
million (Di John 2010a).  Of course, this was 
exacerbated by the collapse of world copper 
prices in 1974 and again in 1979. Laden with 
debt, per capita income in Zambia declined 
by 50% between 1974 and 1979. In the years 
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that followed, the state used the dwindling 
resources from mining for everything but 
reinvestment, with no new mines opened 
between nationalisation and privatisation 
(Hesselbein and Garrett 2009). 
In a larger sense, the Zambian case 
has two important implications. First, state 
capacities across functions are clearly not 
monolithic. Maintaining peace and state 
resilience has come at the cost of economic 
development. Second, and closely related, 
the creation of formal rules of the game and 
political stability are not sufficient conditions 
to promote rapid economic development.
As noted previously, it is not only states 
but also at the city level that we can observe 
“resilient stagnation” for long periods 
where cities are kept relatively insulated 
from wider civil conflict but in ways that do 
not spur development. In some cases we 
see cities remaining in a state of “resilient 
stagnation” only to see this break down 
due to dynamics that ultimately lie beyond 
the city. For example, between the end of 
Uganda’s countrywide civil war in 1986 and 
the outbreak of riots in late 2009, similar 
processes of clientelistic co-optation of elites 
and their constituents were characteristic 
of politics in Kampala. Despite a much 
higher level of ethnic tension than in 
Dar es Salaam, for decades this did not 
manifest in violence, not because social 
tensions were channelled into effective 
institutionalised bargaining but because 
informal systems of rent-sharing and 
elite collusion kept the lid on tensions in 
the city. This has been at the expense of 
development and state transformation at 
the metropolitan level (Goodfellow 2010). 
Largely due to increasing national level 
tensions that extend beyond the city, elites 
in Kampala have begun aggressively to 
manipulate violent civic conflict, which 
became a significant feature of capital city 
life in 2009. 
 
The political economy of 
informality and state fragility
A second major theme that emerges in this 
line of research is the dynamics of capital 
accumulation in the informal sector and 
its links to elite bargaining and political 
settlements. The informal, sometimes 
illegal, activities provide a veritable 
powerbase for violent entrepreneurs, be 
they warlords, drug barons or insurgents. 
This leads to a situation where there is 
no consolidated elite bargain within a 
country. This makes a state very fragile 
and violent, with the clearest examples 
among our countries being Afghanistan 
and the DRC (Hesselbein 2011).
Even in otherwise more consolidated 
states, elites – based largely in the informal 
economy – can violently challenge the state 
and the state finds it difficult to extend 
its authority. These mounting violent 
challenges have been observed in middle-
income countries in Colombia (Gutiérrez 
2008) and the Philippines (Lara 2011).
Research on Afghanistan provides 
a useful illustration of these points 
(Goodhand and Mansfield 2010). 
The country underwent a profound 
transformation during the war years. 
A new class of military entrepreneurs 
with regional politico-military structures 
and warlord politics developed. 
Fractionalisation of the country can be 
observed through the fact that provincial 
cities are often better integrated into the 
economy of neighbouring countries. A 
further transformation related to the shift 
from subsistence farming to the export of 
poppies, which is the main export product 
of Afghanistan. Modernisation meets fierce 
resistance, and there are continuities that 
survive in an economy heavily marked by 
war: the country remains characterised 
by informal institutions, insecurity and 
lawlessness. The formal taxable sector 
of the economy amounts to less than 10 
per cent of the GDP, more than 90 per 
cent of economic activities are informal, 
decentralised and fragmented. Local power 
holders collect “taxes” at borders and rival 
both the state and other locals in control 
over taxation. There are some islands of 
growth, but they depend on construction 
financed by development aid. Otherwise 
growth does not happen in agriculture, 
mining or manufacturing. Levels of poverty 
are growing, from 33 per cent (2005) to 42 
per cent (2007), and there is very limited 
Even in otherwise 
more consolidated 
states, elites – based 
largely in the informal 
economy – can 
violently challenge the 
state and the state 
finds it difficult to 
extend its authority. 
These mounting 
violent challenges 
have been observed 
in middle-income 
countries in Colombia 
and the Philippines.
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infrastructure (Goodhand and Mansfield 
2010; Hesselbein 2011).
The opium industry has experienced 
important changes in the pattern of 
capital accumulation contributing to 
shifts in power within the factionalised 
political networks in Afghanistan. In 2005 
poppy cultivation took place in all 34 
provinces, whereas by 2010, 70 per cent 
of the production was generated in the 
five provinces bordering Pakistan, with 
Helmand alone responsible for 50 per cent 
of the production. This is not so much the 
result of counter-narcotics policies, but 
due to political arrangements, security 
regimes and protection rackets. The 
bulk of the value added is added outside 
Afghanistan (76 per cent), with only 24 
per cent remaining with the farmers. 
Linkages to other sectors of the economy 
– inside and outside the country – are 
provided by money dealers (Hawaladar), 
who organise money flows to banks, aid 
agencies, smugglers and warlords. Drugs 
have led to an expansion of labour-force 
participation and to accelerated inequality, 
and are shaping economic opportunities. 
The elite bargains underpinning capital 
accumulation in the informal economy in 
Afghanistan are fragmented and violently 
contested. This is remarkably different 
from neighbouring Tajikistan, where 
drugs constituted an important variable 
in peace negotiations, and the settlement 
involved the dividing up of drug-trafficking 
routes between key protagonists. There, 
an elite bargain was forged in the wake of 
violence, which allowed the establishment 
of a relatively stable state (Matveeva 2009). 
In Afghanistan, like in the DRC, there is 
not one grand elite bargain as in Zambia 
but rather a set of multiple and fragmented 
bargains that reflect the contestation of 
different regional elites.
The bargaining processes play 
themselves out differently in different parts 
of the country depending on a range of 
different factors, including:
 
 “ the contradictory policies of international 
actors; the extent to which the regions/
groups benefited from rights and entitlements 
distributed at the Bonn agreement and 
afterwards; the power base of provincial 
elites; the perceived legitimacy of the central 
state at the local level; the magnitude and 
types of resources available at the provincial 
level relative to resource flows from the centre; 
the strategic and economic significance of 
the border region; the level of insurgent 
activity; and the degree of external (state 
and non-state) involvement in the region” 
(Goodhand and Mansfield 2010: 13).
Drugs have also played an important role in 
reshaping the political settlement and the 
conduct of political competition. This is not 
only the case for the Taliban, who finance part 
of their activities through the “taxation” of the 
drug trade, but is the case as well in “official” 
politics, where poppies are important to buy 
votes, gain access to parliament or senior 
positions. Furthermore, drugs provide the 
basis for political and military entrepreneurs. 
As Giustozzi and Orsini (2009) observed, 
because of the combination of patrimonial 
politics and periodic elections, drugs shorten 
the life cycles of political alliances.
Our research suggests that similar 
processes are occurring in informal 
sectors of mining and agriculture in the 
DRC (Hesselbein 2011). Both illegal and 
informal mining provides the livelihoods 
for about two-million artisanal miners and 
their dependents, which constitutes about 18 
per cent of the population (Hesselbein and 
Garrett 2009).  Despite the presence of state 
companies and multinationals in mining, 
the mining sector still suffers a remarkable 
absence of the state, both in terms of tax 
collection and in terms of a development 
vision to harness wealth in minerals for the 
wider economic development of the country. 
Underpinning this chaotic and unregulated 
economy is a set of (often violently) contested 
and fragile regional elite bargains.
The informal mining sector in the 
DRC, particularly in the Kivus, is taxed by 
private and usually armed actors. Not only 
is this onerous for the artisanal miners, but 
also makes the consolidation of formal 
mining activities difficult if not impossible. 
No single actor in the elite is capable of 
imposing a bargain on rivals inside or 
The elite bargains 
underpinning capital 
accumulation in the 
informal economy 
in Afghanistan are 
fragmented and 
violently contested. 
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and the settlement 
involved the dividing 
up of drug-trafficking 
routes between 
key protagonists.
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outside the state. Neither the national 
army, the former Rwandan genocidaires 
in the FDLR nor the several rebel armies 
opposing one of these or both of them, nor 
the central or provincial officials, are strong 
enough to preside over the imposition 
of a stable elite bargain. Any agreement 
reached locally can be challenged by 
violence (Hesselbein and Garrett 2009). 
In Katanga, the provincial governor 
appears to preside over a local elite bargain. 
Efforts by the governor to compel mining 
companies to cultivate lands for food crops 
for their workers were nevertheless thwarted 
by the high costs involved in acquiring and 
preparing the land and contestation over land 
rights, often between traditional authorities. 
Agricultural inputs all had to be imported 
from abroad. Fractured authority has 
meant that those raising livestock are often 
confronted with demands for taxes from 
three different authorities: the commune, 
traditional authority and the mayor. The 
few efforts to establish larger-scale farming 
faced constraints of poor rural to urban 
infrastructure and attempts to tax operations 
by local armed groups (Hesselbein 2010).
Laissez-faire urbanisation  
and the political economy of 
urban informality
A defining characteristic of urbanism across 
the global South today is the phenomenon 
of informality. While the urban informal 
economy is often celebrated as a pro-active 
response by urban dwellers to difficult 
circumstances, from the perspective of 
state consolidation and sustainable urban 
development, pervasive informality is 
highly problematic. Indeed, one of the key 
insights that emerged in the course of our 
research is the importance of recognising 
that state consolidation is, in essence, a 
process of formalising the institutions that 
govern security, economic activity and the 
delivery of public goods. 
Rapid urbanisation and urban growth 
over the past 30 years has been accompanied 
by a retreat of the state as an active force 
in managing urban affairs in many parts 
of the world, including the regulation of 
land and housing markets, public service 
provision and urban economic activity (Beall 
and Fox 2009). In some cases this has been 
a passive process in which city expansion 
is not actively addressed by government 
authorities. In other cases governments 
have actively withdrawn their presence from 
cities due to local political and economic 
dynamics and/or as a result of pressure from 
international actors to “downsize” the state 
through privatisation and deregulation, and 
to focus resources on rural poverty alleviation 
and development. The result in both cases 
has been laissez-faire urbanisation in recent 
decades. As a consequence, political and 
economic entrepreneurs have stepped 
into the breach as informal providers or 
regulators of key goods and services such 
as land, housing, water, policing, transport, 
credit provision and contract enforcement. 
There are effectively two aspects of this 
phenomenon that are problematic from a 
state-building perspective.
First, in most of the cities we studied, 
state actors such as politicians, bureaucrats 
and other state personnel such as police, 
use their positions of authority to extract 
rents from informal economic activities. 
In Kampala, for instance, the multi-million 
dollar urban transport industry remains 
beyond state regulation and taxation due 
to the participation of local and national 
politicians in the taxi business, depriving 
the state of a potentially lucrative revenue 
stream and making it impossible for planners 
to effectively manage congestion and ensure 
public safety (Goodfellow 2010). In Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania, the participation of 
local officials in the informal governance 
of urban land and housing markets has 
served as a tool for the ruling CCM party 
to maintain its support base in urban areas 
at the expense of the rational execution of 
urban planning regulations (Kombe 2010). 
A similar dynamic of official interference 
in informal land and housing markets can 
be found in Karachi, Pakistan (Budhani et 
al. 2010). In all of these cases, the lack of 
effective, formal state regulation of markets 
creates opportunities for public officials to 
extract rents. Consequently, the very people 
who should be supporting the consolidation 
of state authority and legitimacy in the eyes of 
While the urban 
informal economy 
is often celebrated 
as a pro-active 
response by urban 
dwellers to difficult 
circumstances, from 
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and sustainable 
urban development, 
pervasive informality 
is highly problematic. 
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urban residents actually undermine the state 
and have powerful incentives to maintain the 
informal status quo.
A second dynamic is the emergence of 
non-state authorities who carve out fiefdoms 
within cities and establish their authority by 
providing (or regulating) critical goods and 
services where governments fail to do so. We 
see this dynamic at play in Managua, where 
gangs provide neighbourhood protection 
and finance themselves through drug rackets 
(Rodgers 2005, 2008); in Karachi, where 
social networks bound by ethnic and religious 
identities serve as an important mechanism 
of contract enforcement (Budhani et al. 
2010); and in the history of Colombian cities, 
where at times paramilitaries controlled the 
political economy of whole cities (Gutiérrez-
Sanín et al. 2009). Where rival authorities 
Box 3: Urban regulation in Kigali
In our research an obvious outlier to this general trend is the case of Kigali, Rwanda, 
where the government has unambiguously asserted its regulatory authority in and over 
the city (Goodfellow 2012). In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, proactive physical 
planning and investment in infrastructure was accompanied by the mobilisation 
of people working in the informal sector into cooperative associations closely 
supervised by the City of Kigali (Goodfellow 2011a). The functioning of these urban 
associations is arguably linked to security imperatives and the political dimensions 
of the government’s agenda. While the government’s approach to post-conflict 
urban governance has been controversial, it has served to transform Kigali from a 
city scarred by devastating violence and disorder into one characterised by orderly 
urbanisation and low levels of crime despite a trebling of its population (Baker 2007: 
348; UNPD 2009; Goodfellow and Smith forthcoming). In 2008 the city was even 
awarded a UN-Habitat “Scroll of Honour” for these achievements. Interestingly, 
the Rwandan case echoes Tilly’s argument concerning the importance of conflict 
as an impetus for state consolidation. The ruling RPF in Rwanda clearly developed 
a remarkable level of discipline and focus in the course of its struggle to capture 
the Rwandan state apparatus – attributes that have been essential to its success in 
cultivating peace and order in Kigali, and to positioning the city as the spearhead 
of national economic and political recovery (Goodfellow and Smith forthcoming).
compete for control of urban space, state 
consolidation is retarded and the spectre 
of state fragility remains. The emergence 
of intermediaries and powerful informal 
service providers in urban areas can be read 
as both a consequence of state withdrawal 
and as a contributing factor to the persistent 
failure of governments to actively project 
formal authority across the urban landscape. 
Policies that contribute to the withdrawal 
of the state as an active manager of urban 
affairs are often evaluated on grounds of 
efficiency, but almost never for their impact 
on state consolidation. This is a major blind 
spot which has far-reaching consequences 
for the ability of states to embark upon or 
return to a path of state consolidation and 
economic development.
In sum, laissez-faire urbanisation in the global 
South has created a political economy of 
informality in cities that may inhibit the 
consolidation of legitimate, accountable state 
organisations. It should be stressed that this 
is a hypothesis emerging from our research 
and one that requires further empirical 
investigation. It is not clear from our research 
the extent to which the political economy 
of urban informality has implications for 
national level organisations. However, 
as the primary spatial interface between 
state and society there is little doubt that 
what happens in cities does have broader 
political implications.
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Impact of international actors  
on elite bargains and trajectories 
of accumulation
In all of the countries we studied, elite 
bargains, political settlements and the 
trajectories of accumulation to which they 
gave rise were deeply shaped by interaction 
with international actors and processes 
within the international economy. In the 
DRC and Rwanda it is possible to observe 
what we have called a “deadly sequence” 
where sharp external shocks to the economy 
were followed by deeply cutting austerity 
programmes managed by the international 
financial community causing extreme 
economic contraction and social hardship, 
followed then by international pressure to 
introduce political competition. In the DRC 
the sequence resulted in two wars with massive 
loss of life and in Rwanda in the genocide of 
1994 (CSRC 2008). The severe constraints 
on state action and capacity imposed by 
structural adjustment programmes in the 
1980s created the context in which many 
states unravelled (Hesselbein 2009). Only 
where political settlements and the elite 
bargains within them were robust enough 
could such external shocks be absorbed, as 
we have observed in Tanzania and Zambia. 
Nowhere has international intervention 
been so important in shaping elite bargains 
and the possibilities for a political settlement 
than in Afghanistan, through on-going 
military intervention. The fragmentation 
of elites in Afghanistan and the forms of 
violent contestation in the informal economy 
have been aggravated by international 
actors where:
 “ military and financial support for the 
central state had the effect of lowering 
the price of loyalty, thus decreasing the 
necessity for central state elites to negotiate 
with peripheral elites. Conversely, CIA 
funding of regional ‘warlords’ artificially 
inflated the price of loyalty, strengthening 
their bargaining powering in relation to the 
central state” (Goodhand and Mansfield 
2010: 13). 
In fragile states, the pattern of aid 
distribution can have a crucial effect on 
political settlements. In Afghanistan and 
the DRC aid inflows that provide some 
of the elite with rents have contributed 
to the creation of a “dual public sector”, 
partly provided by the state, partly by 
NGOs (Ghani and Lockhardt 2008; OECD 
2010), and aggravated divisions are found 
between the centre and the periphery and 
between the north and the south of the 
country. This pattern of aid distribution 
can create sites of decision making 
outside the state and contribute to the 
emergence of rival sources of patronage 
breaking up existing political settlements 
or pre-empting the consolidation of a new 
settlement that encompasses the territory 
of a country. The resulting trajectories of 
accumulation reinforce the tendencies 
towards disaggregation and state fragility.
 
Policy implications 
There are several policy implications that 
emerge from our research on economic 
resource mobilisation.
1. Centralised patronage underpinned 
by an inclusive elite bargain and  state 
control over resources can play an 
important role in maintaining political 
stability, but may come at the cost of 
economic development. Policy makers 
need to consider the extent to which 
deregulating an economy across the 
board will be politically destabilising 
thus undermining economic reforms. 
We discuss in the next section how some 
polities have been able to overcome this 
“resilient stagnation”.
2. State capacity varies substantially 
across functions and sectors within 
polities, a central feature of fragile states 
not acknowledged in aggregate measures 
of governance, but this variation needs 
to be taken into account in the design 
of economic reforms in fragile states 
(Di John 2010d). There are numerous 
examples of this. South African tax-
collection capacity is much greater than 
its ability to undertake industrial policy or 
tackle HIV/AIDS.  Botswana’s democratic 
institutions are among the most robust 
The severe constraints 
on state action and 
capacity imposed by 
structural adjustment 
programmes in  
the 1980s created  
the context in  
which many  
states unravelled.
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in the developing world yet it has also 
been very poor at controlling HIV/AIDS. 
Tanzania and Zambia have had relatively 
poor records of economic performance 
but have been able to prevent large-scale 
political violence, unlike most of their 
neighbours. This variation in capacity is 
not picked up by aggregate measures of 
governance (for example, Kaufman et 
al. 1999), and our understanding of why 
capacity varies so much within polities 
is limited. Detailed historical analyses of 
the political coalitions and settlements 
underpinning specific state capacities are 
essential to increase understanding of 
variable state capacity within a polity. As 
such, investigating under which conditions 
the achievement of state resilience hinders 
or facilitates economic development is an 
important area of research.
 
3. The creation of organisations that can 
provide support for informal sector firms 
is central to improving production capacity 
and thus sustainable employment creation. 
Firms are in the informal sector precisely 
because not paying taxes is part of their 
competitive advantage and survival strategies. 
Thus tax collection and other government 
strategies need to be linked to providing 
incentives for informal firms to register as 
taxpayers. A promising approach to this 
challenge could be to link the expansion 
of the tax base to the informal sector in 
exchange for providing incentives for 
small and medium-sized firms to increase 
productive capacity. 
 
4. While sectors such as construction and 
the drugs trade provide livelihoods in the 
informal sector for a substantial number of 
people, they are unlikely to be sustainable 
in political economy terms. This is because 
these trajectories of accumulation take place 
in the context of fragile political settlements 
that undermine state building. Moreover, 
the dynamism of the informal sector means 
that capital accumulation proceeds without 
increases in the formal tax base of the state. 
This further undermines the prospects of 
state building.
5. Governments need to effectively 
regulate land and housing markets and 
deliver key public goods in an effort to 
formalise urban informal economies to 
avoid the emergence of political and 
economic entrepreneurs with powerful 
incentives to resist state consolidation. 
In urban settings, policies that contribute 
to state withdrawal are often evaluated 
on grounds of efficiency and equity, but 
almost never for their impact on the 
institutional resilience of the state. This is 
a major blind spot which has far-reaching 
consequences for the ability of states 
to embark upon or return to a path of 
institutional consolidation. 
 
6. Assessing the initial conditions of 
a polity and the parameters of the 
political settlement on which the state 
is based must be a prerequisite before 
prescriptions for far-reaching economic 
reforms are adopted. Rapid economic 
liberalisation associated with structural 
adjustment programmes in Africa, even 
when these programmes were only partially 
implemented, had a much more devastating 
impact where political settlements and elite 
bargains were factionalised than where more 
solid political organisations reigned, as in 
Tanzania and Zambia. 
Governments need 
to effectively regulate 
land and housing 
markets and deliver 
key public goods in 
an effort to formalise 
urban informal 
economies to avoid 
the emergence of 
political and economic 
entrepreneurs with 
powerful incentives 
to resist state 
consolidation. 
© Tom Goodfellow, Owino Market in Kampala
FROM FRAgIlITY AND RESIlIENCE 
TO DEVElOPMENT7
Promoting development – or progress towards accelerated growth and 
poverty reduction – requires transcendence of basic fragility as well as 
the bargains that may have achieved resilience at the cost of growth 
and development. This means creating state capacity that can manage 
an intensification of economic integration within a state’s territory and a 
step-change in productivity in agriculture, manufacturing, wider industry, 
trade and key service delivery. Unsurprisingly, qualitative and quantitative 
research provides plenty of evidence that achieving a developmental 
take-off is the best insulation against a decline into fragility. Even the 
most resilient state will remain vulnerable to pressures to move back 
into fragility caused by long-term poverty, inequality and low growth.
The way “state fragility” is defined in the 
policy community loses sight of the huge 
distance that must be traversed from 
both conditions of fragility and stagnant 
resilience to a situation where the state 
is presiding over accelerated growth and 
poverty reduction. A “developmental” or 
“transformational” state has to be able to 
create incentives and conditions for the 
holders of wealth to invest in productivity-
raising economic ventures, and incentives 
and conditions for labouring people to 
work for wages.
While our research was focused more on 
the distinction between fragile and resilient 
states than on developmental success stories, 
we were able to observe several factors crucial 
to the transition from fragility and resilience 
to development. First, a comparative study of 
mining in four countries suggests the need 
for the creation of extensive regulatory and 
organisational capacity within the state if the 
gains of privatisation in a major resource-
extractive industry are to be harnessed for 
developmental purposes. It also suggested 
that the developmental potential of 
resource-extractive industries is likely to be 
profoundly affected by the parameters of a 
political settlement in place when resource 
extraction begins. Second, a comparative 
study of coffee production in two of our case-
study countries underlined the likelihood 
that processes of incremental change in a 
single sector may be the most likely route to 
achieving developmental progress, but the 
challenge will remain the replication of such 
progress across a nation’s economy. Third, 
our research has demonstrated that taxation 
can be harnessed to influence the direction 
of development in the production sectors 
and to create a political terrain favourable 
to forming coalitions with an interest in 
growth and development. Fourth, the 
research has contributed to a growing body 
of work that illustrates that the way aid is 
delivered in fragile and resilient states can 
have a profound impact on its potential to 
contribute to sustained development. Finally, 
we conclude with a reflection on the types of 
coalitions that are most likely to provide the 
basis for positive developmental transitions.
Bringing political settlements 
in line with developmental 
trajectories of accumulation:  
a comparison of experience  
in mining
The challenge facing developmental 
coalitions in resilient states that may 
be locked into poverty and economic 
stagnation is to transform existing political 
settlements in ways that are favourable to 
developmental trajectories of accumulation. 
This will often require confronting elite 
privileges that have been entrenched 
in the process of achieving a degree of 
resilience and peace. We discussed above 
the costs incurred in Zambia by placing 
the mining industry within the state and 
allowing copper proceeds to be used 
for non-copper businesses as a way of 
“buying in elites”, but at a high cost for 
economic development. The response of 
mainstream development policy, endorsed 
by political authorities in Zambia, was to 
privatise the mines in 1999. While this 
ended one form of preferential access 
it created another, largely captured by 
48 •  MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES
foreign mining companies and local elites 
aligned with them. While a developmental 
breakthrough required a transformation of 
the political settlement, the strategy of state 
Box 4: Zambian privatisation contributed little to development
In Zambia, the radical shift from the highly costly nationalisation of mining discussed 
in the previous section to the wholesale privatisation of the sector by 2001, did not 
present a recipe for a big developmental advance. On the positive side it brought 
new foreign investment into the sector, allowing the opening of new mines and the 
expansion of production. However, criticisms of the arrangements came from a 
wide variety of sources. Secret deals, called “Development Agreements” struck with 
foreign investors permitted wide tax exemptions, exemptions from environmental 
regulations and the refusal to honour pensions. While the World Bank assisted with 
the design and implementation of the privatisation plans, by 2008 officials said that 
the industry was “privatised without a plan” (Hesselbein and Garrett 2009). There 
is a basic absence of any regulatory influence on employment, health, minimum 
wages or local processing (Fraser and Lungu 2007). 
Officially, the law demands that royalties of 3 per cent be paid by the companies, 
but in reality royalty payments amount to only 0.6 per cent, which the Ministry of 
Mines says are the “lowest in the whole of Africa” (Hesselbein and Garrett 2009). 
The IMF (2008) reported that a plan had been adopted in 2008 to increase royalties 
and corporate income tax and to introduce a windfall tax linked with international 
copper prices as a major drive to increase state revenues. However, under company 
pressure the Zambian parliament scrapped the windfall tax in 2009. The realignment 
of the political settlement in Zambia that ushered in privatisation and the state’s 
withdrawal from an active role in the mining sector has done little to catapult a more 
developmental trajectory of accumulation.
withdrawal from mining and agriculture 
clearly did not succeed in igniting a more 
developmental trajectory of accumulation 
as Box 4 illustrates.
In both Tanzania and Rwanda traditionally 
mining played only a minor role in the 
economy. However, both countries have now 
embarked on new strategies to develop their 
mineral resources, though with decidedly 
different prospects. Unlike in Zambia, the 
CCM in Tanzania survived the introduction of 
competitive politics as the dominant political 
party at the helm of the state, whereas in 
Rwanda the RPF has been in power since 
the genocide and rules under conditions of 
limited political competition. 
While historically mining played only 
a small role in Tanzania’s economy, by late 
2006, Tanzania was the world’s only producer 
of tanzanite and accounted for 2% of the 
world’s gold output, putting it third in Sub-
Saharan Africa after South Africa and Ghana. 
Privatisation post-1985, driven by the IMF, 
weakened the state’s capacity to engage with 
private business. However, mining companies 
were still subject to licences and contracts 
– controlled by CCM officials in the state. 
Mining contributed 2.3 per cent of GDP in 
2008, not quite reaching its peak of 2.9 per 
cent in 1966, but with a government objective 
that it reach 10% by 2025. There are some 1.5 
million artisanal miners, meaning that even 
a greater percentage of the population is 
dependent on artisanal mining income than 
in the DRC (22 per cent versus 18 per cent 
in the DRC). The challenge is to scale up the 
mining sector (Hesselbein and Garrett 2009). 
The strategy adopted by the CCM has 
been understandably to attract foreign 
investment into the sector, succeeding on a 
large scale in Mwanza. To do so, government 
lowered tax rates on corporate income, 
reduced VAT and provided tax exemptions 
on fuel. Mining firms have developed few 
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connections with local supply chains and have 
not developed local processing operations. 
Only modest contributions have been made 
to local community development. These 
have been directed to the local governments 
where mines are located, but without linkage 
to other sectors such as infrastructure, 
agriculture, manufacturing or energy. 
However, a large proportion of those working 
in mining remain in the artisanal sector. 
The state has attempted to draw artisanal 
miners into the formal sector by supporting 
the formation of savings cooperatives, while 
foreign corporations have done the same 
through contract arrangements. The highly 
decentralised and small-scale character of 
these operations has made them targets for 
“gold laundering from the Eastern DRC” 
(Hesselbein and Garrett 2009).
The political settlement that bought 
peace in Tanzania and the state organisations 
based on it existed before the establishment 
of significant mining operations in the 
country. This partly accounts for the state’s 
governing of the sector in a relatively law-
bound fashion, in contrast to the DRC. 
However, it also has meant that rents derived 
from mining have accrued to the coalition 
of interests embedded in the CCM and the 
state organisations it controls. In the era 
of liberalisation this has led to little state 
involvement in leveraging resources from 
the sector in pursuit of a comprehensive 
development plan. This sits in sharp contrast 
to the experience of Botswana, where the 
political settlement that presided over the 
state when diamond mining was launched 
was dominated by those with an interest in 
mobilising rents for developmental purposes 
(Di John and Putzel 2009). Something similar 
to Botswana may be occurring in Rwanda. 
There are indications that mining 
could become an important industry in 
Rwanda in the future, though it is nowhere 
near the size of the sector in the DRC or 
Zambia. While there was some mining 
as early as the 1930s it later fell off until 
exploration in 2006 found significant gold 
and cassiterite deposits (Hesselbein and 
Garrett 2009). The fact that a consolidated 
state preceded the launching of major 
mining activity may allow Rwanda to 
create a more developmental regulatory 
framework in the sector than has emerged 
in either Zambia or Tanzania. 
In Rwanda the state has established a 
number of agencies to work with the private 
sector along the lines of its development 
strategy. The Rwanda National Innovation 
and Competitiveness (RNIC) Program laid 
out an objective to use public investment 
in the mining sector to promote both the 
export of metals and precious stones, and 
to launch import substitution in quarrying. 
Rwanda’s Investment and Export Promotions 
Agency (RIEPA) promoted private sector 
investment in the sector through the 
privatisation of the government-owned 
wolfram (tungsten/wolframite) operations. 
The programme involved setting up skills 
training for the mining sector, improving 
distribution channels and supporting the 
development of Rwanda’s national brand. 
The state has offered tax exemptions on 
investments and inputs to private investors, but 
on condition that they upgrade production 
and processing facilities in what appears to be 
a corruption-free environment (Hesselbein 
and Garrett 2009). The Rwanda Geology and 
Mines Authority (OGMR) provides specific 
administrative and regulatory support for 
expansion of the sector, bringing together 
all government departments involved. In the 
legal sphere, the state passed a mining law that 
removed dysfunctional four-year contracts in 
the sector that had deterred investment and 
promoted only short-term profiteering, while 
at the same time they have ensured that the 
longer-term contracts issued are performance-
based. The state has also supported the 
formation of cooperatives and the provision 
of extension services among artisanal miners 
(Hesselbein and Garrett 2009). 
In Rwanda, both in mining and in 
agriculture the national elite has pushed 
miners and farmers to become more 
organised, which in turn prompted significant 
national and international investment and 
increased productivity (see Hesselbein 2009, 
2011; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011). 
Clearly, if resilient but economically stagnant 
states are to embark on a more developmental 
trajectory of accumulation, coalitions need to 
be built that can use the leverage of the state to 
provide incentives for productive investment.
In Rwanda, both 
in mining and in 
agriculture the 
national elite has 
pushed miners 
and farmers to 
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and international 
investment and 
increased productivity.
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Incremental changes towards 
a developmental trajectory: 
the historical case of coffee 
in Colombia and recent 
experience in Rwanda 
Our research suggests that pockets of 
growth can also emerge in an incremental 
fashion in conflict-affected and post-
war countries, which may be the most 
likely way in which stagnant resilience 
may be transformed into more dynamic 
development. This is important for policy 
because wholesale changes in governance 
are unlikely in low-income and/or conflict-
affected environments. Pointing to sectoral 
successes may direct attention towards 
creating successful development projects 
rather than the unrealistic and unfeasible 
“big push” macro-institutional reforms that 
are advocated by the “good governance” 
agenda. Our research suggested that 
the creation of state and state-private 
institutions have been central to driving 
capital accumulation and growth in the 
agricultural sector (Hesselbein 2011). 
One case that stands out is the historical 
experience of the coffee sector in Colombia 
(Ramos 2009; Hesselbein 2011). For over 
eight decades, the National Coffee Federation 
developed into one of the developing world’s 
most successful examples of collective action. 
Financed by a small surcharge (or levy) on 
members’ coffee sales, the Federation was 
instrumental in organising improvements 
in quality, pest control, technical advice, 
research, storage credit and international 
marketing and branding for nearly 400,000 
smallholder producers.  The Coffee Fund 
under its auspices guaranteed internal 
minimum prices for coffee, acting as a 
buyer of last resort, which reduced the risks 
of production.  The political influence of the 
Federation historically made it a powerful 
lobby to demand prudent macroeconomic 
management, particularly the avoidance of 
exchange-rate overvaluation. 
The problem in Colombia, of course, 
was that the kind of coalition that emerged 
within the coffee sector, which promoted 
sustained growth over time, could not be 
replicated across the economy as a whole. 
While developmental change may be more 
possible in a single sector of the economy, 
the challenge remains to examine the 
means by which progress in one sector can 
be replicated in others. We pointed to some 
of the reasons for this in our discussion of 
Colombia’s political organisations above. 
Nevertheless, a great deal more research 
is required to understand why progress 
achieved in one sector of an economy is 
so often difficult to replicate in others.
Similar progress has been made in the 
coffee sector in Rwanda since the National 
Coffee Strategy was adopted in 2003 
(Hesselbein 2010, 2011). By the late 2000s, 
the Rwandan Coffee Development Authority 
OCIR-Café had helped to organise around 
100 producer organisations with 300,000 
members. It pushed the establishment of 
coffee-washing stations, of which there were 
over 1,000 in 2008. Each of them required 
between US$ 100,000 and 200,000 investment, 
secured through the government’s 
encouragement of the private sector. The 
owner of a coffee-washing station, which 
could be a cooperative or a private coffee 
merchant, buys the coffee. Furthermore, 
OCIR-Café provides the certificate of origin 
and undertakes marketing activities to get 
Rwandan coffee into Northern supermarkets 
and coffee shops. 
The Rwandan example shows how 
informal activities can be transformed into 
formal ones and contribute to a step-by-step 
transformation of production. Promising 
is the fact that the mechanisms deployed 
by Rwanda in the coffee sector have been 
replicated in other parts of the country’s 
agriculture. The state has mobilised its 
agencies to create a system of positive 
incentives promoting the modernisation 
of agricultural, both in terms of cultivation 
and in agriprocessing (Hesselbein 2010), 
which have been directed both towards the 
domestic private sector and towards rural 
communities. 
Using taxation to promote 
developmental outcomes
We have discussed the importance of taxation 
in determining trajectories of state fragility 
and resilience, but it can also play a pivotal role 
Pointing to sectoral 
successes may direct 
attention towards 
creating successful 
development 
projects rather than 
the unrealistic and 
unfeasible “big push” 
macro-institutional 
reforms that 
are advocated 
by the “good 
governance” agenda.
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF CRISIS STATES • 51
in promoting developmental progress. There 
are at least four reasons why taxation and tax 
reform are central to developmental state-
building (Di John 2010c). First, governments 
must be able to ensure sustainable funding 
for social programmes, and for public 
investments to promote economic growth 
and development. Second, taxation is the 
main nexus that binds state officials with 
interest groups and citizens. Not only can 
taxation enhance government accountability, 
it also provides a focal point around which 
interest groups (such as producer groups, 
labour unions and consumer groups) can 
mobilise to support, resist and even propose 
tax policies. In other words, taxation is as 
constitutive of state formation as it is of 
interest-group formation. Third, taxation, 
particularly in the form of land and property 
taxes, customs and border collection can 
help increase and consolidate the territorial 
reach of the state. The diversity of the tax 
base is a telling indicator of the ability of 
the state to engage with different sectors 
and regions and is indicative of the degree 
to which state authority permeates society. 
Fourth, fiscal capacities are needed to build a 
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not 
themselves ensure state legitimacy. Elections 
provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice 
demands; responding to those demands 
requires capacity to mobilise, allocate and 
spend public resources effectively.
Often, tax-administrative reforms 
are designed to increase the tax take and 
are not coordinated with how taxation 
affects production patterns. That is, a pro-
revenue approach often takes precedence 
over a pro-growth approach in tax policy. 
History provides several examples of the 
importance of land tax in increasing 
agricultural production. In the case of 
Japan, Taiwan and Korea, a land tax was 
introduced as part of a production strategy 
to help improve agricultural production 
(see Bird 1977; Grabowski 2008). Extensive 
land surveys were undertaken that mapped 
all plots of land in the territory and 
classified it according to type, productivity 
and ownership. As a result of land surveys, 
the state in each country secured a revenue 
base, and was able to finance improvement 
in agricultural production through 
investment in roads and irrigation. 
The case of the Colombian National Coffee 
Federation discussed above suggests that the 
state can use taxation of agriculture to solve 
collective action problems in production 
(such as the provision of funds for storage, 
distribution and marketing for thousands of 
dispersed smallholder producers) and help 
forge strong state-society negotiations and 
mutual obligations (Thorp 2000).
 
Ensuring aid contributes  
to creating states’ 
development capacity
The way foreign aid is delivered can also have 
a big effect on the possibility of transiting from 
a situation of fragility or resilient stagnation 
to a more developmental trajectory. There 
is a risk in heavily aid-dependent countries 
(that is where aid is at least 50 per cent of 
government expenditure) that aid acts as a 
disincentive to domestic revenue collection. 
However, in most of our cases this problem 
was avoided. In Rwanda, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Zambia (though aid there is 
less important at 25 per cent of government 
spending) tax collection was increased over 
the period 1990-2010.
There are, however, important policy 
lessons that have emerged that are relevant 
to the process of state building. The first 
concerns large taxpayer offices. In Rwanda, 
DRC and Afghanistan, IMF assistance to 
ministries of finance in designing and 
reforming tax administrations seems to 
have made at least some contribution to 
improving the efficiency of tax collection. 
The second concerns the extent to which 
aid by-passes the state in the delivery of social 
services and other programmes. Ghani et al. 
(2007) and Boyce (2007) suggest that the 
most damaging impact of aid on processes 
of state building may be the way in which 
foreign assistance gives rise to a “dual public 
sector”. By this they mean that only part of 
the funds deployed in delivering public goods 
are channelled through the state, while an 
important part are channelled directly to 
sub-national or non-state actors (Boyce 2007: 
14). If power to decide on spending is located 
in NGOs or private contractors, those who 
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wish to make a claim on these resources will 
look to and interact with those NGOs and 
contractors and not the state. This can leave 
the central state weaker, giving much more 
room to organised rivals to emerge as more 
important actors than the state.
In the DRC, a study we led for the 
OECD estimated that as of 2008, 146 parallel 
management units established with donor 
funds could be observed. In Afghanistan, 
research suggested that the problem of the 
dual public sector in aid delivery could be 
overcome through setting up “dual-control 
oversight mechanisms” that could reduce 
corruption and still ensure resources 
flow through the state. The Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund, which was World 
Bank-funded, seemed to play this role. The 
ARTF allowed donors to put their money 
into a pooled bank account subject to certain 
minimum fiduciary oversight (OECD 2010).
The third concerns the high levels of 
project aid which wind up “off-budget”, 
that is, not reported to finance ministries. 
In most of the cases studied, nearly two-
thirds of aid was project aid, most of which 
was not “on-budget”. This exacerbated 
problems of macroeconomic planning and 
the coordination of aid. The problem of 
“off-budget” aid is of most concern for very 
fragile states that have yet to build sound fiscal 
systems such as the DRC and Afghanistan. In 
the latter, our research suggested that one 
important mechanism to avoid off-budget 
aid is the sector-wide approach (SWAp) 
where donors pool funds to be applied to 
an integrated sectoral programme designed 
by the government (OECD 2010).  
The most positive experience of aid’s 
contribution to enhancing developmental 
outcomes have not surprisingly been 
where states have a clear development 
plan and the capacity to “manage” foreign 
donors. Historically, this was underlined 
by the experience of Taiwan and South 
Korea (Wade 1990; Amsden 1989). In our 
comparative research on economic resource 
mobilisation three of the countries had a 
long-term development plan: “Vision 2020” 
in Rwanda, “Development Vision 2025” 
in Tanzania and “Vision 2030” in Zambia 
(Hesselbein and Garrett 2009; Hesselbein 
2010). In undertaking research both among 
government officials in the capital but also 
those outside and among business actors, the 
striking difference was that in Rwanda the 
plan was known chapter and verse whereas 
elsewhere there was only a vague knowledge 
of such plans (Hesselbein and Garrett 2009).
Supporting transformational 
development coalitions
Just as political organisation appears to have 
been decisive in steering a state from fragility 
to resilience, so too it is crucial to moves from 
fragility and resilience to development. The 
push for development requires a shift in 
patterns of investment where those who hold 
wealth and who have enjoyed privileged access 
to the means to make it and to sites of political 
decision making, begin to invest in more risky 
but potentially more lucrative productivity-
enhancing enterprise. It means also that 
those who have anchored their livelihoods 
in subsistence production need increasingly 
to work for wages and compete for jobs 
requiring often uprooting themselves or their 
families from communities, and acquiring 
the education and skills necessary to secure 
employment. There are new opportunities for 
both elites and non-elites, but also great risks. 
The coalitions of interest that have solidified 
around arrangements that have secured state 
resilience usually need to be disrupted. In 
Zambia, UNIP and later the CMD, and in 
Tanzania, the CCM, have built organisations 
within the state that have secured stability 
but entrenched interests (Di John 2010a; 
Putzel and Lindemann 2011). Even the 
disruptive processes of economic and political 
liberalisation have not undermined the main 
parameters of elite access to the means for 
wealth and political decision making.
Commonly, elites enjoying privileged 
access to income streams and political 
decision making have moved toward more 
risky patterns of investment and economic 
transformation only when they were 
confronted with threats. This is perhaps why 
it is not so surprising that among our case-
study countries the clearest evidence of the 
crafting of a political settlement amenable 
to accelerated development has emerged in 
Rwanda (Hesselbein 2011). There the RPF 
emerged out of a minority community from 
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among survivors of the genocide in 1994, and 
families that had been forced into exile during 
long periods of exclusion and repression. 
They have a keen sense that in order to 
survive they must succeed in delivering 
developmental progress (Golooba-Mutebi 
2008b; Putzel and Golooba-Mutebi 2009). 
Elites have supported the establishment of a 
centralised political organisation subjected 
to little political competition, and a state with 
significant powers and increasing capacities to 
govern the economy because the alternatives 
are so stark.
Often where governments have emerged 
with the singular authority to influence the 
direction of development – that is, with 
powerful executive authority – that power has 
been abused. In the history of the countries 
we studied we have seen this pattern in the 
DRC (Hesselbein 2007; Putzel et al. 2008), 
Rwanda and Uganda (Golooba-Mutebi 
2008a, 2008b), but many more examples 
among late-developing countries can be 
observed. The endowment of a state with an 
executive authority with real power to impose 
positive and negative incentives on elites and 
non-elites has to be accompanied by checks 
against the abuse of executive authority. The 
executive powers a state requires to achieve 
resilience, as we have seen, are difficult 
enough to secure. Considerably more 
authority and especially capacity is required to 
endow an executive authority with the means 
to promote more rapid capital accumulation 
in developmental and socially beneficial 
directions.  This makes the likelihood of such 
“developmental states” rare. Foreign actors 
can do little to bring about the rise of such a 
state, but should be at least able to recognise 
and support embryonic developmental states 
when conditions have given rise to them, as 
may be the case in Rwanda.
However, development coalitions may 
emerge more incrementally, as the reformist 
movements around mayors formed in two 
cities in Colombia discussed above illustrate 
(Gutiérrez et al. 2009). Similarly, alliances may 
be formed that can advance developmental 
progress in particular sectors of the economy, 
as we noted in the historical case of coffee in 
Colombia, or within particular departments of 
the central or local state, as can be potentially 
seen in even in the most fragile situations – 
around the Ministry of Finance in the early 
days of the Karzai regime in Afghanistan or 
the Health Ministry in Uganda during the 
fight against HIV/AIDS in the late 1980s 
(Putzel 2006). 
Most experiences of accelerated 
development have required an activist state, 
not directly running operations within an 
economy, but working through positive 
and negative incentives to shepherd private 
investment towards the most promising and 
most productive activities. We could see 
this in the comparative study of mining in 
Rwanda on the one hand and in Zambia 
and Tanzania on the other discussed above. 
External actors tend to uniformly recoil in the 
face of such active state management of the 
economy (Putzel and Golooba-Mutebi 2009), 
where instead they should support states to 
develop the capacity to intervene intelligently 
in developing sectoral priorities and using 
taxation and other administrative measures 
to steer investment. This also requires an 
understanding that such activist states need 
to be given the room to make mistakes, or to 
pursue strategies that may in the first instance 
prove unsuccessful. 
Like in the struggle to achieve basic state 
resilience, the kinds of political settlements 
and patterns of political organisation that 
can preside over accelerated processes of 
development may appear less than fully 
democratic – as in Rwanda today, or (at least 
for its first ten years) the NRM “no party 
democracy” in Uganda. What matters more 
than the formal rules of democracy are the 
checks on abuse of executive authority and 
the mechanisms within the state and reigning 
political organisations that ensure inclusive 
developmental outcomes. External actors in 
Rwanda have demonstrated that it is possible 
to provide extensive support for a less than 
democratic but developmental regime while 
keeping up pressure for increased political 
freedoms (Putzel and Golooba-Mutebi 
2009). They have to be ready to endorse 
developmental movements from below as 
well, but to do so they need an analytical 
lens which can recognise such movements 
when they emerge.
What matters more 
than the formal 
rules of democracy 
are the checks on 
abuse of executive 
authority and the 
mechanisms within 
the state and reigning 
political organisations 
that ensure inclusive 
developmental 
outcomes. 
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Policy implications
1. Ensuring that resource-extractive 
industries contribute to wider developmental 
patterns through revenues generated and 
processing operations established, requires 
an activist state. This does not mean that 
a state must run the operation of mines or 
even maintain ownership of the land in which 
they are located, but it must have the capacity 
within its revenue and licencing agencies 
and in its law-making bodies, to design and 
implement sectoral development plans that 
ensure the contribution of such industries to 
the creation of infrastructure, the emergence 
of processing activities and the development 
of skills among workers in the sector. In the 
face of political arrangements, which block 
the development of a resource sector, the 
answer is seldom likely to be the wholesale 
withdrawal of the state from intervention 
within the sector.
2. The successful management of 
resource-extractive industries is most 
likely to happen in states that consolidate 
a national development coalition before 
the exploitation of resources begin. In 
Botswana and more tentatively in Rwanda the 
effective regulation of mining was in no small 
part due to the fact that developmentally 
oriented coalitions were in power when 
mineral extraction began. At the very 
least, this should mean that the first step in 
assistance to a country, which is engaging 
with international or domestic business to 
undertake exploration for minerals, fossil 
fuels or any other natural resource, should be 
the creation of knowledge, skills and agencies 
within the state capable of both bargaining 
with and regulating private investors.
 
3. Sustainable employment creation and 
poverty reduction in rural areas requires 
the development of effective organisations 
where the focus is on developing production 
strategies. As discussed in the example of the 
Colombian National Coffee Federation and 
in Rwanda, pockets of growth can emerge 
incrementally and these “islands of success” 
can form the basis of development projects. 
This approach is likely to yield greater success 
than “big push” macroeconomic reforms 
often advocated by international actors. The 
challenge will remain to replicate advances 
in single sectors to other sectors within 
agriculture and industry.
 
4. Taxation and tax reform can be deployed 
to promote investment in lines of production 
with good potential for growth. Tax allows 
governments to secure the revenues needed 
for social programmes and public investments. 
Taxation is also one of the central mechanisms 
that binds states to their citizens, and it can 
be organised both as a means to increase 
public accountability but also a nexus for 
political organising in society. Expanding the 
tax base geographically and sectorally can help 
to embed the state in society and revenue 
expenditure by the state is one of the principal 
means to meet societal demands.
5. Aid needs to be channelled through 
the agencies of the state and it should 
give due priority to developing the core 
capacities of the state to govern economic 
development. There is always a risk that 
aid can decrease incentives for expanding 
domestic revenue collection, so donors need 
to give due consideration to mechanisms 
that increase the capacity of states to raise 
their own finances. Aid channelled outside 
state systems or “off-budget” can contribute 
to the creation of a “dual public authority”, 
thus weakening states over time as the centre 
for decision making, in favour of potentially 
rival networks of patronage.
6. Developmental coalitions may emerge 
in less than democratic ways, or only 
within particular tiers or organisations 
of the state, but if they are inclusive 
and incorporate measures to check the 
abuse of executive authority they deserve 
the support of external actors. Political 
settlements and the elite bargains at their 
centre, which are capable of steering a course 
through the conflictual processes that may 
lift a government out of resilient stagnation, 
arise only rarely and are largely a matter of 
internal politics. External actors need to be 
able to recognise them and support them 
even when they are organised along lines 
that fall short of the standards of modern 
liberal democracies.
 
Aid channelled 
outside state systems 
or “off-budget” can 
contribute to the 
creation of a “dual 
public authority”, thus 
weakening states over 
time as the centre for 
decision making, in 
favour of potentially 
rival networks 
of patronage.
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